The unity of phaedrus by Hanno, Tomoko
Durham E-Theses
The unity of phaedrus
Hanno, Tomoko
How to cite:
Hanno, Tomoko (2005) The unity of phaedrus, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham
E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2352/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
Dissertation 
The unity of Phaedrus 
Reconsidered 
A copyright of this thesis rests 
with the author. No quotation 
from it should be published 
without his prior written consent 
and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
Department: 
Classics and Ancient History 
Student: 
Tomoko Hanno 
(Ustinov College) 
M.A. by research 
Words: 43580 
Submitted in 2005 
15 MAR 2006 
. , 
Declaration 
This dissertation is the results of my own work. 
Material from the published or unpublished work of others, which is referred to in the 
dissertation, is credited to the author in question in the text. 
Tomoko Hanno 
Abstract 
My dissertation will discuss the whole argument of Plato's Phaedrus according to a 
particular approach I have adopted. This approach deals with three problems unique to 
this dialogue: (a) the subject of Phaedrus, (b) the influence of Phaedrus as the 
interlocutor and (c) the critique of written works. To solve these problems, I will divide 
the subject into four stages and examine each stage. Finally, the question ''what unites 
Phaedrus?" will be answered. 
There are four stages, each corresponding to a chapter. 
Chapter 2: (1) In the fust part ofthis dialogue, what is argued? 
Chapter 3: (2) In the second part of this dialogue, what is argued? 
Chapter 4: (3) How do the characters converse on those topics? 
Chapter 5: ( 4) What does the author, Plato, intend to express by writing this 
dialogue? 
Chapters 2 and 3 will discuss problem (a), chapter 4 is on problem (b) and chapter 5 
is on (c). As the arguments proceed through its stages, I think we may acquire the more 
comprehensive and transcendental view: the view of the author. 
Through this dissertation, we shall seem to understand the main subject: that the 
best kind of companionship (the aspect of love) consists in inquiring into truth by 
engaging in logos (the aspect of rhetoric) [from chs.2 and 3]. And what Plato wants to 
tell us by writing this dialogue is to show a picture of a philosopher which Plato regards 
as true [ ch.4] and to attempt to provoke us the readers, in order to encourage us to 
practise this activity in the way that Socrates does [ ch.5]. As we leave the dialogue, we 
are supposed to embark on philosophical search for ourselves. 
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1. Introduction 
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This dissertation will deal with Phaedrus, which is one of the most important works 
of Plato and is located in the middle period. I would like to focus on the question: 
what unites this dialogue. In other words, I will consider "what does Plato express by 
writing this dialogue?" But, first, let us offer a general account of this work. The 
Phaedrus has two characters: Socrates and Phaedrus (the title is named after this 
interlocutor). Just as in most of all Plato ' s dialogues, Socrates is the main speaker of 
this dialogue. In the beginning, he bumps into Phaedrus with Lysias' speech on love. 
Thus, first, they seem to concentrate on love; especially Socrates gives a splendid 
speech about ideal love as his second speech. But, after finishing the speeches, 
Phaedrus suggests a question about the criterion of wonderful speeches. Then the 
discussion on speaking (rhetoric) starts. Therefore, generally speaking, the former part 
of this dialogue is about love and discussed by relatively long speeches, but the latter 
part is concerned with rhetoric with short conversation. In addition to the variety of 
subjects and styles, we might notice plenty of Platonic ideas: the three parts of soul, 
recollection, beauty itself (the Idea or Form) and dialectical methods (Collection and 
Division). 
Now, let us ask the question again: ' 'what does Plato want to tell us?" As we have 
seen from the general survey offered here, the many subjects and styles and variety of 
Platonic ideas prevent us from focusing on any single way of approaching the 
Phaedrus. However, this question seems to be more difficult to solve because of the 
use of dialogue form. For, there seem to be commonly three crucial problems with 
reading Plato ' s dialogues: the absence of the author, the conversation form and the 
characters ' diversity. Now, let us examine these three features. 
The first difficulty is the absence of Plato from his dialogues 1. Instead of him, 
Socrates is usually the main speaker. Thus, we often hesitate to say that some 
arguments are strictly ' 'what Plato asserts". What is more, because of the conversation 
form, every proposal is open to "yes" or "no" from the interlocutor (or interlocutors). 
1 There are two references to his name, in Apology (34A) and Phaedo (59B). But 
Plato never becomes a character who asserts his opinion in his dialogues. 
Thus, it may be open to doubt whether a statement is intended to be true if the 
interlocutor denies it. Finally, the third point makes the reading Plato's works more 
complex. I mean, the interlocutors of Plato's dialogues are full ofvariety, in respect of 
their ages, origins, occupations and interests. Plus, they respectively express their 
ideas, whether affirmative or negative, from their own point of view. Therefore, it 
seems important for us to identify the nature and tendencies of interlocutors, when a 
statement is conftrmed or denied. We have to take into consideration who affirms or 
denies it. Owing to these three problems, identifying true Plato's intention is highly 
problematic. Therefore, we seem to be not allowed to read through it in a simple way, 
as if his dialogue were a logical treatise. If we dare to take that way, we seem to risk 
being led toward the wrong interpretation. Thus, to sum up, a typical feature of all the 
problems in question is that the real argument of the dialogues is hard to identify. To 
put it another way, it urges us to search. 
We have other problems too that are unique to Phaedrus, which make us more 
perplexed. As we have seen from the general account of the dialogue offered here, we 
might easily discover a kind of complexity, especially in its subject. Secondly, we 
have to consider the interlocutor, Phaedrus, because he seems to have a great 
influence on the subject, argument and style. Thirdly, the most embarrassing feature is 
the critique ofwritten works. This is strongly asserted by Socrates at the end ofthis 
dialogue. But if we notice that this statement is written by Plato, this becomes still 
more contradictory and a more difficult problem to us. These three problems peculiar 
to Phaedrus might be clarified as the following: (a) the subject ofthis dialogue, (b) 
the influence ofthe interlocutor (Phaedrus) and (c) the criticism ofwriting. 
In addition to the first three general difficulties affecting the reading of Plato's 
dialogue, we have recognized that Phaedrus has three other problems. First of all, in 
the next section (1-2), I focus on the first problem, (a), briefly in order to illustrate the 
difficulty of interpreting this dialogue and to show the approaches of other 
commentators who have studied Phaedrus. And in 1-3, I will refer to the other two 
difficulties: (b), (c). Then fmally (1-4), I am going to suggest my approach to the 
interpretation of Phaedrus, which can deal with the original three difficulties and the 
three other problems peculiar to this dialogue. 
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This much I think you would say; that every speech should be put together like a living creature, as it 
were with a body of its own, so as not to lack either a head or feet, but to have both middle parts and 
extremities, so written as to fit both each other and the whole. (264cl-5i 
This seems to be one of the most famous passages in Phaedrus. The powerful 
statement that every speech should have an organic structure is necessarily 
appropriate for this dialogue itself. However actually it might be nearly impossible to 
fit this rule to it because of the complexity which we have considered before. For 
example, if we look for a "head" part, namely a part where its subject is defmed, or 
look for a relationship of corresponding to the limbs, namely its organic connection 
around a subject, we seem to be hardly able to identify these features. 
If Plato is to avoid a contradictory situation between what he does and what he 
says, it is natural to think that there is a unity of conception behind this dialogue. If 
we can find something that can unite Phaedrus, it might be easy to fmd out its organic 
structure. However this is one of the notorious problems of this dialogue. The 
problem may become clear from Hackforth's remarks (1952)8 that "it is not obvious, 
at a first reading, what its subject and purpose are, whether there are two or more, and 
if so how they are connected". Why is this problematic, and how can this problem be 
solved? 
First, in order to consider the cause of the problem, what appear to be the 
dialogue's subjects should be described. About these, de Vries (1969)22 gives the 
following summary of ancient opinions: 
Hermias has a list of bo~at tou GKonou of the dialogue. Some scholars had argued that it treated nEpt 
Epmto~, others 7tEpt pTJtOpi.KTJ~. One might hold that Epm~ was the subject of the first part, pTJTOPlKl'J of 
the second; one may also say that it treats 7tEpt 'lfUXLKTJ~ apXTJ~· Moreover it was held that there were 
several different GK01tOt., 7tEpt 'lfUXTJ~ being proposed, 7tEpt taya.Oou and 7tEpt tou npmtou KaAoU ..... He 
agrees with the opinion oflamblichus who held that the dialogue treats 7tEpt tou navtobanou KaAou. 
Thus, a great number of subjects in Phaedrus can be identified; namely Love, 
Rhetoric, Origin of soul, Soul, Good and Beauty. Moreover de Vries supplements this 
list by saying that "to those which are listed by Hermias may be added dialectic, 
diacritical method, mania and anamnesis" (p.22). The fact that these various subjects 
2 The translation of Phaedrus, as in what follows, is from Rowe (1986a). 
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exist in one dialogue makes it difficult to fmd the main subject. And this seems to be 
a cause of the impression of disorder in Phaedrus. 
Especially Love and Rhetoric seems to be more major subjects among them, as we 
have considered before (and as de Vries points out). Rowe (1986a)7 describes 
precisely this as "the chief task of any interpreter of Phaedrus", namely "to 
understand the powerful speech by Socrates on the nature of love, and the second, the 
larger part of which is occupied by a rather more prosaic discussion of rhetorical 
theory and practice". In brief, the more important topics should be focused on Love 
and Rhetoric; our task seems to be not only to decide which subject is suitable for the 
whole dialogue, but also to understand what relationship these subjects have. Now we 
can narrow this problem. The question should be asked in this following way. If there 
is one subject which can unite this dialogue, what is it, on Love, or Rhetoric, or a third 
topic? Moreover if one particular topic can be settled on, what relationship does it 
have with the other candidates? 
How can this problem be solved? To consider this question, Hackforth (1952)9 
proposes the following approach. He suggests that "it is helpful to ask for the purpose 
rather than the subject". And he shows three purposes in this dialogue. 
To vindicate the pursuit of philosophy, in the meaning given to that word by Socrates and Plato, as 
the true culture of the soul, by contrast with the false claims of contemporary rhetoric to provide that 
culture. 
This is one of the purposes which he thinks as most important. Hackforth seems to 
think that, through Phaedrus, Plato tried to encourage us to engage in philosophy. 
And he explains that this purpose "is present throughout, and is what gives the 
dialogue its unity". Thus he thinks what unites this dialogue is the purpose, namely 
philosophy, not a subject, for example Love, Rhetoric or other ones; "once this is 
seen ... by the reader, he will no longer think it necessary or helpful to ask whether the 
main subject is Love and Rhetoric."(p.9) 
I think that Heath ( 1989) interprets this dialogue very similarly to Hackforth. 
Heath seems to avoid thematic unity through any subject. Instead, he thinks "the 
criterion of appropriateness" (p.l70) important. He says "the various themes touched 
on ... should all be philosophically significant, that is, appropriate to the function or 
functions of the genre" (p.l73 ). 
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What is this "appropriateness"? He explains it by saying that "the themes touched 
on should correspond to the teaching-needs of the interlocutor or pupil" (p.l73). Thus 
he puts emphasis on the purpose of teaching philosophically, and he thinks any 
subjects should be required to achieve this aim. So he claims it is not necessary to fmd 
any single subject running through the dialogue. Rather he thinks "given Plato's 
conception of philosophical discourse it is the imposition of thematic unity which 
would in such circumstances amount to a violation of the dialogue's appropriate 
order" (p.l72). Therefore Heath's idea seems to be similar to Hackforth's: the purpose 
is more essential than the subject3• 
The way of uniting Phaedrus by its purpose appears to be really attractive. In this 
way, we may well think we do not need to struggle with the problem any more 
because we do not have to decide which subject is critical or what relationship the 
numerous subjects have. However it seems to be too fast to reach this decision. For 
there would be the following question left unsolved; namely is there any of Plato's 
dialogues that does not have the aim of encouraging us to philosophise? This 
purpose might apply to not only Phaedrus, but also to almost all Plato's dialogues. 
Thus even if we regard this purpose as the unifying facts of Phaedrus, the 
characteristic aspect of Phaedrus would never be brought to light. What does 
Phaedrus, whose subjects are mainly supposed to be love and rhetoric, tell us, 
specifically? 
Against this type of interpretation, Rowe (1989) seems to think that there is a key 
subject which can unite this dialogue, not a purpose. As I have said before, this 
dialogue has two parts, about love and rhetoric. But he clearly maintains that the "two 
parts can be said to form a single argument, which is itself a species of 'thematic' 
unity" (pp.l7 5·6). In order to fmd a method of uniting Phaedrus, he identifies "the 
place of Socrates' palinode" as the most difficult problem (p.l76). The 'palinode' is 
represented by Socrates' second speech, which describes lover and beloved in detail. 
3 Heath (1989) 164 remarks that "earlier treatments of the dialogue form do take a 
different view" from later Neo· Platonists. In other words, the Neo· Platonists think 
that "every text should have a single target, intention or theme, to which everything 
in the text could be related". Contrarily, Heath picks up Dio Chrysostom and offers 
Dio's positions: "if in the course of discussing one topic another topic suggests itself, 
then it is perfectly legitimate to pursue the new topic far beyond its bearing on the 
original theme, as a subject of discussion in its own right." In short, it might be that 
a speaker can choose any subjects, if it is useful for the audience from a philosophical 
viewpoint. This ancient interpretation is also the way uniting according to "purpose", 
as Hackforth and Heath do. 
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Thus, generally speaking, the earlier part including Socrates' second speech appears 
to be about Love. However Rowe regards Socrates' second speech as "relevant to the 
discussion about legein (logoi)" (p.l77). This is important. In short, he seems to focus 
on Rhetoric as the main subject of this dialogue. 
The outline of his idea is this. At first, he regards the palinode as something that 
has a dynamic role. Thus, if the palinode is considered only in the context ofthe first 
part, "it appears as rhetoric", however "its real status only emerges in the course of 
[the second part], which looks back and reflects on it". Therefore "the palinode will 
itself become, retrospectively, philosophical" (p.184 ). That is to say, the status of 
palinode changes as the argument proceeds and it is properly interpreted from the 
point of the second part of Phaedrus. 
If so, the theme of love in Phaedrus is never critical. Ultimately, Rowe asserts 
love is not the subject of even the frrst part. For he thinks that even in the frrst part 
Plato is concerned about "how things are to be said" (p.l88). What this means is that 
it is important how a subject is said, not what subject is discussed. So the whole frrst 
part is related with the latter part about legein, namely Rhetoric. Moreover Rowe says 
"we may regard this section (the first part ofthe Phaedrus) as a digression" (p.188). 
Putting the former part to gather with the latter part, he seems to think the subject of 
legein can completely unite the whole dialogue. 
This idea seems really powerful and convincing, but I am afraid that he thinks 
Love is less valuable than seems right. For there seems to be a critical reason why 
Plato chooses Love as a topic of this dialogue. The reason why I think so is a 
characteristic of Socrates. In Plato's dialogues Socrates can be often found as a lover. 
For example, in Charmides, Socrates frankly expresses his amazement at the beauty 
of Charmides. Thus it might be necessary to consider Socrates as a lover in order to 
understand this Phaedrus. 
As we have seen so far, we could understand that it is difficult to identify the 
subject which can unite this dialogue. In order to cope with this problem, I will 
present my way of interpreting this dialogue. And this way can be applied to the other 
two problems and the original difficulties which Plato's dialogues commonly have. 
Before introducing my approach (in 1-4), let us examine the other two problems 
briefly, in the next section. 
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In 1-1, I have suggested three special problems for the interpretation of this 
dialogue: (a) the subject of this dialogue, (b) the influence ofthe interlocutor 
(Phaedrus) and (c) the criticism of written speeches. And we have examined the first 
one, considering how other commentators cope with this problem. Then, in this 
section, the other difficulties will be introduced briefly. It will help to understand my 
approach as explained in the next section. 
The second problem, (b), is about the character, Phaedrus. If we put an emphasis 
on the style namely dialogue form, not only the speaker but also the interlocutor seem 
to play an important rule in the argument. Basically, Phaedrus is described as a person 
who loves beautiful speeches on any subject. He is eager to be concerned with 
producing speeches. He is inclined to believe famous people somewhat blindly. 
Especially, he sticks to the popular type of rhetoric (to which Lysias belongs), which 
is completely different from reformed rhetoric which Socrates strongly recommends. 
The presence of Phaedrus must be taken into consideration, because it is possible that 
his answers and his attitude may seriously affect (more exactly, distort) the process of 
Socrates ' argument. I will deal with this problem mainly in chapters 4 and 5. 
The third problem, (c), seems to be the most problematic of all. For, the author 
himself denies his activity: Plato criticizes writing, in a document written by himself. 
In Phaedrus, Socrates insists on the advantage of speaking, compared with writing, 
which is just an "amusement" or "reminder" (276B-E). But, it is the case that Plato 
writes down his thought. How should we deal this problem? This problem will be 
discussed in chapter 5. 
Now, we have recognized three problems unique to Phaedrus, and then in the next 
section, I will suggest the way of interpretation which can deal with these problems. 
And the approach I shall propose seems to be also suitable for the original problems 
of Plato' s dialogues: the absence ofthe author, the proposal open to ' yes ' or 'no ' , and 
the variety of interlocutors. As I have referred before, these difficulties can increase 
the uncertainty of any arguments which the characters state. In other words, it requires 
us to remember that every statement and argument in his dialogues might be judged 
by ourselves and reconsidered over and over again. This seems to have the same root 
as the criticism of writing, and it seem to be the core of Plato ' s thought. My approach 
which will be explained in the next section will clarify this idea. 
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In this section, I will suggest my approach to read through the dialogue. This way 
seems to be helpful in dealing with the three original problems which Plato's 
dialogues have, and the three problems peculiar to Phaedrus. I intend to develop my 
dissertation according to this approach. First, I try to divide this dialogue into the 
following four stages as the following: 
(1) In the first part ofthe dialogue, what is argued? 
(2) In the second part of the dialogue, what is argued? 
(3) How do the characters converse on those topics? 
(4) What does the author, Plato, intend to express by writing the dialogue? 
And each stage is corresponding to each chapter: (1) is chapter 2, (2) is chapter 3, 
(3) is chapter 4 and (4) is chapter 5. Stage (1) and (2) will deal with the arguments 
on love and rhetoric respectively. But in stage (3), we will focus on the characters 
who make the arguments. Then, in stage ( 4 ), concentrating on "writing", we will 
consider the view of Plato as the author. Thus this way of interpreting the dialogue 
enables us to acquire a more comprehensive and more transcendental view. Now, I 
would like to explain this approach more exactly. 
First, the argument of Love will be examined as stage ( 1) in chapter 2 of the 
dissertation. The first part of this dialogue mainly consists of three speeches on love. 
The most important speech seems to be Socrates' second speech, and there, love is 
defmed as a kind of mania (insanity). However, I will focus on the repeated 
conception "sophrosyne": true love seems to be more harmonious and well-organized 
for both a lover and a beloved. This love is as ideal as becoming like gods, nearly 
impossible for human beings. But it is clear that the man who is eager to come close 
to the ideal state with his beloved should be called a philosopher. 
Then, the inquiry proceeds to the next stage (2) about the second argument of this 
dialogue, which will be discussed in chapter 3. The subject seems to change from 
Love to Rhetoric. In chapter 3, it will be clear that the ideal rhetoric has two features: 
organizing the structure of a speech well and taking care for the listeners, for the 
purpose of pursuing truth most efficiently. And someone who possesses these 
conditions can be properly called a philosopher. Here, we may see that the concept of 
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philosophy provides a connection between love and rhetoric. So, what relationship do 
these subjects have? This is problem (a). 
As we have seen above, the discussion on love suggests the extremely ideal 
picture of companions: a true lover eagerly tries to proceed to truth and to urge his 
beloved to do so. But in the argument, it lacks a description of an actual way of doing 
this. How can we pursue truth with our true friends? It is possible to say that the 
discussion of rhetoric seems to supply the actual way to become ideal companions. In 
other words, the later argument might have a function of complementing the 
ambiguous and missing part of the earlier argument. Namely, both arguments are 
about philosophy, but the argument on love might suggest the unrealistic and ideal 
aspect, and the rhetorical part complements by offering the realistic and concrete way 
in which the ideal picture might come true. If we take this approach to the problem (a), 
the subject which unites this dialogue, it seems to be possible to answer that it is the 
ideal but realistic kind of companionship to pursue truth by using speeches (logos). 
The ideal picture of love converges with the activity of true rhetoric, but the core of 
the conception oflove stays alive as an ideal relationship with others. 
Thirdly, let us consider the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, as stage 
(3), which will be argued in chapter 4. At the same time, we can consider problem 
(b): the influence of Phaedrus as the interlocutor. If we focus on Phaedrus, we can 
recognize that he is very interested in rhetoric. At a glance, he will be able to be the 
best companion of Socrates, in respect of love of speeches. But it will be revealed that 
he seems to have an intrinsic preference for flowery and beautiful speeches and 
dependence on authority. Moreover, he does not hesitate to express his 
misunderstanding of what Socrates argues. Thanks to his failings, the argument often 
wanders, so that Socrates' way of speaking does not seem to be ideal one which 
Socrates has suggested, because of the lack ofwell-organized structure. However, 
Socrates tries to give speeches to Phaedrus in the most efficient way: he considers 
Phaedrus sincerely and attempts to convert him to philosophy. This attitude shows 
that Socrates' way of speaking seems to be best possible in this actual world. In other 
words, the vivid description of their conversation might show the realistic activity of 
Socrates as a philosopher. Thus, stage (3) presents us with a more realistic aspect than 
stage (2). 
Finally, we will examine Plato's critique ofwritten speeches as stage (4). This 
will be dealt with chapter 5 and this is related with problem (c): the criticism of 
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writing. This is the most embarrassing problem because this is naturally applied to the 
dialogue itself which Plato wrote. Compared with speaking, written works are 
regarded as just an "amusement" or "reminder", which does not require any serious 
attention. How do we understand this criticism? This problem seems to be deeply 
connected with the presence of Phaedrus: until the end of the dialogue, we cannot 
clearly judge whether he changes his mind to leave trivial rhetoric and decides to 
embark on research. In other words, in spite of the eagerness of Socrates to make 
Phaedrus convert to philosophy, there is no evidence that Phaedrus decides to engage 
in philosophy. Therefore, we are urged to ask ourselves: "Is Socrates' speaking to 
Phaedrus successful or not?" or "Are the arguments of this dialogue appropriate or 
not?". To put it another way, the dialogue itself turns to be a question to us. However, 
the dialogue keeps silent in response to any questions we ask. Thus, we have to start 
with the inquiry and the conversation by ourselves or with other readers, leaving the 
dialogue as just a "reminder". 
This is my approach to interpreting this dialogue, and the outline of my whole 
dissertation. As we have seen, this way seems to be suitable for three problems unique 
to Phaedrus and fmally, to cope with original problems which every use of Plato's 
dialogue form has. For, all of the difficulties seem to be useful for making every 
statement open to question. By using dialogue form with these features, Plato 
encourages readers to attempt to look for truth. 
According to the approach, the main arguments of this dissertation will be put 
forward. In the next chapter, let us go to the ftrst stage: the discussion of love. 
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2. About Love 
As we have seen in the Introduction, there seem to be two main themes in this 
dialogue: Love and Rhetoric. First of all, according to my approach, in this chapter 2 
let us inquire into Love in the first part of Phaedrus. The consideration will lead us to 
understand the true meaning of Love in Phaedrus, and help us to examine the 
discussion on rhetoric in the second part. 
The term which I translate as Love is eros. The word eros is defmed in the Greek-
English Lexicon as "love", mostly in the sense of sex and passion, or "desire". 
However these two concepts are not enough to understand eros in Plato ' s context, 
because he seems to give eros more positive meanings as well. Especially, in 
Phaedrus, eros appears to be both a good thing and a bad thing. For example, in some 
speeches, eros is thought of as a crucial evil; thus a lover is equivalent to a "sick" and 
"mad" person. By contrast, in another speech, eros is regarded as a blessing from the 
gods. More complicatedly, in the latter part of this dialogue, Socrates seems to think 
of these extremely different speeches as one speech, and admire the organic structure 
from the dialectical point of view. 
This drives us to ask a question: what kind of love does Plato regard as true Love 
in this dialogue? It seems to be extremely incomprehensible for the reader. 
For the purpose of answering this question, let us describe the Love of Phaedrus 
in detail concentrating on the first part of the dialogue, which is generally thought to 
be about Love. Especially, I shall focus on the three speeches on Love: Lysias ' speech 
(230e6-234c5) \Socrates' first speech (237b2-241dl) and Socrates' second speech 
(243e9-257b6). In spite of the contrasting definitions and different descriptions of 
Love in these speeches, the following examination will clarify the true character of 
Love. And then if we apply the clear vision of Love that here emerges in the latter 
part of Phaedrus, about Rhetoric, I think the image ofRhetoric will be more obvious. 
4 Lysias does not appear in this dialogue as a speaker, but he plays a very major role 
as "his (Plato's) main target" (Rowe(l986a)l38). Plato describes Lysias' works as 
kompseuo (to be smart) (227c7), asteios (charming) (dl) and demopheles (of public 
use) (d2). About these words, see de Vries(l969)37 ("as often in Plato, "asteioi" is not 
without irony"). The way he use these words seems to show that Plato does not 
approve ofLysias' speech in this dialogue. 
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My approach of this section will be like this: the three speeches about Love will 
be examined in turn. Lysias ' speech and Socrates ' first speech will be considered at 
the same time (2-2), because they start from the same proposition, namely that one 
should show affection to non-lovers because love is a bad thing. Then, Socrates ' 
second speech will be examined in detail (2-3, 2-4). It offers the divine aspect of Love 
and, as we will note later, the true image of Love (2-5). 
Through this approach, the concepts of"sophrosyne5" (temperance) and 
"madness" will come into focus ; for the contrast will make Lysias ' speech and 
Socrates' first speech easier to understand. Especially in Socrates ' second speech, 
Love is defmed as one of divine madness, and finally Love will emerge as implicitly a 
kind of "divine sophrosyne" which we seem to be able to achieve through divine 
madness. 
z;~tvl~i'l,f~!lflmtl:,:m;;allls 
We will begin by considering Lysias ' speech. Its subject is claimed to be that 
"favours should be granted to a man who is not in love rather than to one who is" 
(227c7-8). How does Lysias demonstrate this problematic statement? To solve this 
question, we have to make clear the idea of love which Lysias has. 
By and large, his speech appears to consist of fifteen arguments. A feature ofhis 
speech is the comparison between non-lovers and lovers. This is underlined by the 
repeated usage of men and de; namely Lysias refers to one party first, and then the 
other party, to distinguish non-lovers from lovers. And approximately half the 
arguments6 show that Lysias approves of non-lovers in comparison with lovers. 
It is useful to quote 231 a2-6 as a distinct example of what I have said; 
Those in love repent of the services they do when their desire ceases; there is no time appropriate for 
repentance for the others. For they render services with regard to their own capacity to render them, not 
under compulsion but of their own choosing, in the way in which they would best look after they own 
affairs. 
5 It is difficult to think ofthe appropriate English word for "sophrosyne" so I 
transliterate . (Sometimes, it is translated as "self-control" and "temperance".) 
6 There are six clear examples which I can confirm in Lysias' speech. Especially, 
232a1·232a4 seems to be an obvious case. 
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Here the contrast between lovers and non-lovers about their credibility will be 
clear. The reliability of the non-lovers can be thought of as something derived from 
their right judgement, not their desire as in the case ofthe lovers. But this is a feature 
to be considered later. Now let us turn to lovers, who are here characterized by 
"desire". The following quotation, from 231c7-d6, gives a more manifest image of 
lovers. More importantly, it will clearly show a fault oflovers and Lysias' concept of 
Love. 
What is more, how is it reasonable to give away such a thing to someone who has an aflliction of such 
a kind, which no person with experience of it would even try to avert? For they (lovers) themselves 
agree that they are sick (nosein) rather than in their right mind (sophronein), and that they know that 
they are out of their mind, but cannot control themselves; so how, when they come to their senses, 
could they approve ofthe decisions they make when in this condition? (231c7-d6) 
In short, there is a suggestion here that when they are "in their right mind", they 
regret their previous decisions which they made while they are in love. From this, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that Lysias' lovers think wrongly because of their desire. 
Lysias seems to regard this state as being "sick". 
On the other hand, how are non-lovers described? Let us consider the following 
sentence. 
But if you listen to me, in the first place I shall associate with you with an eye not to present pleasure, 
but to the benefit which is to come, because I am not overcome by love, but master of myself .... 
(233b6-cl) 
The speaker is represented as saying that he himself is not in love and he can 
control himself, which is referred to as an advantage of non-lovers. The important 
point to note is that he (the speaker) pretends not to fall in love with a beautiful boy, 
though he actually wants his favours. For the purpose of this speech is only to 
persuade a beautiful beloved to show affection to this speaker, as non-lover. He tries 
to do that to repeat his advantage towards his beloved, but he never expresses his 
desire to acquire the affection from the boy explicitly. If he tells of his love honestly, 
he must admit that he is the very lover who he himself regards harmful. 
Judging from the above, it seems difficult to distinguish lovers and non-lovers 
actually, but here let us make clear the concept which Lysias has in mind. Non-lovers' 
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self-control can be thought of as a kind of sophrosyne, which enables them to be self-
controlled and consider the future. By contrast, the lovers whom Lysias describes 
have opposite features; namely they think wrongly due to their desire and pursue 
temporary pleasure. 
Now let us turn to the first speech of Socrates. The reason why I deal with this 
speech at the same time as dealing with what Lysias' speech says, as I have said 
before, is that their starting-points seem to be equivalent. This remark of Phaedrus 
shows this idea clearly; 
For my part, I will believe like this; I will allow you to make it an assumption that the man in love is 
more sick than the man not in love. (236a6-bl) 
This assumption appears to be almost identical to Lysias' statement7• Obtaining 
this agreement with Phaedrus, Socrates begins his first speech reluctantly. So, their 
two speeches regard lovers as being sick. This will turn out to be clear from following 
considerations. 
Let us turn to the description of Love in Socrates' first speech in detail. At the 
beginning ofhis speech, the defmition of love is brought to light. First, he 
distinguishes "an inborn desire for pleasures" from "an acquired judgement which 
aims at the best" (237d7-9), which is able to rule and lead us. Then he says that when 
we are under the control of desire, we are in a state of "excess". On the other hand, 
when judgement rules us and makes us rational, this is said to be "restraint 
(sophrosyne)". Finally, he clearly defmes Love; 
The irrational desire which has gained control over judgement which urges a man towards the right, 
borne towards pleasure in beauty, and which is forcefully reinforced by the desires related to it in its 
pursuit of bodily beauty, overcoming them in its course, and takes its name from its very force---this is 
called love. (238b8-c4) 
Now this definition of Love8 presents the nature of lovers in this way: a lover can 
be defined as "the man who is ruled by desire and enslaved to pleasure" (238e2-3) 
7 The idea is repeated in the whole ofLysias' speech, but it is manifest at 231c7·d6 
cited before. 
8 Griswold (1986)63 refers to two features of Love (eros) in Socrates' first speech: 
'short·lived' and 'self-contradictory'. About the latter, he explains it by saying that 
"Eros is the desire for bodily beauty, but the lover prefers a beloved who is unmanly, 
14 
and "a sick man" (e4). This is deeply linked with a feature of love previously 
mentioned in Lysias' speech. As I said earlier, lovers whom Lysias describes are 
characterized by sickness. 
Though we can fmd the same term "sick" in both Lysias' and Socrates' first 
speech, does it have actually an equivalent meaning? The concept of Socrates' first 
speech seems to be a little different from Lysias' meaning. More exactly, it is more 
precise than Lysias' meaning. This can be seen from the following passage. It is a 
part of the argument which explains the unreliable character of lovers. 
When he ceases to be in love, he is untrustworthy for the future, for which he promised many things .... 
Now, when he should be paying what he owes, he changes in himself and adopts a different ruler and 
master, sense and sanity (sophrosyne), in place oflove and madness .... (240e8-9 ..... 241a2-4) 
The purpose of this passage is to make us think of the exact state of lovers in 
Socrates' first speech. From this citation, we may notice that it is said to be 
"madness", not just "sickness". Is the "madness" different from the "sickness"? If so, 
what is the implication of"madness"? To answer these questions, the lovers in both 
Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech have to be considered more carefully in the 
following two ways. 
To begin with let us examine a passage mentioned before. I cite the important part 
again; 
They (lovers) themselves agree that they are sick (nosein) rather than in their right mind (sophronein) 
and that they know that they are out of their mind, but cannot control themselves; (231c7-d6) 
Here we may notice the strange situation of lovers, which lovers agree that they 
know (eidenai) that they are out of mind. They admit that they go wrong under the 
influence of their desire. What makes this situation different from the situation in 
which someone does not notice that he himself is doing a wrong action or has a wrong 
attitude? The former situation seems to be worse than the latter because the man 
agrees and knows his licentious way of life. However he has no intention to put his 
life right and stop satisfying his desire. The very kind of man who makes his own life 
weak, and lacking in natural charm." Griswold (1986)48 finds this failing (self· 
contradictory) in Lysias' speech as well. 
15 
worse by himself would be regarded as being "mad", not just "sick". And the 
criticism of Socrates9 seems be directed at this fact10• 
Then how do they spend their life? As we have noticed, the lovers are defmed as 
people "ruled by desire and enslaved to pleasure". Socrates claims that this kind of 
person "will make the one he loves as pleasing to himself as possible" (238e3-4) 
because ''to a sick man anything which does not resist him is pleasant" ( e4-5). This 
attitude is described in detail according to the aspect of mind, body and estate (238E-
240A). For example, their harmful influence in the aspect of mind will be quoted; 
Necessarily, then, he will be jealous, and by keeping him from many other forms of association, of a 
beneficial kind, which would most make a man of him, he will be a cause of great harm to him; and the 
greatest harm he will cause will be by keeping him from that association from which his wisdom would 
be most increased. This is that divine thing, philosophy, from which the lover will necessarily keep his 
beloved far away, out of a dread of being despised; (239a8-b6) 
The lovers desire the beautiful boy and make him weaker and inferior, and never 
competent to outdo lovers in any area. This kind of attitude can be called a kind of 
madness. 
On the other hand, how about non-lovers who do not seem to suffer this miserable 
state? Lysias' speech gives many comments on them11 • Beforehand, the feature of 
non-lovers seems clearly to be as self-control from the passage (233b6-cl). However 
as I mentioned at that time, the man who shows the merit which non-lovers are 
supposed to have to a beautiful boy is just pretending not to be in love with him, since 
he actually wants a boy to show affection to him. Thus the reason why non-lovers 
insist on controlling themselves seems to be based on their self-interested thinking12• 
In this case, their sophrosyne appears just a means to acquire a beloved one. 
9 Lysias seems to imply that "madness" means losing control. Thus the concept of 
madness improves from the idea ofLysias' meaning, but not explicitly, to Socrates' 
definition. 
10 I do not know whether this mad man can exactly identify what is bad. However, if 
he does not understand that, he can notice that he is in wrong state. For example, if 
the sick person does not know the name of his illness, he can notice his bad condition. 
The problem here is not that he is ill, but that he ignores his illness, although he 
notices it. 
11 This consideration on non-lovers has to be limited to Lysias' speech; for there is no 
reference about non-lovers in Socrates' first speech. 
12 Griswold(1986)45 comments on the non-lover: "he is associated with calculation" 
and he repeatedly refers to "the importance of being self-interested." 
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Furthermore, although Lysias himself seems to understand this hidden fact, he 
cleverly conceals it. Lysias seems to make his speech look like serious advice for 
young men, but he is perhaps really showing his skill in advancing the paradoxical 
idea that non-lovers are more suitable than lovers. This intention of the author appears 
to be self-interested as well. 
It follows from what has been said that the non-lovers who are described in 
Lysias' speech may actually be equivalent to the lovers in Lysias' and Socrates ' frrst 
speech because they are in the same position: they understand what they actually are; 
in lovers ' case, they know that they think wrong and pursue beautiful boys physically, 
and then they intend to make boys weaker and inferior. They are just harmful to boys. 
And in non-lovers ' case, they pretend not to be in love with boys and display their 
"self-controlled" attitude to acquire the affection of boys. So as to give a name to this 
state, the meaning of madness in Socrates ' first speech should be recalled. It clearly 
shows the character of people who do not intend to correct their wrong way of life. 
The very term, madness, seems to be appropriate for the concept of Love mentioned 
in this section. 
a;t;:ntllll$,~~ -;;maa;;~~ 
In this section, let us look closely at Socrates' second speech. Here, what kind of 
Love can we fmd? What difference does it have from Love as previously defmed? 
Can it be regarded as the true image of Love? To answer these questions, the 
approaches to be taken here are: first, a defmition of Love in Socrates ' second speech, 
secondly an outline ofLove, and fmally a cause of the Love will be explained in turn. 
In the first place, a defmition of Love should be discussed. At a first glance, this 
question seems to be easy because Socrates clearly claims that Love in his second 
speech is ''the fourth kind of madness" (249d4-5). Again, we can fmd madness as a 
definition of Love; however it seems to be extremely different from the madness as 
Love to which Lysias ' and Socrates ' first speech have referred. 
In order to make this point clear, the precise meaning of madness and sophrosyne 
should be understood. These two concepts are evidently expressed in this passage: 
1l1e ancients testify to the fact that god-sent madness is a fmer thing than man-made sanity 
(sophrosyne). (244d4-5) 
17 
From this citation, we might expect that, in his second speech, sophrosyne is 
human, and madness is from the gods. What meaning do they have respectively? At 
all events the Love in Socrates' second speech seems to be referred to as one of "god-
sent madness". 
Before turning to a closer examination of Love as divine madness, a few remarks 
should be made concerning human sophrosyne. What is this sophrosyne? Does it 
seem to be the same as the contradictory self-control mentioned before? For the 
purpose of thinking about this, let us concentrate on the end part of Socrates' second 
speech. There, after enumerating the merits of true lovers, Socrates refers briefly to 
the demerits of non-lovers. 
The acquaintance of the non-lover, which is diluted with a merely mortal good sense (sophrosyne), 
dispensing miserly benefits of a mortal kind, engenders in the soul which is the object of its attachment 
a meanness which is praised by the majority as a virtue, and so will cause it to wallow mindlessly 
around and under the earth for nine thousand years. (256e4-257a2) 
From this passage, it seems that the mortal sophrosyne has a negative meaning. 
Especially "dispensing miserly benefits of a mortal kind" seems to be noteworthy 
because his phrase clearly reminds us ofthe previous sophrosyne as self-interested 
thinking. Thus it is allowed to say that this kind of sophrosyne can be called as 
"human (mortal) sophrosyne". 
Let us now return to the consideration of Love as one of madness from the gods. 
In his second speech, the statement that divine madness is better than human 
sophrosyne is repeated. In addition to the quotation of 244d4-5 above, we can see it in 
an explanation of three kinds of divine madness. These kinds of madness are briefly 
summarised by Rowe (1986a)l68: "the madness ofthe seer, of sufferers from an 
inherited curse, whose madness fmds a cure for their suffering, and of inspired poet"13• 
For example, Socrates expresses himself like this about the madness of the seer. 
13 In Socrates' second speech, divine madness is better than human sophrosyne. 
However, these three kinds of madness seem to be not worth much because poetry is 
referred simultaneously. This will be clear as the argument proceeds. 
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The prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona achieve much that is good for Greece when 
mad, both on a private and on a public level, whereas when sane (sophrosyne) they achieve little or 
nothing" (244a8-b3) 
Love in his second speech is such a kind of divine madness, one that comes as a 
blessing from gods. In fact, "such madness is given by the gods to allow us to achieve 
the greatest good fortune" (245b7-cl). Of course, it should also be added that this 
kind of madness has nothing similar to the previous madness in Lysias' and his first 
speech. Later, at 265A, these two kinds of madness are clearly distinguished: "the one 
caused by sickness of a human sort" and "the other coming about from a divinely 
caused reversal of our customary ways of behaving" (265a9-11 ). 
In the second place, let us turn to an outline of Love in his second speech. How is 
this kind of Love as one of divine madness described? The description ofLove begins 
with a long story about soul (246A-249D). Soul is portrayed vividly. Socrates depicts 
soul as ''the combined power of a winged team of horses and their charioteer" (246a 7) 
in both divine and human cases. In divine cases, the horses and the charioteer are 
good and of good origin. However, in human (and other living things') cases, the 
horses are both good and bad. It means that one of a pair is good horse and other is 
bad. But a more precise account of the horses will be given later. Now the point that 
needs to be emphasized is that it is "difficult and troublesome" (24 7b4) for the 
charioteer ofhuman soul to drive his horses because of the mixture. 
Then Socrates continues telling a story about the way souls travel. In the case of 
divine souls, because ''the chariots of the gods travel easily, being well-balanced and 
easily controlled" (247bl-3), they can proceed to outside without difficulty and stand 
on the back ofheaven, then look at the ''things outside the heaven" (247c2) 
completely. What are these ''things outside the heaven"? Socrates tries to give it an 
expression in this way: it means "being which really is" (247c7) outside the heaven, 
which seems to be "without colour or shape, intangible, observed by the steer man of 
the soul alone, for example, Justice itself, self-control (sophrosyne) and 
knowledge"(24 7 d6). 
On the other hand, in the case of human or other souls, even though they all are 
eager to try to observe the ''things outside the heaven", some barely succeed but not 
completely, others scarcely do it, stepping on and pushing each other; for it is highly 
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difficult to drive their horses whose characters are good and bad. In this conflict and 
confusion, "many souls are maimed, and many have their wings all broken" (248b3). 
Socrates describes the destiny of souls which cannot follow the travel of gods and 
observe the '"things outside the heaven" completely. They are assigned to enter a 
human body and a kind of way of life according to how much of the truth the soul 
saw
14
• Anyway because "a soul which has never seen the truth will not enter this 
(human) shape" (249b5-6), it is meant that any human soul has the natural capacity to 
contemplate the truth to a greater or lesser degree. 
The outline mentioned above has fmally made clear the concept of Love as divine 
madness. Socrates describes this kind of madness as follows. 
The madness of the man who, on seeing beauty here on earth, and being reminded of true beauty, 
becomes winged, and fluttering with eagerness to fly upwards, but unable to leave the ground, looking 
upwards like a bird, and taking no heed of the things below. (249d6-8) 
This passage says that lovers are passionate about remembering the truth, and this 
passion seems to make them forget everything and so be called "mad". Especially 
they are eager to remember Beauty itself (true beauty) through their senses. It means 
what is beautiful can be caught by their sight, because the beauty is "most evident and 
most loved" (250d7-el) and the visual sensation is '"the keenest" (250d3) among our 
senses. Thus, in the third place, the cause of Love seems to be beauty itself. 
However, we must note this condition of lovers. 
And these (souls), when they see some likeness of the things there, are driven out of their wits with 
amazement and lose control of themselves, though they do not know what has happened to them for 
Jack of clear perception.(250a6-b 1) 
The cause of Love is defmed as Beauty itself, but these lovers do not yet know 
this. As a result, though they do not know what attracts them strongly, they just long 
for and follow beautiful boys. This state will be considered soon. 
The whole general image of Love has now been made clear. Next we have to 
examine closely real features of lovers who are affected by this kind of Love. Then let 
14 According to the ordinance of Necessity, the souls which saw the truth most are 
ordered to become a seed "which will grow a man who will become a lover of wisdom 
(philosophos) and ofbeauty" (248d2·3) 
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us move to this question: what is the state of lovers when they catch sight of the 
beauty? Socrates explains the lover as ''the man who observed much of what was 
visible to him before" (251a2) and their extraordinary attitude when they see a 
beautiful shape, as if it were like a god. The unusual state of lovers can be represented 
by these two changes which that arise in lovers. First, the lovers feel fear. It is useful 
to quote this description: "(The lover) shudders and experiences something of the 
fears he had before, and then reveres it (a beautiful boy) like a god as he looks at it" 
(25la3-5). Then secondly, the wings oflovers' soul start to grow up: 
After he (a lover) has seen him (a beloved one), the expected change comes over him following the 
shuddering---- sweating and a high fever, for he is warmed by the reception of the eflluence of beauty 
through his eyes, which is the natural nourishment of his plumage. (251 b5-7) 
It amounts to saying that souls regain their wings because of their love, a kind of 
divine madness. Moreover the very wings presently enable us to come back to the 
heaven, where gods live. The return to heaven is regarded as the final end of every 
human soul. 
However, here we have to pay attention to the passage which explains that lovers 
in divine madness are described concretely. 
The entire soul, stung all over, goes mad with pain; but then remembering the boy with his beauty, it 
rejoices again. The mixture of both these states makes it despair at the strangeness of its condition, 
raging in its perplexity, and in its madness it can neither sleep at night nor keep still where it is by day, 
but runs wherever it thinks it will see the possessor of the beauty it longs for; and when it has seen him 
and channelled desire in to itself it releases what was pent up before, and fmding a breathing space it 
ceases from its stinging birth-pains, once more enjoying this for the moment as the sweetest pleasure. 
This it does not willingly give up, nor does it value anyone above the one with beauty, but quite forgets 
mother, brothers, friends, all together, not caring about the loss of his wealth through neglect, and with 
contempt for all the accepted standards of propriety and good taste in which it previously prided itself it 
is ready to act the part of a slave and sleep wherever it is allowed to do so, provided it is as close as 
possible to the object of its longing; (251 d5-a7) 
In this passage, we may notice that the lover's state is easily influenced by the 
presence of his beloved. Lovers long for the boy at any price. Can this state directly 
remind us of truth? Of course, they are eager to acquire beauty, but they do not know 
exactly what they try to obtain truly. Namely they seem to think that what they must 
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take is the beautiful beloved one, not the beauty itself perceived though this boy. 
Divine madness is rightly defmed as the enthusiasm for seeing the beauty itself. 
However here in addition to it, there seems to be other kind of enthusiasm, or to put it 
more exactly saying, a kind of confusion. How does this confusion give influence to 
recollection? 
For the purpose of considering this, let's start with a lover's attitude. As we 
noticed above, it is a lover who is scared at the cause of love, namely the Beauty itself. 
And the fact seems to urge the recovery of his wings. This frightened attitude is good 
evidence whether he is actually in Love or not15• This will be clarified by the 
comparison with the attitude of non-lovers who face a beautiful person; for Socrates 
depicts non-lovers who are not suffering from this kind offear at 250el-25lal; 
The man whose initiation was not recent, or who has been corrupted, does not move keenly from here 
to there, to beauty itself, when he observes its namesake here, so that he does not revere it when he 
looks at it, but surrendering himself to pleasure does his best to go on four feet like an animal and 
father offspring, and keeping close company with excess has no fear or shame in pursuing pleasure 
contrary to nature; 
The importance ofthe concept of fear cannot be overemphasized because without 
fear as first change, there seems to be no chance for the success for growing of wings. 
It means that he misses the great opportunity to go back to the heaven where the gods 
live, the truth exists and he originally lives. This seems to be miserable because it is 
natural and necessary for soul to be eager to live in "the plain of truth" where it can 
acquire ''the pasturage which is fitting for the best part of the soul" (248c6-7). 
The lovers who long for and follow beautiful boys appear to be close to this kind 
of people. Of course, they are different because the lover's attitude is caused by 
beauty itself, not simply their lusts. However I think that they are never unrelated 
because this kind of lover does not understand what it is they desire, so that they run 
15 Hackforth(1952)98 comments "What strikes us first is the initial stage, the 
shuddering awe (251A) which the holiness of the beauty inspires; it would seem that 
Plato finds the origin of spiritual love in that same "sense of the holy" in which some 
modern thinkers have found the origin of religion." 
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after beautiful boys themselves a bit blindly. That is to say, they appear to share some 
features of ordinary lovers and non-lovers 16. 
The concept of shame17 which is referred to with fear seems to be crucially 
important. As it will be shown in the next section, these both concepts are repeated 
many times through the process of loving. More importantly, it can give a hint 
towards an answer to the question; the relationship between the confused and 
miserable situation of lovers and their possibility of remembering truth and recovering 
of wings as divine madness. I think that the recovery of wings that occurs in souls 
might not be enough to be understood only by explaining the several changes 
explained before. Therefore in the next section, it is important to examine a state of 
soul in detail, so that the great role played by the concepts of fear and shame in the 
process of Love can be shown. 
24iLove as ~di~Jie ~(,pft;~o$Yne" 
In the previous section, as influences on lovers, we may notice the physical 
changes (warming up and sweating), the emotional changes (feeling fear and shame) 
and customary changes (forgetting everything but beauty). However the connection 
between these changes and recollection is not manifest. Namely the divine madness 
makes lovers remember truth, but in fact their attitude following the beautiful boy day 
in and day out seems to be so far from the image of one who pursues the truth. Thus I 
think that there is the missing process which connects the lovers longing for boys and 
the recovery of his wings. In order to fmd this missing part, in divine madness, we 
16 These lovers remind us "non·lovers" in Lysias' and Socrates' first speech. They 
pretend not to be lovers, although they are eager to acquire boys. In this case, they 
have no fear, but there is just desire of physical pleasure. 
17 It is noteworthy that a concept of shame is closely related to the fear from the 
quotation mentioned above. (For example, in Euthyphro, see "where there is shame 
there is also fear" (12b9). There is other examples 656E6·647A, 671C·D and 699C in 
Laws.) Especially the feature of the non·lover may be manifest in the contrast with 
an attitude of Socrates. At the beginning of his second speech, he explains the reason 
why he wants to recant his first speech. Socrates frankly expresses his anxiety to 
Phaedrus; namely, anxiety that his previous speech is "dreadful" (242d4) because he 
offends against Eros as "a god, or something divine" (242e2). As a result, Socrates 
tries to obtain the agreement of Phaedrus saying that "you see how shameless the 
speeches were" (243c1·2). At the same time, Socrates mentioned that someone whose 
character is gentle and noble would suppose to be listening to someone who never 
understands true kind of Love, so that the man thinks Socrates' previous speech as 
bad. Then Socrates makes a decision to restate a speech of Love "out of shame for 
what this man would think, and out offear of Love himself' (243d3·4) . 
23 
need to consider what happens to a soul which is described as a charioteer and his two 
horses. 
First, the description of soul should be clearly remembered. The soul is described 
as "the combined power of a winged team of horses and their charioteer" (246a7). 
The actual point is that human souls are considered as a mixture of good and bad. 
This is directly depicted in the characters of two horses: one good and one bad; 
The first of the two, which is on the nobler side, is erect in form and clean-limbed, high necked, nose 
somewhat hooked, white in colour, with black eyes, a lover of honour when joined with restraint and a 
sense of shame, and a companion oftrue glory, needing no whip, responding to the spoken command 
alone; the other is crooked in shape, gross, a random collection of parts, with a short, powerful neck, 
flat-nosed, black-skinned, grey-eyed, bloodshot, companion of excess and boastfulness, shaggy around 
the ears, deaf, hardly yielding to whip and goad together. (253d3-e5) 
What kind of action do these horses take when they see an appearance of a 
beloved one? Interestingly their attitudes are completely opposite: when a charioteer 
has a chance to look at his beloved, a good horse is "constrained by shame" (254a2) 
because it is obedient to his master. By contrast, a bad horse tries to rush at the boy by 
force because it "no longer takes notice of goading or the whip from the charioteer" 
(254a3-4). 
As I mentioned above, the rush forwards and withdrawal of lovers are described 
by the actions of two horses, the character of one of whom is sophrosyne, the other 
hubris (excess). In this case, two parts of the soul appear as hesitating to go forward to 
the beautiful boy, but the other part of soul drags them forcefully to the boy. It is 
manifest that the lovers' state of soul can be seen as a kind of confusion and conflict. 
This state seems readily connected with the situation of miserable lovers who 
wander around their boys because of the mixture of joy and pain. In this case, these 
two horses seem to be equal, or else the bad horse appears to be a bit stronger than 
good one. Therefore the soul is dragged closer to the beautiful boy all the time. This 
unruly power of the bad horse causes that the lovers to sigh for their lovers and their 
soul falls into utter confusion. 
When the bad horse drags the chariot to the beautiful one, the charioteer starts to 
remember beauty itself though his appearance more clearly. 
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As the charioteer sees it [the flashing ofbeloved's face], his memory is carried back to the nature of 
beauty, and again see it standing together with self-control (sophrosyne) on a holy pedestal. (254b5-6) 
The important point to note is the fact that sophrosyne is referred to along with 
beauty. So far, beauty has been treated as something special among the Forms 
because only beauty can be seen though our senses so that it causes the one seeing to 
feel fear as the first change of Love. But now, it appears that both beauty and 
sophrosyne can be remembered. What is this sophrosyne? And what does it have to 
do with Love? 
To answer these questions, let us consider the passage which succeeds the one 
above. When the charioteer sees the beloved one close by him, "he becomes 
frightened, and in sudden reverence falls on his back" (254b7-8). It is important to 
pay attention to the concepts of fear and reverence (shame) appearing at the same time 
in his attitude here. In the previous section, these concepts were expected to be 
regarded as something essential as considerations of lovers. What is more, these 
concepts can be recognized in the action ofhis horses. When the charioteer is 
surprised at the beauty ofthe beloved one and pulls back his reins, his good horse 
tends to follow the charioteer willingly and "drenches the whole soul with sweat from 
shame and alarm" (254c4-5). However, the bad one will try to go against the 
instruction of his charioteer, and encourage him to go forward to the beloved 
"shamelessly" ( d7). 
In this way the bad horse pulls the chariot to his beloved one against the charioteer 
and white horse's desire, but fmally it surrenders itself to its charioteer. This scene is 
described like this; 
When the same thing happens to the evil horse many times, and it ceases from it excesses, now 
humbled it allows the charioteer with his foresight to lead, and when it sees the boy in his beauty, it 
nearly dies with fright; and the result is that now the soul of the lover follows the beloved in reverence 
and awe. (254e5-255al) 
This black horse which used to act forcefully against the charioteer now seems to 
follow him; thus every part of soul, the charioteer and his team of horses seem to have 
a same intention and attitude. In this case, the soul has a kind ofharmony, in which 
the charioteer rules his horses without difficulty. This harmonious state is really 
different from the confusion and conflict which the soul of the lover experienced 
25 
when it saw its beloved. For in that case, the bad horse has the power to drag, but 
now the bad horse is strictly ruled. Thus, in this harmonious situation, lovers do not 
seem to long for and wander around the beautiful boy. And they are eager to proceed 
to truth with this boy. To consider this harmony in detail, it is helpful to note 
"reverence and awe" cited in the above passage. 
These two concepts, fear (awe) and shame (reverence), are repeated in the passage 
about the lovers' approach to the beloved one; for example, when a charioteer catches 
sight of his beloved, as I mentioned before, he stands in awe and feels reverence. 
After the frightened charioteer pulls back his reins, his good horse feels shame about 
his approach to the beloved, but his bad horse resists and forces the charioteer to go 
close to the beloved again. However, at last, the bad horse becomes obedient and the 
charioteer feels reverence and fear toward the beauty of beloved unimpededly. 
For reasons mentioned above, the very man who can feel awe and fear before the 
beauty of the beloved is regarded as being able to create in himself the united 
condition of soul, namely harmony. This will remind us ofthe previous idea, 
according to which feeling fear is good evidence for deciding whether one is actually 
in love or not. 
In order to make clear the harmonious state of soul, let us consider the passage 
about a case in which a charioteer succeeds in controlling a bad horse, this passage 
may be the most important part of the whole argument of Love; 
If the better elements of their minds get the upper hand by drawing them to a well-ordered life, and to 
philosophy, they pass their life here in blessedness and harmony, masters of themselves and orderly in 
their behaviour, having enslaved that part through which evil attempted to enter the soul, and freed that 
part through which goodness enters it; and have won the first of their of their three submissions in these, 
the true Olympic game--- and neither human sanitv (sophrosyne) nor divine madness has any greater 
good to offer a man than this.(256a7-b7) 
What is immediately apparent in this passage is the repeated reference to a 
concept of harmony: "well-ordered life", "blessedness and harmony", "masters of 
themselves" and "orderly in their behaviour" because of the enslavement ofthe evil 
part of the soul, the bad horse. A lover whose soul is harmonious seems to live 
happily and in an orderly way, and "when they die they finally become winged and 
light". Here the process of re-growing wings appears to be explained well. It is 
important to notice the process the lover associates with his beloved. The lover does 
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not intend to follow his beloved and acquire the body due to his desire. Rather he 
seems to think of his beloved as the important one because he reminds him of truth, 
namely of beauty itsel:f 8• Thus it can be said that this lover is aware somehow of what 
he loves truly, namely the beauty itself perceived though the beautiful boy. 
On the contrary, how about lovers who fail to become harmonious? Socrates 
refers this kind of lovers as people who are "devoted not to wisdom but to honour" 
(256b7-cl). They cannot rule their bad horses sufficiently, so that their soul remains 
confused. Thus their soul has to leave their body without wings. However they are 
very close to ideal lovers: in the near future they are able to regain their wings as "no 
small reward for their lover's madness" (256d5-6). They can be said to be second-best 
lovers because they are not philosophers, but philotimoi. It is they who are described 
as lovers longing for their beloved all along, as mentioned before. 
By comparison with these second-best lovers, the important role of harmony can 
be seen evidently. In the previous section, the connection between the attitude of 
lovers as divine madness and the recovery of their wings has not seemed altogether 
clear. However, now the concept of control or harmony reached through fear and 
shame seems to throw light on this connection. Thus, this harmony seems to be the 
very requirement to win the genuine reward for Love. 
Now three crucial points can be reached. First, is the state of control and harmony 
the same as divine madness? As we have examined this state, the lover regards only 
his beloved as valuable for him, and he forgets everything but the boy, for example, 
his family, his friends and his property. In this case, his soul is just wandering around 
in pursuit of his beloved because he does not know what he has to acquire exactly: 
the beautiful boy or something beautiful. It seems to be impossible to fmd any 
resemblance between this situation of Love and the Love of control and harmony 
mentioned above. This difference can be clearly found in the quotation above. The 
relevant part is this. 
Neither human sanity (sophrosyne) nor divine madness has any greater good to offer a man than this. 
18 Griswold (1986) 134 thinks that the state of sophrosyne "depends on continually 
renewed recollection." I agree with him, because one must continue to perceive the 
beauty through the boy, feeling fear and shame to become true lovers. This is the 
feature of true lovers, it is very difficult, though. 
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This sentence clarifies the possibility that there is something greater than human 
sanity and divine madness. "This" means that "winning the first of their three 
submissions in these, the true Olympic games", namely "becoming winged and light" 
after the death, which the harmonious life makes possible. This harmonious and well-
ordered way of life can be thought of as the true Love, which should be clearly 
distinguished from the Love referred to as just divine madness. For this state avoids 
the miserable state of confusion. 
Secondly, this harmonious state of soul looks extremely similar to that of the 
divine soul. As we have mentioned, all divine soul is good and of good origin. It 
means that every part of soul is good so that the charioteer easily controls his horses. 
The harmonious soul of lovers seems to bear a close resemblance to the divine soul; 
for the charioteer of this soul drives his chariot with little difficulty because his bad 
horse has become obedient to him. This idea gives substance to that of"becoming like 
god" in Phaedrus (252el-253c6). But this is an idea which we shall examine in the 
next section. 
Finally, this well-ordered and harmonious life of lovers is clearly referred as 
"philosophical" in the passage: "the better elements of their minds get the upper hand 
by drawing them to a well-ordered life, and to philosophy". Here it is useful to quote 
the argument about the philosopher. 
It is with justice that only the mind of the philosopher becomes winged; for so far as it can it is close, 
through memory, to those things his closeness to which gives a god his divinity. Thus if a man uses 
such reminders rightly. being continually initiated in perfect mysteries, he alone through that initiation 
achieves real perfection" (249c4-8) 
As above, the very Love whose feature is harmony and control seems to enable a 
soul to grow its wings again. And now it is a philosopher who can acquire his wings. 
This clearly shows the deep relationship between a philosopher and a lover. "A man 
uses such reminders rightly" seems to imply that a philosopher is also regarded as a 
lover who acquires the united state of soul and his wings, by remembering Beauty 
itselfthrough the beauty of beloved one. 
To conclude this section, the state in question should be distinguished from those 
confused lovers who are eager to acquire both the body and beauty itself, which is 
caused by divine madness. In order to give it a proper name, let us remember the 
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previous argument about sophrosyne (254b5-6). In the discussion, we have confirmed 
that when a lover comes closer to the beauty of a beloved one, the charioteer of his 
soul remembers not only Beauty itself, but also sophrosyne. And fmally, his whole 
soul acquires the character of harmony and control, so that he can stay with his 
beloved with awe and reverence. It enables him (and his beloved) to spend a 
harmonious and well-ordered life and then to recover their wings. Thus this concept 
of harmony and order is deeply related to sophrosyne. 
However, of course, this kind of sophrosyne should be clearly distinguished from 
the "mortal (human) sophrosyne" considered in 2-219. Finally, it seems to be possible 
to call the Love "divine sophrosyne", which has "divine madness"20 as its beginning. 
It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that Love in Socrates' second 
speech can be called "divine sophrosyne"21 • 
~~~tif~eJlfi!ill!9~$~~1,.ilf~ in JrJJtl il~us 
In the previous section, the Love in Socrates' second speech has turned out to be 
"divine sophrosyne" and it has a high possibility of being regarded as the true image 
of Love in Phaedrus because of its greatness and superiority. However, the real state 
of divine sophrosyne has not yet become clarified. I mean when the state of soul 
acquires "divine sophrosyne", what kind of life does the man himself lead in this 
world? Namely what action or attitude does this divine sophrosyne make him choose? 
19 North (1966)176·7 refers to Phaedrus as "the most important dialogue to think of 
sophrosyne'. For in this dialogue, we can admit "its ambiguous attitude towards this 
excellence". In Socrates' first speech, sophrosyneis regarded as "the conventional 
superiority" of sanity, but in his second speech, the kind of sanity is "disparaged" and 
"Socrates eulogizes eros as a form of Divine madness infinitely superior to mere 
human rationality"(p.178). 
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"As it is the greatest of goods come to us through madness, provided that it is 
bestowed by divine gift" (244a6·8). The "through (dia)" shows that we can reach the 
greatest of goods through (or by way o:O madness. In other words, it seems to be 
possible to point out that there is something beyond the madness. The term as 
"divine sophrosyne' is found in Sophrosyne written by North(1966) 179, but she 
means the sophrosyne as one of the Forms. 
2 1 Griswold (1986)75 points "the complicated status of sophrosyne' in Socrates' second 
speech. We can find two kinds of sophrosyne: One is "mortal sophrosyne' which is 
"defined in a utilitarian way" and the other is "divine sophrosyne'. And he thinks 
"divine erotic madness and divine sophrosyne are to be united in the successful 
experience of love." Thus he concludes with "the philosopher is somehow the 
synthesis of lover and non·lover." 
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To answer this question, first the general state of divine sophrosyne should be 
examined more clearly. From the previous section, it is clear a charioteer has the 
greatest power to rule his horses. And this state leads to a harmonious and well-
ordered life. However, what does the simile of the charioteer and his horses refer to? 
Namely, what are the parts or aspects they represent? 
It seems to be relatively easy to begin to answer this question. When we turn to 
Plato's Republic 4, three parts of soul are well examined there: "reason", "spirit" and 
"appetite". To begin with, reason and appetite are divided; 
We will call the part of the soul with which it calculates the rational part and the part with which lusts, 
hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other appetites the irrational appetitive part, companion of certain 
indulgences and pleasures. (439Di2 
And then the spirited part is distinguished as a third part of soul. It is the part "by 
which we get angry" (439E) and this anger "sometimes makes war against the 
appetites, as one thing against another" ( 440A). And "in the civil war in the soul it 
aligns itself for more with the rational part" ( 440E). From this outline, we notice there 
is also a quite resemblance concerning the roles of parts of soul in Republic 4 and the 
charioteer and horses in Phaedrus: charioteer is representative of reason, a bad horse 
is appetite23 , and a good horse seems to take the charioteer's side24 . Thus it is possible 
to say that a charioteer and his two horses correspond with reason, spirit and appetite 
respectively. 
It is helpful to describe sophrosyne in Republic briefly before moving on to the 
main task in relation the general state of sophrosyne in Phaedrus. Sophrosyne in 
Republic is one of four cardinal virtues and is explained by different expressions; for 
example, "a kind of consonance and harmony" (430e3-4), "a kind of order, the 
mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires" ( 430e6-7) and "self-control" 
(430ell). The next passage seems to be especially noteworthy. 
22 The translation of Republic, as it is in what follows, is from G.M.A.Grube. 
23 Griswold (1986)96 comments, in Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech, "it is 
clear that their notion of eros is represented by the black horse alone." In addition, 
the presence of bad horse is a distinct feature being different from the soul of gods. 
Namely, the human soul can be good and bad. Thus, "rhetoric" is important subject 
in this dialogue. (cf. p.l34) 
24 A bad horse which "tends to pull the chariot and its occupant downwards" is 
"presumably the 'appetitive' part of the soul in the Republic; the other, noble, horse is 
the 'spirited' part, the 'ally' of the charioteer, the rational part." (Rowe(2003) 172) 
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---And is not he moderate (sophrosyne) because of the friendly and harmonious relations between 
these same parts, namely, when the ruler and the ruled believe in common that the rational part should 
rule and do not engage in civil war against it? 
---Moderation is surely nothing other than that, both in the city and in the individual" (442cl0-d2) 
It might appear that there is much in common between sophrosyne here and 
sophrosyne in Phaedrus. However we finish the comparison between sophrosyne in 
Republic and sophrosyne in the Phaedrus, let us turn to the situation of divine 
sophrosyne in Phaedrus. 
Now that the role of the three parts, charioteer and two horses, is clear, the general 
state of divine sophrosyne may be precisely understood. As we considered, a 
charioteer seems to represent reason, so that the fact that a charioteer has great power 
to control his horses means that reason can make the whole soul united 
"hierarchicallr5". Moreover, the team of horses is willing to follow his orders. In this 
case, a wish or intention of the charioteer will be carried out as the decision of the 
lover. 
What is a wish or intention of a charioteer, namely reason? To consider this 
question, let us refer to J.M.Cooper (1984)'s "Plato's theory ofhuman motivation". 
First, he thinks "Plato's theory that there are three parts is, roughly, the theory that 
there are three psychological determinants of choice and voluntary action" (p.5). 
Moreover, he interprets "on Plato's theory all three of the parts are independent 
sources of motivation" (p.5). It means ''there are desires of reason as well as bodily 
appetites and impulses of a spirited nature" (p.5). What kind of desire does he assign 
to reason? Cooper shows there are two major jobs of reason: to know the truth and to 
rule. This implies that there are two desires of reason: desire to know the truth and 
desire to rule. Especially, compared with appetite, reason is always regarded to select 
what is good based on what is best. For example, in thirst, ifthere is a conflict 
between "desire to preserve his health" and "desire to drink", the former should be 
selected because it is ''the consequence of a higher-order desire for good"(p.8). 
Namely, generally speaking, the desire of reason seems to be "desire for good". 
25 Griswold (1986)96, 135 refers to the unity of soul as "a hierarchical relationship to 
each other". And he comments that the unity of soul "derives from the successful 
pursuit of the goal desired by reason". And in this case, "the wholeness of a soul 
yoked by reason is not achieved by satisfying every desire of the soul"(p.94) 
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However what does it mean for reason to have such kind of desire? That reason has 
desire for good seems to reflect the fact that every human being is naturally supposed 
to desire to live a good life. 
The man who is in a state of divine sophrosyne seems to have the equivalent 
character mentioned above. Namely, it seems that he is never overcome by any 
appetitive desire so that he can always pursue what is good for him. This way of 
living is represented as a "life here in blessedness and harmony" (256a8-bl) in 
Socrates' second speech. 
The general state of a man who is in the state of divine sophrosyne is now clear. 
Next, his actual practice should be considered. What kind of action or attitude does he 
choose as good? Here what we must remember is the deep connection between true 
lovers and philosophers (256a7-b7 and 249c4-8, cited in the previous section). The 
close relationship seems to suggest what we should think of the real works of lovers: 
the question can be transformed into this question ''what does a philosopher engage 
. ?" m. 
Perhaps the question will be considered in the latter part of Phaedrus, and we 
shall focus on that in the following chapter. However, an answer to our question can 
be found by using the view of the relationship between Love and philosophy as a clue. 
The above should be considered in the argument "becoming like gods26" which is 
included in Socrates' second speech. Simply speaking, the argument mainly explains 
that "each man lives after the pattern of the god in whose chorus he was, honouring 
him by imitating him so far as he can" (252dl-2). The statement that each man 
follows his own god seems to very controversial, however it is possible to say that 
each man "proceeds in accordance with their god and seeks that their boy should be of 
26 Sedley (1999)309 comments that becoming like gods "is indeed a pivotal feature of 
Plato's thought." He finds this idea especially in Symposium and Theaetetus. He 
thinks "god perfectly embodies those standards (the standards for morality), and 
hence constitutes for human moral action not only its proper overseer but also the 
one perfect exemplar." Thus, becoming like gods means becoming morally good. (By 
contrast, Annas (1999)65 seems to think that becoming like gods is not becoming 
virtuous man, but trying to escape to heaven: "a religious or spiritual attitude than a 
moral one." Then, she puts emphasis on "the flight idea" (p.63) in Phaedrus.) 
However, Sedley regards Phaedrus as the dialogue which has "a very different 
ethical application ofthe homoiosis theoitheme" (p.315) because ofthe reference to 
individual gods (Zeus, Hera, Apollo ... ). He comments "the myth G.e. Socrates' second 
speech) has made it clear that all these different gods are alike guided by a complete 
grasp of the moral Forms" (p.315). But I think that Plato thinks that becoming like 
Zeus is exceptional because it enables us to become a philosopher. 
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the same nature, and when they acquire him, imitating the god themselves and 
persuading and disciplining their beloved" (253b4-6). 
It is noteworthy that "becoming like god" in the context of Love is not only the 
task of the lover himself but also the relationship between a lover and his beloved27• 
Namely not only does a lover try to imitate his god, but the lover too is eager to make 
his beloved be like his god, because he thinks that the beloved himself can give him a 
resource for imitating his god. We should especially concentrate on '"those who 
belong to Zeus" (252el), because the people seem to be philosophers referred in the 
ordinance ofNecessity, and more exactly they are the only true lovers. This will be 
clear from the following: 
Those who belong to Zeus seek that the one they love should be someone like Zeus in respect of his 
soul; so they look to see whether he is naturally disposed towards philosophy and towards leadership, 
and when they have found him and fall in love they do everything to make him of such a kind" (252el-
5). 
From this passage, it emerges that a man who belongs to Zeus intends to make his 
beloved a philosopher in addition to being a philosopher himself. And this is no doubt 
the real practice of a lover as possessor of divine sophrosyne. However, how does he 
do that? What makes his beloved become a philosopher? The concrete method does 
not seem to be clear because there is no reference to the way in the former part of 
Phaedrus, about Love. In other words, this part shows just an ideal kind of 
relationship, not describes how to establish the relationship actually. 
Before moving on to consider the real method, examined in the later part of the 
dialogue concerning rhetoric, this point deserves explicit emphasis: a true lover is a 
philosopher who both tries to improve his intellect and encourages his beloved to 
develop his philosophical ability. 
27 Griswold (1986)128·9 points out "the lover's search for himself must take place 
through his divinization of the beloved." And "the mirror like nature of the other's 
soul is indispensable if one is to see oneself." 
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3. About Rhetoric 
s!:It The tiulll~ll'iiJBi$~P:l!ltaf:tj~rtlff&llli~ri~ 
In this chapter, the second part of Phaedrus will be discussed. This is stage (2) of 
my approach. But, before considering the main argument, I shall give the outline of 
the arguments in this part. After that, our inquiry will proceed to the second part of 
this dialogue about Rhetoric. However there seem to be two kinds of rhetoric: ideal 
rhetoric and the ordinary one. Both these kinds will be examined, respectively in 3-2 
and 3-3. Through this examination, we shall fmd a connection with the first part about 
Love in 3-4. All this consideration of rhetoric will show the concrete method of 
establishing ideal relationship of true lovers, who have been regarded as philosophers 
and possessors of divine sophrosyne in the previous chapter (3-5). 
Now let us proceed to the outline of the latter part of this dialogue. This part 
begins with Phaedrus' remark on Socrates' second speech. He admires this speech 
briefly, and soon he shows his concerns with Lysias, his favourite man, because he is 
afraid that Lysias ' previous speech looks worse when it is compared with Socrates ' 
second speech. What Phaedrus says here and his concerns itself appear very 
interesting, but consideration ofPhaedrus ' attitude will be made in the next chapter, 
chapter 4. Phaedrus continues by saying that, 
Just recently one of the politicians was abusing him with this very charge, and throughout all his abuse 
kept calling him a "speech-writer"; (257c5-6) 
The argument about rhetoric in Phaedrus starts with this concern at the beginning. 
Then Socrates begins to discuss speech-writing. During this short discussion, Socrates 
claims speech-writing itself is not shameful because not only speech writers but also 
people generally tend to hope that their written work and their written name will last 
for ever. What is the criterion by which people judge a speech as being shameful? 
This question is presented by Socrates in the focus of the following sentence. 
What is the way to write acceptably, or not acceptably? (258d7) 
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Namely, the crucial point is not whether it is written or not, but how it is 
composed. And it is not too much to say that the following arguments in the latter part 
of the dialogue are given to answer this question. For, this question is clearly referred 
to at the beginning and at the end. Namely, the main argument starts from 259E (after 
the myth of the cicadas as an interlude), and again, the same question comes up: "in 
what way it is acceptable to make and write a speech, and in what way it is not" 
(259e2). Then, in the conclusion, Socrates says ''we were to weigh up the reproach 
aimed at Lysias about his writing of speeches, and speeches themselves, which were 
written scientifically and which not"(277al0-b2). 
The arguments from 259E to 278B seem to be the chief arguments of the second 
part28• First, a relationship between rhetoric and knowledge is referred to. To speak 
sufficiently well needs knowledge (on what kind of knowledge, see below, 3-3) which 
one can acquire through philosophy. Then, Socrates picks up the previous speeches 
about love as an example to explain what he believes is true rhetoric. After rejecting 
Lysias' speech because of its lack of defmition and order, Socrates shows Division 
and Collection in his two speeches as the true dialectical method. Then, the condition 
of speaking and writing well become clear, namely that they are based on knowledge 
and use Division and Collection. It seems to be the proper answer (answer a) to the 
main question of this discussion: "how to write (speak) speeches acceptably?". 
However, an unsuitable remark ofPhaedrus forces Socrates to continue the argument 
again; Phaedrus says ''the rhetorical kind seems to me still to elude us" (266c8-9). 
The argument after this remark is difficult to understand because there seems to be 
much irony about ordinary rhetoric and the analogy with other arts. But, simply 
speaking, an ideal and true image of rhetoric becomes clear by comparison with 
existing and ordinary rhetoric. Here we can find a repeated assertion about how to 
learn "a science of rhetoric" which seems to be an application of Division and 
Collection. I mean this way seems to be to grasp the nature of soul and identify how 
many kinds of soul and speeches, and then to understand how to apply the most 
appropriate speech to the soul from the aspect of effective persuasion. Here we seem 
28 Griswold seems to think of a different division of the second part, namely 257C· 
274B (when does rhetoric lack art?) and 278B·End (when is rhetoric art?). For, he 
regards the myth ofTheuth/Thamus (274B·275B) as the most important part of this 
dialogue. Thus, he thinks that true rhetoric is not dealt in the part discussing 
Division and Collection (265D·266A). This idea is different from mine. (His idea is 
examined in note 53) 
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to find another aspect of speaking well, namely understanding the suitability of the 
audience for a speech and the opportunity to give a speech for the purpose of 
acquiring the most effective influence (answer b). Socrates clearly describes a true 
method of rhetoric by explaining the way to obtain this "science of rhetoric" . 
This will suffice as an outline of the argument about rhetoric29 . The structure is 
complicated (the cause seems to be Phaedrus, but this will be examined in the next 
chapter), but the main target seems to be indisputable: true rhetoric which Socrates 
persistently claims we need, compared with ordinary rhetoric. And key terms are 
'truth' or ' knowledge' acquired by Division and Collection, and ' the inquiry into 
soul'. This consideration is related to answers a and b mentioned above. What 
relationship do these two answers have in regard to speaking well? 
Especially, in this chapter, the nature of ideal rhetoric will become evident, 
namely who, when, to whom, how and why to put it into practice. In order to consider 
these questions, it is better to concentrate on ordinary rhetoric ftrst because of the 
manifest contrast with the ideal one. 
3--2~out ordin~Jjy§~h~toric 
In this section, existing rhetoric will be dealt with. As I have said in the previous 
section, the nature of true and ideal rhetoric seems to become clearer if it is compared 
with this ordinary rhetoric. And this kind of rhetoric is one that Socrates refers to with 
irony and rejects evidently. Then, in fact, what features make this ordinary rhetoric 
false and less valuable? 
The reference to ordinary rhetoric appears after 266D, where Phaedrus claims that 
there is something to be acquired other than dialectical method. As I said, Socrates 
seems already to have fmished the defmition of rhetoric (how to speak and write well) 
before this statement. However he has to embark on a new inquiry because of the 
question ofPhaedrus: "the rhetorical kind seems to me still to elude us"(266c8-9). 
Then, Socrates enumerates various methods of what is regarded to be ' 'the science of 
29Though I do not treat it, later (274B·278B) Socrates suddenly offers a distinction 
between speaking and writing, and claims that speaking is better than writing. 
Socrates talks as if they have been distinguished strictly from the beginning of the 
second part, but that hardly seems to be the case. I will consider this problem in 
chapter 5, but if I talk about it in advance, it is not whether a speech is spoken or 
written, but how it is composed that is impor tant. And this is deeply related with the 
aim of a speaker: namely for instruction or not. 
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speaking": first, as Socrates points out, there has to be a 'preamble' at the beginning, 
and secondly, 'exposition' and 'testimonies' and then 'proofs', 'probabilities'. 
Socrates vigorously and ironically continues to pick up on techniques like 'covert 
allusion' or 'indirect praise'. Finally, Socrates refers to 'recapitulation' as if these 
methods had a function which makes speeches well-ordered30• But they can be 
regarded as ordinary rhetorical techniques, to some extent superficial skills31 • Here, 
the difference of attitude is really interesting, ironic Socrates and enthusiastic 
Phaedrus, but now we have to consider what kind of advantage and disadvantage 
these methods have. This is asked in this following way; 
Soc.: Let's hold what we have more closely up to the light, and see just what the power of the science 
is which is contained in them. 
Ph.: A very forceful power it is, Socrates, when it's a question of mass gatherings. (268al-3) 
Here, it is clear that these ordinary techniques are efficient in "mass gathering". 
This reference implies that these are effective only for the mass, but not for 
individuals. I mean, these methods seem to have an inflammatory influence on crowds. 
It is impossible for Socrates to approve of this kind of effectiveness (we must notice 
that only Phaedrus points out this feature as something good). Socrates warns by 
saying that "see whether their warp has some gaps in it" (268a5-6). It seems that there 
are gaps between rhetoric to be found and rhetoric found here. 
Then what is the demerit of these methods? Socrates evidently explains by using 
an analogy with other arts: medicine (268a8-c4), tragedy (268c5-d5) and music 
(268d6-e6). In each analogy, Socrates posits two groups, true experts and mock 
experts, the latter shamelessly claiming they are excellent in the field, the former 
30 The way of listing these skills is interesting because it easily reminds us of the 
necessity of organic structure in every speech. However, it is obvious that those who 
use these methods, namely ordinary rhetoricians, do not attach importance to this 
well-organized structure. They want to just persuade people by focusing on 
probability. Then, from this way of reference, I think that Socrates seems to try to 
express a strong ironic feeling and an extreme contrast between true methods (which 
truly make a speech organic) and trivial methods (mentioned here). 
31 Rowe (1986a)204 says 'it is worth noticing that he (Socrates) does not explicitly 
commit himself here (or indeed anywhere else) to the view that all, or indeed any, of 
the techniques in question are in fact useful towards the proper purposes of the 
orator'. And Hackforth (1952)143 also comments "the practice of rhetoric ... fell far 
short of anything that would entitle it to the name of a techne, a solid scientific 
accomplishment". And "the actual catalogue of these technemata ... are oflittle 
importance." 
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easily fmding some crucial mistakes made by the latter. In the case of rhetoric (269a5-
c5), Adrastus and Pericles are represented as true experts of rhetoric. Socrates thinks 
that they might reprove Socrates and Phaedrus, and would forgive the false 
rhetoricians by saying that; 
Phaedrus and Socrates, one should not get angry, but be forgiving, if some people who are ignorant of 
dialectic prove unable to give a definition of what rhetoric is, and as a result of being in this state think 
that they have discovered rhetoric when they have learned the necessary preliminaries to the science, 
and believe that when they teach these things to other people they have given them a complete course 
in rhetoric, and that the matter of putting all of these things persuasively and of arranging the whole, as 
something involving no difficulty, their pupils must supply in their speeches from their own resources. 
(269b4-c5) 
In this passage, we may fmd some failures of the false experts, who may be able 
to deal cleverly with the many trivial techniques mentioned above. They cannot 
defme what rhetoric is and they do not know dialectical method which Socrates thinks 
of as the genuine rhetorical method (266C, Collection and Division, to be considered 
in the next section). Actually, they are satisfied with understanding ''the necessary 
preliminaries to the science" which means various artistic and trivial methods. Thus 
they seem to lack both knowledge and true method. Picking up these points, it is 
impossible for them to be true rhetoricians. 
Their mistakes seem to be clear, but one more aspect should be added. It is their 
relationship with their pupils. They teach their students only the necessary 
preliminaries, but they never instruct them in the genuine methods of rhetoric, namely 
''the matter of putting all of these things persuasively and of arranging the whole" as 
Pericles might think (I cited above). As a result, their pupils are left without true 
methods. And it could be easy for them to become the kind of rhetoricians who lack 
true knowledge and methods, and try to teach their preparatory skill as true rhetoric 
methods. This harmful influence is immeasurable. What is more, let's consider the 
speech which has no appropriate arrangement, given by false rhetoricians. Perhaps 
this kind of speech will make the audience thoughtless or confused because it has no 
logical structure. I think it seems to be like an advertisement because it has just an 
impact on people, making them move without making them think clearly about it. 
There are two aspects of these demerits: as mentioned above, one is lack of 
knowledge and the other is a wrong relationship with other people. They are not just 
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ignorant, but harmful for their students, or audience, because they teach only 
preliminaries while being content with their teaching. These two disadvantages seem 
to be very important if we want to make clear the difference between true rhetoricians 
and ordinary rhetoricians. I mean, true rhetoricians are competent in these two aspects, 
namely having knowledge (answer a) and a good relationship with their audience 
(answer b). Thus, from the consideration above, we may notice that the features of 
these false experts are completely opposite to the state of true experts. 
Then who is a true rhetorician? Socrates imagines that Pericles would list the false 
points of self-professed rhetoricians. Now let us consider Pericles, who is referred as 
an able rhetorician in Phaedrus. Pericles, as at a glance Plato seems to intend to imply, 
does not exhibit these kinds of demerit so that he seems to be able to disprove 
ordinary rhetoric experts. Thus Socrates admires Pericles by saying that 
It is not surprising, I suppose, my good fellow, that Pericles turned out to be the most complete of all 
with respect to rhetoric. (269el-2)32 
If so, what feature does Pericles have? From the passage cited before (269b4-c5), 
being different form ordinary rhetoricians, Pericles appears to be aware of true 
rhetorical methods and to have sufficient knowledge, and pass on his true rhetorical 
techniques to people. Especially, he seems to have an ability in ''the matter of putting 
all of these things persuasively and of arranging the whole". This might mean that he 
is able to compose his speech "persuasively" as a whole (more persuasively than 
speeches of ordinary rhetoricians). This concept of"persuasiveness"33 seems to be 
important for the consideration of rhetoric in this dialogue. What is "persuasiveness"? 
What kind of persuasiveness does he seem to have? And then, is this kind of 
persuasiveness required as a skill oftrue rhetorician? 
32 Hackforth (1952)149 affirms that Plato refers to Pericles as 'oratorical excellence'. 
And this is a feature 'which neither Socrates nor Plato would deny'. In addition, de 
Vries (1969)233 comments that 'here his (Pericles') rhetorical gifts are praised'. I 
admit that Pericles has a kind of oratorical excellence, but whether it is true rhetoric 
or not is a problem. 
33 Pithanos means "persuasive" and this term appears three times in this dialogue: 
269c2, c9 and 272d8. The first occasion is in the passage cited above. The second 
follows the first, and it refers to the person who seems to be a true rhetorician, 
namely Pericles. The last occasion is in the context which recommends acquiring 
"what is convincing" rather than truth. Thus this concept of "persuasive" seems to be 
connected with Pericles and what it is plausible for people to agree to easily. 
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Let's focus on Pericles more in order to answer the question. Unfortunately, we do 
not have enough reference to Pericles, but his relationship with Anaxagoras is clearly 
shown in Phaedrus. 
All sciences of importance require the addition of babbling and lofty talk about nature; for the relevant 
high-mindedness and effectiveness in all directions seem to come to a man from some such source as 
that. This is something that Pericles acquired in addition to his natural ability; for I think because he 
fell in with Anaxagoras, who was just such a person, and became filled with such lofty talk, and arrived 
at the nature of mind (no us) and the absence of mind, which were the very subjects about which 
Anaxagoras used to talk so much, he was able to draw from there and apply to the science of speaking 
what was applicable to it. (269e-270a8) 
Here, we may notice some expressions, which do not seem to show simply praise, 
for example "babbling" or "lofty talk"34 as problematic terms. However the most 
noteworthy sentence seems to be that Pericles "arrived at the nature of mind (nous) 
and the absence of mind" after he met Anaxagoras. The praise for Pericles is related 
to the influence of Anaxagoras35 . Now we have to remember one of the most famous 
passages in Plato's dialogues. In Phaedo, Socrates frankly expresses his 
disappointment about Anaxagoras' nous. Namely, when Socrates was interested in 
natural science, he sought for "the cause for everything". However he could not be 
satisfied with the explanation of natural science. One day he had a chance to listen to 
Anaxagoras and he was extremely attracted by his thought about nous. Thus, Socrates 
was eager to obtain the book of Anaxagoras. However, 
34 de Vries (1969)233 gives a comment that "babbling'' was the term which the man in 
the street used as a matter of course to denote philosophical discussions. And "star· 
gazing (lofty talk)" is "used contemptuously for cosmological speculation". Plato uses 
the terms sometimes to characterize his own philosophical occupation, but they show 
some "proud humility" and some self·irony. 
Rowe seems to think that these words are used negatively by comic writers, but used 
positively by Socrates (Plato). And, now, when he refers to Anaxagoras and Pericles 
as those who engage in babbling and lofty talk, Socrates just pretends to use 
positively (namely ironically). See Rowe's comment (1986a)205. These comments 
show these words are very ambiguous. 
35 Hackforth (1952)149 comments "what Pericles took from him <Anaxagoras) was not 
a doctrine, but method of viewing thing, of viewing anything''. But I think what is 
important is not what subject he learnt, but the fact Pericles was taught by 
Anaxagoras. 
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This wonderful hope was dashed as I went on reading and saw that the man made no use of Mind 
(nous), nor gave it any responsibility for the management of things, but mentioned as causes air and 
ether and water and many other strange things. (98C)36 
This famous passage clearly shows that Socrates has negative feeling toward 
Anaxagoras. From this fact, we must infer that Socrates' praise for Pericles is 
doubtful37• For, in this context, Pericles is said to learn from Anaxagoras to develop 
his rhetoric ability. However what happens if the very lesson is not reliable, or more 
exactly, false from the Socratic point of view? In this case, the persuasiveness 
mentioned before as Pericles' merit has to be questioned as well. What kind of 
persuasiveness is it? 
Here, we have to remember a kind of rhetoric which Phaedrus continues to insist 
on. This is based on "probability", not ''truth" or "knowledge". This appears 
repeatedly in the second parts, especially 260A (insisted by Phaedrus) and 272D-
273D (assuming that Lysias would assert it). And Phaedrus is eager to affirm that this 
is very effective and powerful. This kind of rhetoric seems to be different from other 
kind mentioned before as just dealing with various artificial skills. Those who 
engaged in this type would have no crucial knowledge. They cannot organize their 
speech well as Pericles seems to be able to do. However, when the knowledge of 
Pericles is doubtful, what is based on his speech? It is natural to think it is not 
knowledge (truth), but "probability" which is similar to knowledge (truth). Then let us 
see what happens if we trust this "probability" excessively. 
This type of speech can be seen especially in a law-court. An interesting example 
here is: if a weak and brave man beats up a strong cowardly man, the former would 
have to defend himself. However, at that time, "neither party should speak the truth" 
(273b6) because the truth appears to be not persuasive for their audience. Who thinks 
the weak man could defeat the strong man? As a result, each of them has to claim that 
'I am right' in an extremely strange way. 
The coward (the strong man) should say that he wasn't beaten up by the brave (weak) man single-
handed, while the other man should establish that they were on their own together, and should resort to 
36 The translation of Phaedo is from G.M.A.Grube. 
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"Given what we know of Plato's view of Anaxagoras, the net result is to transform 
what looks initially like a positive judgment in Pericles into a negative one"(Rowe 
(1986a)204) 
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the well-known argument, 'how could a man like me have assaulted a man like him?' The coward will 
certainly not admit his cowardice, but will try to invert some other lie and so perhaps offer an opening 
for his opponent to refute him (273b6-c4) 
Even if they are eager to prove their innocence to win the case, this situation 
manifestly shows a ridiculous result when people depend on only persuasiveness, not 
on truth. Namely it is the fact that beaten man intends to testify against himself 
because he blindly pursues persuasiveness rather than the truth although he is 
relegated to a very unfavorable position. The strong but coward man has to lie still 
further in order to cover up his lie, and the weak but brave man just tries to have that 
poor man's defects exposed. As a result, the brave (weak) man takes advantage ofhis 
foolish testimony, so that he will be able to easily win this case Gust using common 
phrase). The speaker (the beaten man) does not care about the truth, so that the result 
which his speeches produce is terribly distorted and absurd. And Socrates points out, 
extremely ironically, ''the way to speak 'scientifically' will be something like this" 
(273c4-5i8• 
Thus, a man who pursues only persuasiveness seems often to put an emphasis on 
what people naturally think. And this seems to be "easier and shorter" route (272cl) 
to become a rhetorical expert: ''the man who is going to be competent at rhetoric need 
have nothing to do with the truth about just or good things, or indeed about people 
who are such by nature or upbringing. For they say that in the law-courts no one cares 
in the slightest for the truth about these things, but only for what is convincing; and 
this is what is probable, which is what the man who is going to speak scientifically 
must pay attention to"(272d4-e2). And "it gives us the entire science" (273al) 39• And 
Socrates thinks this method is learned from "Lysias or anything else" (272c2). 
If Lysias is regarded as one of the people involved in this kind of rhetoric, it is 
proper to look at his speech concerning its truth and influence. First, can we fmd any 
truth in his speech? His speech, as we have seen, recommends boys to show affections 
to non-lovers. But actually, these non-lovers pretend not to love beautiful boys and 
their outward sophrosyne conceals their self-interested thinking. In the previous 
chapter, we have taken his speech as refused by Socrates' second speech, which 
38 The answer of Phaedrus is noteworthy: "Of course ( Ti men)" (c6). 
39 Phaedrus says that ''You have stated just what those who profess to be experts in 
speaking say" (273a2·3). I think this is only one proper answer of Phaedrus 
throughout this dialogue. 
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seems to be described truly as far as Socrates can. Moreover, we may think Lysias 
wants to make a display of his skill in this paradoxical subject, not to say what he has 
considered carefully and seriously. But, he is so skilful that he can attract many 
people, especially Phaedrus. Thus his speech is persuasive and attractive enough for it 
to be admitted that he is one of the eminent orators in Athens at that time. However he 
lacks truth and care for his audience 40, namely answer a and b. 
In addition, what kind of orator do they become, people who go by this easier and 
shorter route? Socrates picks up Tisias as one of such a kind of people, namely those 
who "profess to be experts" (273a3). However I think that Pericles can be included in 
this group, even though there is no speech of Pericles in this dialogue (so that we 
cannot examine his speech). He seems to be able to compose his speech persuasively 
and in a well-organized41 way, so that in that point he seems to be superior to other 
trifling rhetoricians who can deal with just superficial techniques. However Pericles 
seems to have no knowledge which gives a basis to true rhetoric because his 
knowledge is derived from Anaxagoras. Thus, from this fact42, his skill of organizing 
speeches well turns out to be false. Namely, his persuasiveness is just ofno value for 
imitation, and it will collapse in the face of true persuasiveness. Therefore, it is 
evident that he is never a true rhetorician 43• 
From what we have said so far, we can discover two groups, namely trivial 
rhetoricians who are skilful at artistic techniques and the class of rhetoricians of some 
ability who can give their speeches persuasively. But both of them belong to existing 
40 Griswold (1986)49 rightly points out some faults toward listeners in Lysias' speech, 
especially about the result. Namely, the speaker in Lysias' speech offers favours not 
only for the speaker himself, but also for the interests of the boy (false beloved one, 
because the lover ofLysias' speech is never a true lover), and if the boy accepts his 
offers, this fact makes him a "self-interested" man like the speaker (false lover). Thus, 
this kind of speech will spoil the listeners. 
41 Socrates attributes this merit, "arranging the whole", to Pericles (passage cited 
before). 
42 We cannot consider his influence within this dialogue because we have no reference. 
However, if his speech is neither excellent nor true, but he and everyone regard it 
excellent and true, it is natural to think that this result is not good. 
43 We must remember a criticism of Socrates of Pericles' political skill in Gorgias 
(515B-517A). Rowe (1986a)204 cites Guthrie's remarks that 'to Plato the two [i.e. 
oratory and statesmanship] cannot be separated'. Compared with Socrates, as a true 
statesman and true orator, it is necessary to deny that Pericles is true because he 
seems to lack knowledge and consideration of the people of Athens (see especially 
515D-516D in Gorgias;"Pericles certainly showed them (citizens) to be wilder than 
they were when he took them over"). I think this idea is right, but there are opposite 
comments on Pericles, see note 32. 
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and ordinary rhetoricians because they commonly have no access to truth and no care 
for audience. However, it is possible for them, Lysias and Pericles, to be more 
harmful and terrible than others. For, though they have no certain knowledge, they 
can give some more persuasive speeches. Moreover, it is confirmed that ordinary 
rhetoricians have an influence on mass audiences. But, Lysias and Pericles seem to be 
able to produce a more dreadful effect on an audience. For their false persuasiveness 
can easily pull the strings of crowds as they please, in spite of their lack of truth. 
We have considered ordinary rhetoricians. And now we can identify their general 
features as the following two aspects: (1) a lack of truth in their speeches and (2) a 
lack of care about the people to whom their speeches are directed. By contrast, it can 
be considered that ideal rhetoricians have the following two merits, namely that there 
is truth in their speeches and that they show consideration to the listeners. In the next 
section, let us concentrate on the image of ideal and true rhetoricians in Phaedrus. 
IIIW~iiiiJ111:1i~iQfic 
In the previous section, 3-2, we have seen the failings which ordinary rhetoricians 
have, namely lack of truth and care. However, they seem to be crucial for excellent 
speeches, because from the beginning of the latter part ofthis dialogue, Socrates 
insists on the importance of truth in any speech. 
Well then, for things that are going to be said well and acceptably, at least, mustn' t there be knowledge 
in the mind of the speaker of the truth about whatever he intends to speak about? (259e4-6) 
What kind oftruth is it? For, as Socrates admits, we can never acquire ultimate 
truth insofar as we are human beings. This is obvious from the statement of Apo/ogy44 
of Plato, but there seems to be a reference to this in Phaedrus. Namely, Socrates says 
44 After Socrates accepted the oracle "no one was wiser than Socrates", he often 
visited someone reputed wise, a politicians, poets, writers and craftsmen. But he just 
noticed that he was wiser than everyone. For, in the case of a politician, he thought "I 
am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, 
but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, 
neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that 
I do not think I know what I do not know" (21D). Besides this consideration, Socrates 
clearly said that "what is probable is that in fact the god is wise and that his oracular 
response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing ... . ". Thus Socrates is 
wise as far as he admits "his wisdom is worthless". Only gods are allowed to achieve 
truth and be called truly as "wise". 
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that it is not appropriate to call someone "wise (sophon)", but it seems "to be fitting 
only in the case of a god" (278d4). And, in the case human beings, we have to call 
them "a lover of wisdom (philosophon)" even if they "know how the truth is" (278c4-
5). Perhaps, for this "truth" seems to be always provisional. 
In order to answer his question, the following sentence will give a hint: ''unless he 
engages in philosophy sufficiently well he will never be a sufficiently good speaker 
either about anything" (261a4-5). Namely, if we engage in philosophy, we have the 
possibility (even if hardly) of gaining this knowledge45• (Admitting "our wisdom is 
worthless" may be the start-point of philosophy, going close to the knowledge.) 
In addition, we may note that Socrates treats rhetoric as "leading of the soul 
(psychagogia)" twice (261a8 and 271c10). And, though I shall examine this part 
later, Socrates describes the ideal speech which ''takes a fitting soul" (276e6) and 
delivers knowledge to a listener, and makes him "as happy as it is possible for a man 
to be" (277a3-4). It is possible to think there is a deep connection between rhetoric 
and the souls of audience in this dialogue. Thus, this is also a key idea when we 
interpret the arguments about rhetoric. 
Thus, I think we can take the following two approaches corresponding to the 
features: truth and soul. They seem to be deeply related with respectively (1) 
dialectical method (Division and Collection) and (2) inquiry into the soul, so that we 
shall consider the picture of true rhetorician according to these aspects. 
In the first place, we concentrate on dialectical method. Socrates claims that this 
can be shown in two Socrates' speeches. But, before that, in order to consider the 
method, it seems to be better to examine Socrates' comments on Lysias' speech. 
45 Concerning the difficulty of acquiring truth, Griswold (1986) 170 ff. presents a 
question as "the crux of the problem of rhetoric". Namely, "if a philosopher cannot 
express in discourse, even to himself, what he contemplates, then he cannot 
distinguish himself from the zealot or the dogmatist and so ceases to be a 
philosopher." I think that what he asks here is whether there is a certain way of 
distinguishing a true philosopher from a false philosopher (sophist). (In addition, he 
refers the distinction between "divinely erotic madman" and "humanly erotic 
madman".) And the answer can be in the effort of a philosopher. It means, he is not 
just convinced of what he thinks as true, but "he will be persuaded only if he hears 
himself giving reasons for what he sees" (p.172). Thus he has to try to "express 
himself in discourse". In his attitude, Griswold thinks "rhetoric is already present". 
However, Griswold points out that it is difficult for the eager philosopher to avoid 
making a mistake. To solve the problem, Griswold thinks that Socrates offers 
"dialegesthai" and that this method will be discussed the arguments from the myth 
ofTheuth I Thamus. Finally, if there is a clear distinction between a philosopher and 
a sophist (false philosopher), it might be the activity of philosopher, namely dialogue. 
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Compared with it, Socrates shows the advantages of his speeches and the real 
methods of dialectic which are displayed in his speeches. 
At the beginning, Socrates makes Phaedrus repeat the first part ofLysias' speech. 
' You know how matters are with me, and you have heard me say how I think it is to our advantage that 
this should happen; and I claim that I should not fail to achieve what I ask because I happen not to be in 
love with you. Those in love repent ofthe services they do when their desire ceases---' (230e6-231a3 
in Lysias' speech, 262el-4 and 263e3-264a3 in second part of Phaedrus) 
And Socrates properly points out that the subject which Lysias deals with, Love, 
is a "disputed case" like 'just' and 'good'. It means that Love is something on which 
''we diverge, and disagree both with each other and with ourselves" (263a9-1 0). 
However Lysias fails to defme this disputed subject when he starts his speech. What 
is more, there is another terrible feature in his speech. Socrates frankly expresses this 
feature saying that Lysias is ''trying to swim through his speech in reverse, on his 
back". It means that his speech starts with the conclusion of his speech, namely that a 
boy should show favours to non-lovers. As a result, it is manifest that Lysias' speech 
has an utterly disorderly structure, because it lacks the defmition of the subject, to be 
placed at the beginning, and instead it starts with the conclusion, which ought to be 
placed at the end. Socrates describes the situation like this. 
Don't the elements of the speech seem to have been thrown in a random heap? Or do you think the 
second thing he said had to be placed second for some necessary reason, or any of the others where 
they were? (264b3-5) 
Here, two failures in Lysias' speech are pointed out. These are the lack of 
defmition and logical order46• Thus we can infer that Socrates' speeches have the 
advantage in these aspects. And Socrates himself says ''there was something in them 
(Socrates' speeches) which should be noticed by those who wish inquire into 
speeches" (264e7-8). And this 'something' seems to be two procedures, namely 
Collection and Division. Collection is explained: 
46 These features may clarify the aim of Lysias' speech. Repeating the conclusion 
throughout his speech makes the audience accept it without doubting or arguing. It 
may help to recall the attitude of Phaedrus at the beginning of Phaedrus. He is just 
impressed by Lysias' speech and eager to remember the whole speech. (228A-E) 
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There is perceiving together and bringing into one form items that are scattered in many peaces, in 
order that one can define each thing and make clear whatever it is that one wishes to instruct47 one's 
audience about on any occasion. (265d3-5) 
What function does this procedure have 48? Rowe ( 1986a) 200 says ''this does not 
mean that collection itself provides the definition, but that is necessary preliminary to 
it". Collection seems to prepare the pre-defmition, for example "a kind of desire" or 
"a kind of madness" (265a6-7t9 in the case of Love. It is possible to think that 
Collection prepares the hypothetical defmition, through its potential to give a proper 
beginning. Because of this procedure, a certain defmition which both speakers agree 
with can be arrived at and it enables the speech to be "clear and self-consistent" 
(265d6-7). 
And the explanation ofDivision is this; 
Being able to cut it up again, form by form, according to its natural joints, and not try to break any part 
into pieces, like an inexpert butcher. (265el-3) 
How does this Division work in Socrates' speeches? Socrates explains that ''there 
were two kinds of madness, the one caused by sickness of a human sort, the other 
coming about from a divinely caused reversal of our customary ways of behaving." 
(265a9-ll). We have discussed these two kinds ofLove in previous chapter. This 
47 Here, it is noteworthy that Socrates refers to the conception of teaching when he 
talks about rhetoric. This concept will become important later, especially in the 
context of written and spoken speeches. 
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'The first method consists in taking a comprehensive view of the multitude of 
scattered particulars and bringing them under one general form of notion, for the 
purpose of defining and so placing out of doubt the nature of the particular subject 
you wish to give instruction in' (Thompson (1868) 107·8) 
49 Hackforth (1952) 133 gives a comment on this procedure of Socrates' speeches. He 
thinks there is a serious problem. Namely, "Socrates speaks as though the generic 
concept of madness had been common to his two speeches", but he thinks it is not 
true. Namely in the first speech, Socrates starts from "hubris" and in the second one 
"madness". Then Hackforth criticizes Plato for not taking appropriate procedures 
(Division), but I think the problem of definition can be solved in the following way. 
First, we notice both concepts mean a situation which "desire surpasses sanity" (as 
hypothetical definition). And then by Division, what "desire" and "sanity" 
respectively are, as discussed in the two speeches seems to be more exactly 
understood. Namely, in the first speech, 'human desire (to pursue for beautiful bodies) 
which surpasses human sanity' and in second speech, 'divine desire (to remember the 
truth, Form) which surpasses human sanity'. 
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Division, Rowe says, means cutting up the genus again "by its natural joints", until 
the definiendum is reached (p.200) in this following way. 
And just as a single body naturally having the same name, and labeled respectively left and right, so 
too the two speeches regarded derangement as naturally a single form in us, and the one cut off the part 
on the left-hand side, then cutting it again, and not giving up until it had found among the parts a love 
which is, as we say, 'left-handed', and abused it with fulljustice, while the other speech led us to the 
parts of madness on the right-hand side, and discovering and exhibiting a love which shares the same 
name as the other, but is divine, it praised it as cause of our greatest goods.(265e4-266bl) 
Thus, by the procedure of Division, we can fmd two kinds of definiendum in 
Socrates' speeches: 'left-handed' madness and divine madness50• Here the 
hypothetical defmition ofLove given by Collection, "a kind of madness", is more 
exactly defined again. Namely this method enables us to move our inquiry forward. 
Thus, using both procedures, we seem to have a possibility to pursue truth 
efficiently51 • Namely we posit the starting-point (genus or a part of definition) given 
by Collection, which is agreed to by each speaker and listener. Then, we can acquire a 
more exact definition through the process of Division 52• 
And, we must notice the relationship between the explanation of Division and 
well-ordered structure, which Socrates refers to as one of the sufficient conditions of 
excellent speech, as follows. 
Every speech should be put together like a living creature, as it were with a body of its own, so as not 
to lack either a head or feet, but to have both middle parts and extremities, so written as to fit both each 
other and the whole. (264c2-5) 
50 See chapter 2 (especially2·2 and 2·3). The former has been regarded as "human" 
madness, which forces people to think wrongly and strongly desire a beautiful body. 
The latter is divine madness which compels us to desire to remember the truth. Both 
of them can be characterized as "desire" and "madness". 
51 Thompson (1868)108 refers two passages of Cratylus (386E and 387) as important, 
because they "show that the method owed its value in Plato's eyes .... to its power as 
an engine of positive discovery, and as a means of revealing the thought or plan in 
Nature which underlies all her phenomena". And he says "if we remember this, we 
shall not wonder at the enthusiasm with which Socrates presently speaks of the able 
dialectician". 
52 We seem to be able to proceed with our inquiry, based on the new definition given 
by Division. Thus, these procedures (Collection and Division) enable us achieve a 
more accurate definition as far as we can. 
48 
It is possible to think that Collection prepares a hypothetical definition to start the 
speech which is like a head, and Division can give speeches an organic structure53 
"just as a single body" to discover a more exact definition. Some scholars54 are 
anxious about the way of dividing, namely Plato seems to intend to explain Division 
as dichotomy but this challenge seems to fail. But I think that it is important not 
whether the speech is divided in exactly two directions or not, but whether it has a 
reasonable structure or a logical system which both a speaker and a listener can follow. 
From this point, Socrates' two speeches have a proper Division to offer a systematic 
construction. 
Now let's remember the two faults ofLysias' speech: the lack of definition and 
ordered structure. Namely, there is no definition ofthe subject (Love) at the beginning, 
and no organic structure because the conclusion is merely repeated over and over 
again. However, these two procedures mentioned above seem to be able to supply the 
deficits ofLysias, and more generally of existing orators. 
As mentioned above, we can understand how the dialectical method is important 
when one tries to compose speeches. Using these procedures, we can identify the 
provisional definition of the subject which we should start from, and the proper and 
logical structure by which we can discuss clearly and consistently. And they appear 
when we intend to seek for truth and they help us to acquire a more exact knowledge. 
Namely, it is crucial that we try to pursue the truth in our own speeches if we are 
eager to give a splendid speech. The very two procedures are, as Socrates clearly 
claims ''the science of speaking" (266c2-3). And the person who has this science can 
be regarded as a true rhetorician. 
For the purpose of considering this science of speech more, let's focus, secondly, 
on inquiry into soul. This can be examined by thinking how one acquires this art. The 
53 Griswold (1986)181 seriously criticizes this method of Division by saying that 
"much of the content and significance of the (Socrates') speech is lost when they are 
dissected by the butcher's art". For example, the explanation of Division never refers 
to soul as the important theme. Thus, Griswold think "the animal is dead when it is 
operated upon by the art of definition, division and collection". I think he regards 
these arts (Division and Collection) as the feature of written speeches, being 
comparing with "live activity of dialegesthai". Certainly, actual conversations, and 
even this dialogue does not have these arts completely. I will deal with this problem 
in the next chapter. But, I do not admit that the arts or speeches with these arts look 
like "phantoms", as Griswold thinks. On the contrary, the kind of speeches is as 
ultimately ideal as it is nearly impossible. 
54 Hackforth (1952)133 and Hermeias (Thompson (1868)109 refers to him.) 
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way to learn this science, or how to teach it, is repeated in this dialogue four times 55, 
270dl-7 (a general explanation), 271a4-b5, 271c10-272c8 and 273d8-e4 (I will 
consider the last passage in the next section). Especially, I will pick up what Socrates 
says about teaching the science at 271a4-b5. 
In that case it is clear that both Thrasymachus and anyone else who seriously teaches a science of 
rhetoric will first write with complete accuracy and enable us to see whether soul is something which is 
one and uniform in nature or complex like the form of the body; for this is what we say is to reveal the 
nature of something. 
And in the second place, he will make clear with which of its forms it is its nature to do what. or to 
have what done to it by what. 
And then thirdly, having classified the kinds of speeches and of soul, and the ways in which these are 
affected, he will go through all the causes, fitting each to each and explaining necessarily results in one 
being convinced and another not. giying the cause in each case. 
This is how to teach the science, but the way of learning is almost the same as to 
this method56• If this method is explained more simply, it is possible to say first that it 
is a matter of identifying what soul is, secondly of understanding the activity and 
passivity of soul, and fmally of knowing what kinds of speeches and soul there are. 
All this process is for the purpose of understanding the best way of matching audience 
(soul) and speeches from the point ofview of persuasion. Here, in order to become a 
competent speaker (or composer), we have to get hold of the nature ofboth soul and 
speeches, and the cause of persuading people by giving an efficient speech to a 
specific kind of soul. 
We should remember here the persuasiveness of Pericles and other rhetoricians, in 
the previous section. The persuasiveness seems to be based on "probability", because 
the orator is not interested in truth, but they seem to be able to "arrange the whole" 
"persuasively". What difference in persuasiveness is there between ideal orators and 
existing orators? 
55 Griswold (1986)196 includes 277b5-c6 as one of the arguments about the way. But 
this passage is so important that I shall discuss it independently, in the next chapter. 
56 At 270dl-7, those who "want to be experts ourselves and be capable of making 
others experts" are explained. "First, is the thing (soul, 270e5) ... simple or complex? 
Next, if it is simple, we should consider ... what natural capacity it has for acting and 
on what, or what capacity it has for being acted upon, and by what; and if it has more 
forms than one, we should count these, and see in the case of each, as in the case 
where it had only one, with which of them it is its nature to do what, or with which to 
have what done to it by what?'' 
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In the ideal case, it is manifest that the way of teaching (learning) rhetoric is deeply 
connected with "leading of the soul" (one of the necessary things for excellent 
speeches) because it enables one to show how to persuade people in the most effective 
way. Therefore, an eminent orator needs to care about not only his speeches, but also 
the situation of his audience. Namely he does not only concentrate on how to 
compose his speech well, but also tries to recognize his influence on the audience 
serio\lsly. This makes it clear that this orator takes the results of his speeches into 
consideration. He has to consider seriously the effect which his speeches have 
because a fme speech should bring a fme influence and a fme result on listeners. 
By contrast, what is the influence of ordinary orators who lack the truth and lack 
care for their audience? Even if they can give their speeches "persuasively", the result 
apparently is quite different from the result of true oratory. In order to see this, I will 
pick up a conversation between Socrates and Phaedrus. Socrates offers an example 
like this; 
When an expert in rhetoric who is ignorant of good and evil finds a city in the same condition and tries 
to persuade it, not by making his eulogy about a miserable donkey as if it were horse, but about what is 
evil as if it were good, and having applied himself to popular opinions actually persuades the city to do 
evil instead of good ... (260c6-10) 
Then Socrates asks ''what kind of fruit do you think the (ordinary) expert in 
rhetoric reaps from the seed he sowed after that persuasion?" Phaedrus replies "it is 
not very good" (260c10-d2). In this case, what is the aim of the speech? Clearly, it is 
extremely different from the aim of excellent orators, because persuading people to do 
bad instead of good is really harmful not only for the audience, but also for the 
speaker. This kind of speech looks like an empty opinion based on malice (including 
indifference) and the ignorance of the speaker. Or, the orator wants to show his 
artistic skill by dealing with a paradoxical and deceptive theme (as in the case of 
Lysias' speech). In either case, it is impossible for this kind of speech to have a good 
influence. 
In this section, we have discovered that there are two features which ideal orators 
have, but ordinary rhetoricians not: (1) well-ordered speech which aims at the truth, 
and (2) a serious attitude towards his audience. The first one can be based on 
dialectical methods, Collection and Division, to provide a definition and a logical and 
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organic structure. And the second feature comes from the inquiry of souls, which 
enables us to understand the best way of making a match between souls and speeches, 
to persuade them efficiently. 
And the very man who has these features seems to be perfectly able to give an 
excellent speech with great influence. He can be properly called an ideal rhetorician. 
And in the next section, I would like to focus on the relation with a true lover 
described in the former part of this dialogue. It is useful to remember that Socrates 
says a true lover is a philosopher. And a true rhetorician is also a philosopher, who 
tries to acquire truth. Thus I think the picture of a philosopher of this dialogue can be 
clarified by understanding a feature which both a true lover and a true orator have. 
In the previous section, the whole picture of ideal orators has become clear. Next, 
in this section, I shall try to look for common features which both ideal lovers and 
ideal orators have. First, let us start with the aspect oftruth. If we remember the 
description of ideal lovers, as discussed in chapter 2, the most characteristic trait is 
' divine sophrosyne' which enables them to live a well-organized and harmonious life. 
And those who live such a life are said to be "philosophers" (256a7-b7) who can use 
their reminder rightly. It means that they can be here modestly with their beloved 
boys and perceive beauty through these beautiful boys, and try to remember the truth 
(the Form) as far as they can. And in this chapter 3, true orators tum out to be always 
conscious of the truth, because if it were not for the intention to acquire truth, they 
would never need and provide dialectical method, which enables them to make 
speeches clear and self-consistent. It is necessary for a true rhetorician to pursue truth 
and have the ability to use a dialectical method. They should be properly called as 
'philosophers', and this is supported by Socrates ' remark to the effect that if someone 
intends to speak well, he must "engage in philosophy" (264a4 ). Both of them connect 
with truth and they turn to be a philosopher. 
In addition, how is the aspect of his attitude to a companion? It will become 
manifest if we focus on the relationship of ideal lovers and ideal rhetoricians to their 
beloved and their audience. In the previous section, true orators seem to hope that 
their speeches will influence their audience well, so that they will improve their life. 
And in the context of love, as we have seen in 2-5, it is evident that a lover tries to 
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imitate his god, but the lover is also eager to make his beloved be like his god (in the 
argument of"becoming like gods"i7• Thus, we can also identify the common feature 
as consideration for their companion: for the audience (listener, interlocutor) in a 
rhetorical context and for the beloved one in a love context58• And, "leading of the 
soul" seems to point out this function ofrhetoric59• 
Now, I will suggest that "divine" and "sophrosyne" may be considered as key 
terms which enable to show clearly the connection between true lovers and 
philosopher, true orators. I will examine this idea by concentrating on the way of 
learning (teaching) the science of speeches at 273d8-e4 (the last example). The 
passage expresses a kind of summary ofhowto be a competent orator. 
If not, we'll believe what we showed just now, that unless someone counts up the various natures of 
those who are going to listen to him, and is capable of dividing up the things that are according to their 
forms and embrace each thing one by one under one kind, he will never be an expert in the science of 
speaking to the degree possible for mankind. This ability he will never acquire without a great deal of 
diligent study, which the sensible man ought to work through not for the purpose of speaking and 
acting in relation to men, but in order to be able both to say what is gratifying to the gods. and to act in 
evervthing. so far as he can, in a way which is gratifying to them. (273d7-e8) 
This passage says, as I have suggested before, that people who want to be 
excellent orators should know the kind of soul and things (speeches). For it helps 
them to be able to persuade people in the most effective way. And here, the sensible 
man is referred as someone who is eager to acquire the art of speech. This "sensible 
57 In the context of love, the attitude or change of a lover are shown in singular forms. 
At 256a7·b7 (one of the most important passage and cited in the previous chapter), 
the most blessed life of a lover is described, but in the passage we can find plural 
forms of personal pronouns. For example, "they masters of themselves and orderly in 
their behaviour" (b 1·2), "they become winged and light" (b4) and "they have won the 
first of the three submissions" (b5). It is plausible that both a lover and a beloved boy 
are referred to here, because just before this passage, Socrates explains the attitude 
of a boy loved by a lover. Thus, I think Plato intends to show both a lover and a 
beloved are promised to live their harmony life and acquire their wings because of 
Love. We may notice the importance of companionship from this passage. 
58 North (1966)177 comments on lovers and rhetoricians that "the goal of each is 
ultimately the same: training the soul ··· of the beloved in the first section; of the 
hearer, in the second." I think that "training the soul" means a kind of instruction, 
which enables them to be better (from the point of truth). 
59 Griswold (1986)159 says that "the rhetorician is a lover in that he attempts to lead 
the soul of his beloved". 
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man" represents ton sophrona (273e6)60 • Here, we fmd the relation between lovers 
and orators again. For, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, true lovers can 
be characterized by the term sophrosyne. 
It seems strange that lovers should be referred to in the context about how to be 
good rhetoricians. However, in order to give speeches most efficiently, orators have to 
face the individual and take a particular way. True rhetoricians have to get hold of the 
nature of their listener and give their speech to him in the most appropriate way. "The 
dialectical expert is engaged in the improvement of particular and different minds and 
will continue to relate them as particular and different" (Rowe (1990)246). I think this 
relationship between the true rhetorician and his audience is very similar to that of 
lovers. For true lovers also must put emphasis on the intellectual aspect, namely to 
turn the eyes of his companion to truth and to develop their intelligence with the help 
of their beloved61 in a private way. 
The most important thing in this passage is that both of them are conscious of 
gods as one which we proceed to. For, true lovers seem to try to become like gods 
themselves, and here true orators attempt to gratify the gods. In other word, "complete 
harmony of desire which the gods enjoy" (Rowe ( 1990)235) for true lovers, and true 
knowledge of the Forms in the divine region for true rhetoricians. As mentioned so far, 
it is not too much to say that ideal lovers are equal to ideal orators, and they are 
"philosophers". And the very philosopher is, as Plato suggests, Socrates62 . And 
actually, if we approach him from both sides, a true lover and a true orator, the real 
picture of Socrates seems to become clear. 
60 The concept of sophrosyne appears 16 times in this dialogue. In 10 examples, the 
term means human sophrosyne and in 4 examples it means Idea (Truth) or one of 
virtue. These meanings have been clear in chapter 2. Of the remaining 2 examples 
which are in second part of this dialogue, one is here and another is about modest 
amount of money. I think this sophrosyne (discussed here) cannot be understood 
properly without the concept of Love as "divine sophrosym!'. 
61 It means "sensual interplay with the beloved would be merely a first stage, giving 
way to the higher 'eroticism' represented by interchange of an intellectual sort." 
(Rowe(1990)242). 
62 North (1966)177 says ''both methods of education are intimately connected with the 
historical Socrates, whose teaching effected the union of logos and eros'. (Concerning 
"historical", North does not seem to give a detailed explanation.) 
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In this chapter 3, the feature of true rhetoricians has been found clearly through 
comparison with ordinary orators. The most important points are (1) that speech has 
to have a well-organized and self-consistent structure in order to reach the truth 
efficiently, and (2) that orators have to pay attention to the person to whom his speech 
is directed, and take the result into consideration. The person who fulfils these criteria 
completely is regarded as a "philosopher", and he is also a true lover. 
Thus, now I think we can give an answer to the questions raised in the first section 
of this chapter: who, when, to whom, how and why put the true rhetoric into practice. 
The true rhetoric is practiced by true rhetoricians (more exactly, philosophers), at 
well-timed opportunity, to their listener (their own interlocutor as his companion), by 
giving an appropriate and logical speech in order to have the most excellent influence, 
because they can together reach the truth in efficient way (and this is the true meaning 
of persuasiveness63). 
And these things which the true rhetorician does can be regarded as the concrete 
methods of becoming a true lover, because the true rhetorician can be identified with 
the true lover. We confirmed only the image of the true lover, but not the actual way 
of becoming a true lover in the first argument. Then the argument on rhetoric seems to 
complement the missing part of the argument. 
Now we can clarify the subject of the whole argument of the dialogue. From the 
point of the discussion on Love, the theme might be ideal and well-organized 
companionship toward truth. And from the point of rhetoric, it might be the most 
efficient way to acquire truth: dialectical methods and consideration for the partner. 
Therefore, if we combine these views, we can reach the subject of Phaedrus: well-
organized companionship to reach truth by using dialectical methods. This is the 
answer to problem (a): the subject which unites the dialogue. 
We believe that Socrates is the philosopher whom Plato rightly identifies: true 
lover and true rhetorician. Thus, in the next chapter, let's focus on the interaction 
between Socrates and Phaedrus, because I would like to make clear real features of 
his speeches and the influence of his speeches on Phaedrus. If Socrates' speech is 
perfect (and so has the two features mentioned above), Phaedrus will achieve a better 
state by being given such speeches. Or is there another possibility? 
63 And, this true persuasiveness seems to be deeply related with teaching. I think the 
conception of instruction is important for interpreting the argument about written 
and spoken speech. But this will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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4. The relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus 
, .. ift11lili'IIII1Vm1181i.i~r 
So far, we have discussed Love and Rhetoric in Phaedrus to clarify the picture of 
a philosopher. Especially, in the previous chapter about Rhetoric, from the aspect of 
truth, an ideal speech has a logical structure for everyone involved in the argument to 
be able to follow and approach the truth as far as they can. And this seems to mean a 
true "persuasion" which makes the listeners embark on the pursuit of truth efficiently. 
In addition, from the aspect of care, an excellent speech has a great effect on the 
audience and makes them better (this means that it enables people to love wisdom, 
namely to become philosophers). For, a speaker has consideration for the people to 
whom his speech is directed. The person who can give these kinds of speech seems to 
be a true rhetorician, namely a true philosopher and a true lover because the true lover 
is not only a philosopher, but also someone who tries to make his beloved better (i.e. 
philosophical). And an ideal and moderate companionship might enable him to do 
that. Thus, we conclude that the dialogue has the subject: the best kind of 
companionship to reach truth by logos. And there is no room for doubt that Socrates is 
a true philosopher. 
First, I think that it is good to call attention to the perspective of this chapter again. 
For, as I explained in the Introduction, our research is taking a wider and higher 
perspective, as the arguments proceed. In chapter 2, the three speeches about love 
have been examined in detail, especially about what Lysias or Socrates try to say. 
Next, in chapter 3, the arguments which we have considered in chapter 2 have been 
complemented according to the retrospective perspective. Now, in this chapter, we 
will focus on the two characters of this dialogue, Socrates and Phaedrus, who engage 
in the arguments of Phaedrus, so that we shall be able to understand what Plato wants 
to tell us more clearll4• And this chapter will deal with problem (b): the influence of 
Phaedrus as an interlocutor. What kind of influence does he give the argument? And 
how does Socrates cope with Phaedrus? Throughout this chapter, I try to clarify the 
64 The next chapter, chapter 5, will have a higher perspective than that of chapter 4. 
Namely, Phaedrus will be considered, not in relation to its argument, the st r ucture 
or the characters, but to the wor k itself as a written dialogue. 
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word and deed of Socrates, and to acquire the clear vision of a philosopher living in 
the real world. 
Thus, in this chapter, first, in 4-2, we are going to concentrate on Phaedrus, 
especially his intrinsic temperament and his preferences. Then we shall see his 
attitude as two interruptions. In 4-3, the question how Socrates faces up to Phaedrus 
will be answered. He seems to manage to deal with the preferences and tendencies of 
Phaedrus when he gives an argument. Finally, in 4-4, we shall consider whether 
Socrates' way of speaking can be regarded as ideal one or not. According to this 
consideration, the relationship between Phaedrus and Socrates becomes evident. 
ilillii&~llllllt\Bll\1\lt 
In this section, let us consider Phaedrus. How is he described by Plato? In the 
former part of this section, his features, and in the latter part, his concrete attitude are 
going to be focused on. 
In the first place, let us start with his features or tendencies. His characteristic 
features are well expressed in the beginning ofthis dialogue (227A-230E). He bumps 
into Socrates, when he goes outside the wall to take a walk. He has spent all this 
morning sitting in Epicrates' house where Lysias is staying. And Phaedrus asks 
Socrates to listen to the speech ofLysias. Socrates is glad to accept his proposal, but 
he easily sees through Phaedrus' real plan. 
When he (Phaedrus) heard Lysias' speech he did not hear it just once, but repeatedly asked him to go 
through it for him, and Lysias responded readily. But for Phaedrus not even that was enough, and in the 
end he borrowed the book and examined the things in it which he was most eager to look at, and doing 
this he sat from sun-up, until he was tired and went for a walk, unless I am much mistaken actually 
knowing the speech quite off by heart, unless it was rather a long one; and he was going outside the 
wall to practise it. (228a7-b6) 
From this passage, what feature can we notice about Phaedrus? One of most 
evident features is his love for speeches. He is glad to hear the same speech, and 
continue to read it as far as he can memorize it65 . Then, he goes outside in order to try 
65 His eagerness seems to make him admire speeches which have excellent 
expressions and language, and memorize them, but not encourage him to have 
questions about speeches. For example, about Lysias' speech, he asks Lysias to 
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to put his display of the speech into practice. And, fortunately, he comes across 
Socrates. This feature also becomes clear from Phaedrus' own statement. He hopes 
that he can narrate what Lysias composes worthily "more than I would to come into a 
stack of money" (228a4). 
In addition, Phaedrus seems to be presented as a father of speech, which means 
that he contributes to produce another speech. For example, after reading Lysias' 
speech, Phaedrus does not fail to catch a word of Socrates, when Socrates is careless 
enough to say that "I must have heard something" more excellent than Lysias' speech. 
Then Phaedrus forces Socrates to tell the story. What is more, after Socrates' first 
speech, Socrates hesitates to continue his speech because he "had a certain feeling of 
unease" (242c8) during telling his speech. However Phaedrus is eager to try to let 
Socrates continue. At the time, Socrates frankly expresses his impression on Phaedrus, 
a bit ironically. 
You've a superhuman capacity when it comes to speeches, Phaedrus; you're simply amazing. Of the 
speeches which there have been during your lifetime, I think that no one has brought more into 
existence than you, either by making them yourself or by forcing others to make them, in one way or 
another .... Just so, now, you seem to me to have become the cause of my making a speech. (242a7-b2, 
b4-5) 
As we gather from this passage, Phaedrus loves to hear a lot of speeches, so that if 
there is no speech to hear, he does not mind forcing anyone to make speeches. The 
expression "A man who is sick with passion for hearing people speak" (228b6-7), 
though it refers to Socrates, seems to describe Phaedrus as well66• 
As mentioned above, the two particular features of Phaedrus are clear: his 
somewhat blind eagerness for speeches and his practice of producing more speeches 
to hear. They are the basic nature of Phaedrus, namely love for speeches. But, before 
examining his features more, let us focus on the very interesting interlude of this 
repeat his speech to remember it, but he does not seem to ask a question about the 
problematic theme, "why does a beautiful boy show his affections to a non·lover, not a 
lover?" And I am going to pick up this problem later. 
66 In addition, we can find the similar expression, for example "a companion in his 
manic frenzy" (228b7) or "the one in love with speeches" (c1·2). Socrates says as if 
these expressions show Socrates himself, but it is natural that he implies Phaedrus 
with sarcasm. 
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dialogue: the myth of the cicadas (258E-259D). It seems to help us to understand 
Phaedrus more exactly. 
Here, Socrates tells a story about the cicadas being in the Muses' service. Socrates 
believes that they look down on them, and if he and Phaedrus can engage in 
conversation in the middle of daytime against the drowsiness, "they may respect us 
and give us that gift which they have from the gods to give to men" (259bl-2). Then 
Socrates starts to explain the life of the cicadas. 
The story is that these cicadas were once men, belonging to a time before the Muses were born, and 
that with the birth of the Muses and the appearance of song some of the men of the time were so 
unhinged by pleasure that in their singing they neglected to eat and drink, and failed to notice that they 
had died; from them the race of cicadas was afterwards born, with this gift from the Muses, that from 
their birth they have no need of sustenance, but immediately sing, without food or drink, until they die, 
and after that go and report to the Muses which among those here honours which of them. (259b6-c6) 
If we remember the reference to Phaedrus as "a man who loves the Muses" 
(259b5), namely a follower ofthe Muses67, this story about the cicadas does not mean 
just praise, but it includes a bit of criticism68• Socrates tries to describe the presence of 
Phaedrus as one of the very cicadas which devote themselves to hear speeches and 
does not take care of themselves, moreover does not notice even their death. I think 
Socrates wants Phaedrus to notice his state through this story. For, Phaedrus seems to 
67 Griswold (1986)166 comments that "he (Phaedrus) is dedicated to the pleasure of 
discourse unmixed with the pains and pleasure of the body .... We thus cannot avoid 
comparing Phaedrus to the men enthralled by the extent of ignoring nourishment." 
68 It is not easy to judge whether this comparison of Phaedrus with the cicadas is 
positive or not. The judgments of some commentators differ. De Vries (1969)192-3 
gives a comment that "the myth of the cicadas serves as a relaxing intermezzo. But 
at the same time, some fun is made ofPhaedrus' philologia". But Rowe (1986aH94 
comments that "I doubt de Vries' suggestion that the comparison with the garrulous 
cicadas makes fun ofPhaedrus, specifically". Certainly, we remember the cicadas are 
supposed to report to Muses about people who engage in arts (choral dance and so 
on). Especially in the case of philosophy, the cicadas serve Callipe and Ourania, who 
represent philosophy and rhetoric (and this connection may point out the 
relationship between philosophy and rhetoric). Thus, they seem to be positive. But 
this is the story after they die, and while they are living as human being (not cicadas), 
they indulge in pleasure of songs, namely just delighting in music and speeches (so, 
negative meaning). Thus, this seems to show the possibility of change in Phaedrus: 
as someone can turn into a cicada who devotes himself to Muses, especially Calliope 
and Ourania, after he dies, Phaedrus will be able to become a true devotee of them 
(philosophy and rhetoric). But about the change ofPhaedrus, we will discuss in the 
next chapter. 
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be satisfied with just listening to speeches as far as he forgets everything, without 
having any doubt about the argument and asking any question. 
This attitude ofPhaedrus, being content with listening to beautiful speeches 
without self-examination, seems to clarify his preference and tendency. He does not 
care whether the speech which he hears with joy is right or false. His attention is paid 
to whether it is beautiful or not69• Phaedrus seems to be glad that the speech is more 
beautiful "in its language" (234c7/0 and longer71 • Griswold (1986)22 rightly points 
out the condition ofPhaedrus, namely "his interest tends more to the aesthetic"72• 
In this point, Phaedrus as an interlocutor of Socrates seems to be very peculiar to 
this dialogue about love and rhetoric. For example, in Gorgias, Callicles vigorously 
offers his own argument and, if it is refused, he gives up the conversation with anger. 
And, in Meno, Meno tries to ask a question which he is very interested in, namely 
"can virtue be taught?" (70A). Being compared with them, Phaedrus just enjoys 
hearing any kind of speech (unlike Callicles), whatever the subjects (love or rhetoric) 
without questions and answers (unlike Meno). The more beautiful speeches he can 
hear, the happier he is. 
The consideration above describes Phaedrus as a person who is intelligent and 
curious, but a bit passive73 • He is clever enough to follow any subject which Socrates 
69 What it more, this beauty does not seem to mean that beauty itself which is 
described as the true cause of Love in Socrates' second speech. Certainly it seems to 
be something beautiful and comfortable which seems to be explained as a wrong 
cause of love in Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech. Namely, both Socrates and 
Phaedrus love speeches, but the kind of love seems to be different. The former aims 
at truth, the latter just something beautiful and comfortable. 
70 This is a merit ofLysias' speech which Phaedrus refers to. Phaedrus tends to put 
the emphasis on the way of using language, so later (257A) Socrates confesses that 
when he gave his second speech, "it was forced to use somewhat poetical language 
because ofPhaedrus" (257a5·6). 
71 When Phaedrus talks about the excellent points of Lysias' speech, he refers to not 
only the quality but also the quantity. For example, "do you think any other Greek 
(than Lysias) would have different things from these to say, which were weightier 
and more in number, about the same matter?" (234e2·4). Other examples are 235b4·5, 
235d6·7 and 236b2. From these parts, Phaedrus seems to tend to put the emphasis 
on the sophistication and the richness of words, not the content or the truth of any 
speeches. Thus he seems to be satisfied with listening to beautiful and comfortable 
speeches; the longer they are, the better, though he can deal with both styles: a long 
speech and a short conversation. 
72 He comments that "Phaedrus' love of speeches springs not from a love of the truth 
but from a love of their form, their shape or appearance. He loves beautiful and 
rhetorical speeches." 
73 It is interesting to compare with three qualities to test whether a soul lives rightly 
or not in Gorgias. Socrates uses three expressions to admire the nature of Callicles as 
60 
offers, and he intends to accept any kind of speech, but he does not provoke Socrates 
into examining the argument. He just engages in producing many speeches, especially 
beautiful (comfortable) and long ones. Griswold ( 1986)25 rightly says that "Phaedrus 
is a somewhat effete and self-indulgent 'lover of the Muses', a cultured dabbler in 
rhetoric". 
Secondly, Phaedrus seems to have another noteworthy feature besides love for 
speeches. I point to his dependence upon authority. As we have seen so far, we can 
readily fmd his preference for Lysias, as "the cleverest of present writers" (228al-2). 
Moreover, he refers to a lot of people whom he thinks of as excellent people. So, 
when they discuss ordinary rhetoricians, especially their trivial skills (266D-268A), 
Phaedrus is glad to pick up the names of people who are engaged in these skills. For 
example, ''the worthy Theodorus", "Masterly, Prodicus!" or "But weren't there some 
such things ofProtagoras?". There, the difference of attitude between Socrates and 
Phaedrus is clear. And, at the end of this dialogue, Phaedrus tries to remind Socrates 
oflsocrates ''the beautiful" (278e8)74. 
In addition, Phaedrus is highly interested in the author or the origin of speeches. 
This feature seems to be relevant to his reliance on authority. Phaedrus repeatedly 
asks Socrates the question. For example, when Socrates refers to "men and women of 
antiquity and wisdom" who can present more excellent speeches than Lysias', 
Phaedrus asks Socrates "Who are these people? And where have you heard anything 
better than this?"(235B-C). Socrates notices this feature and makes Phaedrus pay 
attention to this feature to correct his attitude75• We will discuss this reliance on 
authority in the next section. 
an adequate interlocutor, namely "knowledge, good will, and frankness" (487A). 
Being compared with these qualities, Phaedrus is in some extent intelligent (being 
familiar with modern thoughts and flexible for any subject) and friendly to Socrates. 
But there is a problem about his frankness. For, he rarely expresses his opinion (if he 
had) except praise for satisfactory speeches. 
74 Rowe (1986a)215 comments that "One special point in common between Lysias and 
!socrates, and one which is particularly relevant to the concerns of the Phaedrus, is 
that both were essentially writers of speeches." About !socrates, I will discuss in the 
next chapter (especially 5-l) because it clarifies the failure of Phaedrus. 
75 One of most the important and famous examples is 275b5-c4. "Well, my friend, 
those at the sanctuary of Zeus of Dodona said that words of an oak were the first 
prophetic utterance. So the men of those days, because they were not wise like you 
modern, were content because of their simplicity to listen to oak and rock, provided 
only that they said what was true; but for you, Phaedrus, perhaps it makes a 
difference who the speaker is and where he comes from: you don't just consider 
whether what he says is right or not." 
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As I have mentioned above, we can identify two major features ofPhaedrus: 
namely love of speeches and dependence on authority. Then, I would like to raise the 
next question: what does Phaedrus do in this dialogue? To examine his attitude, let us 
concentrate on the second part of this dialogue. For, compared with the first part, it 
takes the form of a conversation, not of long speeches. Thus I suggest we can easily 
identify the character and contribution ofPhaedrus in this part76• 
Now, I shall focus on his responses to Socrates. Phaedrus' answers seem to 
change the direction of the argument at two places. Let us to examine them in turn. 
The first one is his response to Socrates' second speech at 257B-D (I have referred 
to this part in the previous chapter briefly). When Socrates has fmished his long, 
divine speech, Phaedrus makes the following comments on his speech. 
I join in your prayer for that, Socrates, if indeed it is better for us. For some time I have been amazed at 
how much finer you managed to make your speech than the one before; so that I'm afraid Lysias will 
appear wretched to me in comparison, if he really does consent to put up another in competition with it. 
Indeed, my fme fellow, just recently one of the politicians was abusing him with this very charge, and 
throughout all his abuse kept calling him a 'speech-writer'; so perhaps we shall fmd him refraining 
from writing out of concern for his reputation. (257b7-c7) 
His praise of Socrates' speech is just one sentence, namely "for some time I 
have been amazed at how much flner you managed to make your speech than the one 
before". Then his concerns soon move to Lysias and speech writing. Here, the rapid 
shift of themes, from Love to Rhetoric, appears. 
What does his attitude show? Phaedrus seems to be satisfied with hearing the 
speech, so when the speech ends, his attention quickly moves to another speech which 
he hopes to get from Lysias. Thus there are no questions and answers 77 ; he does not 
76 Griswold (1980)157 says about the second part that "the palinode over, we come 
tumbling down from the heights to the more familiar earth --- to the level of 
Phaedrus, in effect." 
77 The lack of questions and answers is also clear at the end of Lysias' speech. And 
there, we can see the "aesthetic" aspect of Phaedrus as well; love for beautiful 
speeches. Lysias' speech ends with the following sentence: "So then I think I have 
said enough; but if you miss something which you think has been left out, ask it." 
(234c4·5). The phrase "ask it" should be noteworthy because we can see the fact that 
the speaker (author) encourages the listener (reader) to ask something, even if he 
requires only additional points besides what he has told. However, Phaedrus' 
response is quite typical of him: "how does the speech seem to you, Socrates? Does 
not it seem to you to be extraordinarily well done, especially in its language?'' (234c6-
7). Certainly, Phaedrus never has a question, but just admires the flowery language. 
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try to understand with all his might what Socrates tells. I am afraid that this meaning 
of "fme" which Phaedrus uses is just about the beautiful language, not the argument 
or truth which Socrates tries to express78• Is Phaedrus content merely because he is 
comfortable? 
Next, we shall look at the second intervention ofPhaedrus at 266C. As we have 
seen in chapter 3, before this interruption, Socrates has completed the definition of 
ideal rhetoric. But Phaedrus gets a word in edgeways . 
.... But you seem to me to call this kind of thing (i.e. what they have argued so far: the science of 
speaking) by the right name, when you call it dialectical; the rhetorical kind seems to me still to elude 
us. (266c8-9) 
Here, this expression of Phaedrus clearly shows he cannot follow Socrates, even if 
he has given positive responses to Socrates so far. As a result, Socrates has to start 
with the arguments about the skills of rhetoricians, though ironically79 because he 
thinks ofthem as false. For example, he refers to the skills which Phaedrus is very 
interested in as just "the refmements of the science" (266d9). Besides, at 277 A-D, the 
responses ofPhaedrus clearly reveal his poor understanding. There, Socrates 
summarizes the ideas which he has described so far. 
Soc: Then now, Phaedrus, we can decide those other issues, since we have agreed about those. 
Ph: What are they? 
Soc: The ones we wanted to look into, which brought us to our present conclusion: ... 
Ph: I thought so; but remind me again how80• 
78 And this anxiety comes true as the argument proceeds. First, we can notice 
Phaedrus' misunderstanding about Socrates' arguments in this section. Moreover, in 
the next chapter, it will be clarified that Phaedrus seems to confuse the thoughts of 
Socrates and !socrates. 
79 At 267D-268A, when Socrates has picked up some trivial skills, he asks Phaedrus 
"anything else you can add on the subject of speaking scientifically". So, Phaedrus 
answers "only small things, and not worth mentioning". But, when we take the 
enthusiastic attitude of Phaedrus into consideration, this answer seems to mean not 
having no important things, but showing modesty about saying what he knows, 
namely "I know only small things and not worth mentioning, but .... ". He seems to 
want to refer to some skills which he knows and Socrates fails to refer to. Thus, 
Socrates cruelly and ironically prevents him from referring to them, by saying "then 
let's leave the small points". 
so De Vries (1969)257 comments "Phaedrus assents, but does not really know what he 
assents to." 
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Soc: And what about the matter of its being fine or shameful to give speeches and write them, and the 
circumstances under which it would rightly be called a disgrace or not? Hasn't what we said a little 
earlier shown ---
Ph: What are you referring to? 
Soc: Hasn't it shown that .... 81 • 
From these passages, Phaedrus does not seem to understand what Socrates is 
eager to tell him. He seems to pretend to understand it, but his understanding is very 
superficial82, though. He just hears what Socrates says, but does not reach any deep 
understanding of it83• Thus, he does not seem to mind about interrupting the argument 
81 Socrates' statements after the last question of Phaedrus cited seem to hint at a 
little irritation. Hackforth (1962)161 comments "Socrates continues his sentence as 
though there had been no interruption" (of Phaedrus). 
82 Some commentators (Hackforth, Heath) believe that Phaedrus has changed 
throughout this dialogue. The most important evidence seems to be Phaedrus' 
response at 276A. There, Socrates describes "a legitimate brother" of speeches (logos) 
as the following: "The one that is written together with knowledge in the soul of the 
learner, capable of defending itself, and knowing how to speak and keep silent in 
relation to the people it should". Phaedrus expresses his agreement with it and says, 
''You mean the living and animate speech of the man who knows, of which written 
speech would rightly be called a kind of phantom." Here, clearly he replies correctly. 
But what if this answer is cited from a famous rhetorician? We can find a similar 
statement in a book, On those who write written speeches or On sophists by 
Alcidamas. In this book, we can find this sentence: "And I do not think it is right that 
speeches written down should even be called speeches, but should be thought of as 
images (eidola. phantom) and patterns and imitation of speeches, and we could 
reasonably have the same opinion about them as we have about bronze statues and 
stone monuments and depictions of animals. For, just as these are imitations of real 
bodies and give delight to the view but offer no use in human life" (27).From this 
passage, especially the way it uses the word "eidola", it seems that Phaedrus uses 
this idea as if it were his own. If it is true that he plagiarizes from Alcidamas' work 
(and Plato intends to describe him that way), it may show not only Phaedrus' 
reliance on a famous rhetorician, but also the fact that Phaedrus still sticks to the 
ordinary (non-Socratic) rhetoric. Thus, though Phaedrus refers to "the man who 
knows", it is highly possible that this knowledge does not mean Socrates "knowledge". 
This problem will be examined in the next chapter, especially focusing on the 
relationship with !socrates. 
83 Even if Phaedrus shows a proper response, it seems to be better that we think of it 
carefully. For example, at 278b5·6, Phaedrus agrees with Socrates by saying that 
"quite definitely I wish and pray for what you say." De Vries (1969)260 hesitates to 
say "at least Phaedrus seems to have been seriously "converted"", but continues to 
comment "some doubts remains about the degree of his understanding." 
Moreover, at 277c7, Phaedrus also agrees with Socrates: "absolutely; that was just 
about how it appeared to us (pantapasi men oun touto ge outo pos ephane)". We can 
notice there are many expressions to emphasize. However, if Phaedrus does not 
understand what Socrates says at all, these expressions give us some ironic and 
ridiculous implications. 
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with his improper questions, but he fails to offer appropriate questions when they are 
needed. 
Why does Plato choose Phaedrus as Socrates' respondent in this dialogue? For, as 
we have considered, we can notice a great number mistakes or misunderstandings on 
his part. It is difficult to solve this problem, but Phaedrus seems to be perhaps the 
most appropriate person, when Plato is dealing with Love and Rhetoric at the same 
time, because of his love for speeches (logos). But we shall consider this problem well 
later in 4-4. 
Here, it seems interesting to try to compare his love with Socrates' kind. In the 
case ofPhaedrus, this love is similar to that ofLysias and Socrates ' first speech. He 
seeks for beautiful speeches, but it is for his satisfaction, not for inquiry for truth as in 
Socrates' case. Socrates notices Phaedrus' tendencies, and he seems to try to convert 
Phaedrus to philosophy by managing to use effective way of speaking. 
However, this is incredibly hard, for Phaedrus just enjoys listening to speeches 
which deal with any kind of subject. How does Socrates cope with that? And what is 
the most efficient and influential speech for this kind of people, people like Phaedrus? 
In the next section, we shall concentrate on Socrates ' relationship to Phaedrus to 
answer the questions. 
In the previous section, we have considered the features of Phaedrus described in 
this dialogue, namely his passion for speeches and dependence on authority. He tends 
to like hearing speeches composed of beautiful languages, but not to be eager to 
understand the arguments seriously. Now, in this section, let us focus on the attitude 
of Socrates84 towards a Phaedrus who has these features. 
84 The general features of Socrates in Phaedrus are the following: "He is poor, goes 
bare foot, is given to self-depreciation and mock-respect for persons of repute, urbane 
and lively, prone to word-play, eager for discussion but conscious of his own 
ignorance, even on the subject of Love on which elsewhere he proclaims himself an 
expert" (Hackforth (1952)13). And de Vries (1969)5 gives some interesting comments 
about Socrates' portrait. 
And I have not dealt with "a susceptibility to the influence of external Nature" as 
"one new feature" of Socrates (Hackforth (1952)14) . It seems to be very interesting 
when we think of Socrates' second speech (243E-257B) or his last prayer to local gods 
(278B-279C). 
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First, how does Socrates deal with Phaedrus' love of speeches, as it is described at 
the beginning ofthis dialogue? For example, in responding to the request ofPhaedrus, 
Socrates offers his first speech and his second speech to withdraw the first one and to 
compensate for his sin. Then, in response to the irrelevant question of Phaedrus, 
Socrates has to start with the argument about rhetoric. Socrates' key feature will be 
evident especially in the arguments about rhetoric. 
Socrates tells the story of the cicadas and a story about Thamus and Theuth in 
Egypt. In the previous section, we have considered the story of cicadas. What makes 
Socrates tell this story? Before the beginning of the story, Phaedrus enthusiastically 
expresses his opinion about engaging in speeches in the following way. 
You really ask if we need to (examine rhetoricians in respect of writing acceptably or not acceptably)? 
What would anyone live for, if I may put it as strongly as that, if not for such pleasures as this? Not, I 
think, for those which have to be preceded by pain if one is to enjoy pleasure at all - a feature 
possessed by nearly all the pleasures relating to the body; which is why indeed they are rightly called 
slavish. (258el-5) 
In this passage, the "this" in the second line means examining all speakers to 
consider the problem that is "what is the way to write acceptably, or not acceptably?" 
(258d7). And Phaedrus calls it "pleasure"85 • Then Socrates begins to telling this story 
about the cicadas86, which "were so unhinged by pleasure that in their singing they 
neglected to eat and drink, and failed to notice that they had died" (259b8-c2). Thus, 
here, I suppose that Socrates tries to have Phaedrus notice his state, because he is 
clearly proud of his pleasure being contrasted with other "slavish" pleasures. 
Certainly it seems to be better than them, but not best, because his pleasure does not 
85 At the almost end of this dialogue (276D·E), when Socrates and Phaedrus talk 
about "amusement" (we will discuss in the next chapter), it is impressive that 
Phaedrus is excited to say "a very fine form of amusement it is you're talking of 
(writing for amusement, as a reminder for himself or anyone who is following the 
same track), Socrates, in contrast with a mean one (drinking and so on)." Here, 
Phaedrus regards someone as excellent who "is able to amuse himself with words, 
telling stories about justice and the other subjects you speak of." From this statement, 
we can know that Phaedrus thinks indulging in writing or telling speeches is 
pleasure and "fine". (Phaedrus does not seem to change throughout this dialogue as 
well. See 5·1.) 
86 This story is a digression from the argument about rhetoric, and even if there is not 
this story, we have no trouble to understand the argument of rhetoric: The part after 
this story can easily be connected with the part before this story. Therefore, this 
digression is not a crucial part of the argument to interpret, but it seems to be 
related with Phaedrus personally: this is especially for Phaedrus. 
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include serious attention to himself or deep understanding of any speech, but just pure 
enjoyment. Especially, one of the most crucial points seems to be that, when he 
indulges in the pleasure, he forgets himself. Therefore Socrates warns Phaedrus about 
his attitude, of just enjoying speeches or something about speeches, by using the most 
efficient way for him: telling a story. 
Next, what of the story ofThamus and Theuth in Egypt? This story is at the 
beginning of the new stage of the argument on rhetoric, as we move from the 
argument about "in what way it is acceptable to make and write a speech, and in what 
way it is not?" (259e2) to the one about "the subject of propriety and impropriety in 
writing", namely "in what way, when it is done, it will be done acceptably, and in 
what way improperly"(274b6-7). In other words, the important point is put on 
''writing", not "speaking and writing". Here, Socrates seems to offer the story to effect 
the transition of the subject. By telling the story, which clearly conveys the criticism 
of writing (deep dependence on letters), Socrates can efficiently brings Phaedrus to 
recognise a change of subject. 
What is more, Socrates' use of examples to explain things seems to be one of the 
efficient methods of encouraging Phaedrus to understand readily at 262C-266D. 
Soc: So do you want to take the speech of Lysias which you are carrying with you, and the ones I made, 
and see in them something of the features which we say are scientific and unscientific? 
Ph: More than anything; as things are, our discussion is somewhat bare. because we do not have 
sufficient examples. (266c6-9) 
Phaedrus frankly confesses a weakness at understanding abstract thinking. Then 
Socrates agrees to accept his proposal, and makes him read the beginning of Lysias' 
speech twice. Basing himself on that, Socrates makes clear the failings of the speech. 
In order to acquire understanding and agreement from Phaedrus, Socrates is happy to 
use a concrete example. 
As we have seen so far, in responding to Phaedrus' love of speeches, Socrates is 
willing to tell a story, use an example and repeat the same things87 to make Phaedrus 
87 In this case, Socrates makes Phaedrus read the beginning of Lysias' speech twice; 
but there is also a case where Socrates himself repeats his opinion. Thus, the passage 
about the inquiry on soul appears four times (270d1·7, 271a4·b5, 271c10·272c8 and 
273d 8·e4) in the Phaedrus. About this passage, we have already seen in 3·3. Some of 
the passages are about how to reach the science of rhetoric, and some are about the 
way oflearning, but the content seems to be similar. The purpose of repeating seems 
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understand truly and rightly. These seem to be the most effective ways to persuade 
him, or to educate him88• And they are suitable only for Phaedrus, who loves speeches 
passionately, but does not prepare himself for philosophical arguments. In other 
words, in Phaedrus' case, telling a story or giving an example might be substituted for 
logical and abstract arguments. Perhaps, each person has his own way of 
understanding. 
Secondly, how does Socrates deal with reliance on authority? Socrates recognizes 
his tendency, and I think that he makes use of it to persuade him more efficiently. For 
example, as we have considered before, Phaedrus respects Lysias from the bottom of 
his heart, and Socrates notices his feeling, so that he picks up Lysias' speech 
repeatedly, and makes Phaedrus himself think through the failings of the speech. This 
is a more effective way to persuade him than if Socrates tried to enumerate the 
demerits ofLysias and show them to Phaedrus. For, if he did that, it would not be 
easy for Phaedrus to change his opinion89, the danger being that Phaedrus would be 
inclined to stick to his opinion and admire Lysias more and more, against Socrates' 
hope. 
Let us consider another example. In the second part of this dialogue, Socrates 
repeatedly says that a grasp of truth is necessary for making a good speech. And he 
refers to Tisias as a representative of those who say that "probability" is more 
important than truth when people want to speak well. There, Socrates confirms that 
to be also to acquire the right understanding from Phaedrus, and emphasize 
Socrates' statement efficiently. 
88 On the transition from Socrates' first speech to his second, Griswold (1986)72 
comments "since he (Socrates) wishes to educate Phaedrus, Socrates first cites an 
example based on another opinion": "if a man of noble and gentle character who had 
experienced love of a similar person overheard the previous speeches, he would judge 
the speakers to be not free and the speeches to be sailor's talk". I think this example 
seems to enable the listener to understand what he says. In this case, by using this 
example, we can easily notice that the former speech has less value. 
89 In 272C, when Socrates talks about "easier and shorter route" (see chapter 3), 
Socrates asks Phaedrus: "if you have any help to give from what you have heard from 
Lysias or any else (about the easier and shorter route, namely ordinary rhetoric), try 
to remember and tell me". But Phaedrus rejects the request: "If it depends on trying, 
I would; but as things are I'm just not in a position to help." Then, Socrates decides to 
tell something he has heard; but before that, he says "the saying goes, Phaedrus, that 
it's right to give the wolfs side of the case as well.". 
This conversation is very interesting when we think of their relationship. Clearly, 
Phaedrus seems to be sensitive to any criticism toward Lysias, thus he might reject 
Socrates' offer. Then, Socrates regards Lysias as "wolfs side" ironically. From this 
case, Phaedrus' love for Lysias is so strong that Socrates seems to try to make 
Phaedrus notice Lysias' disadvantages indirectly. 
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Phaedrus has gone over to Tisias (273a4). And Socrates rejects the idea ofTisias 
completely (273A-274A). In this case, I think that Socrates seems to believe that it is 
more efficient to controvert Tisias as an authority, not Phaedrus himself. 
We have considered how Socrates deals with two tendencies ofPhaedrus. 
Socrates seems to try to communicate with Phaedrus and tell him what he really wants 
to say, dealing with Phaedrus' tendencies: Socrates is willing to tell a story, to refer to 
authority90 and to emphasize the same argument for the purpose of making Phaedrus 
understand better91 • 
However, now, we need to discuss Socrates' way of speaking. For, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, Socrates insists on the ideal rhetoric which has a well-
organized structure for reaching truth. But, when we look at Socrates' way of 
speaking, we see that there is a considerable difference between what he thinks of as 
ideal and what he actually does. For there is no dialectical method which is described 
as Collection and Division, in his conversation with Phaedrus. 
If, as we said at the end of chapter 3, a true rhetorician can give an ideal speech, 
and the rhetorician is a philosopher, namely Socrates, how can we solve this problem? 
In order to answer this question, we need to consider the second aspect of a true 
rhetorician, namely care for his audience. From this aspect, the attitude of Socrates is 
striking because he considers Phaedrus seriously. Socrates always struggles with 
Phaedrus, because Phaedrus tends to admire a beautiful way of using language, and to 
ignore the content of what the author wants to say. 
90 This feature of Phaedrus appears several times in the Phaedrus. Whenever 
Socrates notices it, he does not forget to ask Phaedrus not to do it. For example, 
when Socrates refers to medicine in order to clarify what true rhetoric is by saying 
that "the method of the science of medicine is, I suppose, the same as that of the 
science ofrhetoric"(270b1·2), the conversation between them is as follows: 
Soc: Then do you think it is possible to understand the nature of soul 
satisfactorily without understanding the nature of the whole? 
Ph: If one is to place any reliance in Hippocrates the Asclepiad, one can't 
understand about the body either without this procedure. 
Soc: And he's right, my friend; but besides Hippocrates we should examine our 
account to see if it agrees with him. (270c1·5) 
Here, we may notice what Phaedrus thinks an account as true, basing himself not on 
truth but on reliance in Hippocrates. Thus here, first of all Socrates draws Phaedrus' 
attention to his tendency to follow what famous people say blindly, and tries to 
correct it. 
91 Besides it, Socrates seems to intend to tell a long speech for Phaedrus (see 234e3, 
235b4·5, 235d6·7 and 236b2), for example, Socrates' second speech. 
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In the previous section, a severe problem faced us: is it possible or not for 
Socrates as a true philosopher to give non-ideal speeches? Socrates does not in fact 
seem to follow the rule for producing good speeches, namely structure organized by 
Division and Collection for the reaching of truth. However we have noticed that he 
cares sincerely about Phaedrus and his tendencies. In this section, let us concentrate 
on the fact that what Socrates says is directed to Phaedrus. 
First, we shall consider the condition of Phaedrus. In particular, he has two 
preferences, one for speeches and the other for authority. That is, Phaedrus likes 
beautiful language and tends to depend on what well-known people say. Then, 
Phaedrus frankly expresses his lack of understanding in relation to abstract arguments. 
To put it another way, Phaedrus is not sufficient to be a partner of Socrates and to be 
engaged by a speech developed by dialectical method (Division and Collection). Let 
us ask the question: what does Plato tell us (the readers) by using this kind of 
character as Socrates ' interlocutor? What does Plato wants to say by selecting 
Phaedrus, who is very interested in speeches, but very dependent on authority? 
If Plato intends to represent Socrates as a true philosopher, namely as a true 
follower of Zeus, how should we think of Phaedrus? Socrates cares for Phaedrus and 
speaks only to him. The activity ought to be one like the following. 
And so those who belong to Zeus seek that the one they love should be someone like Zeus in respect of 
his soul; so they look to see whether he is naturally disposed towards philosophy and towards 
leadership, and when they have found him and fall in love they do everything to make him of such a 
kind. (252el-5) 
Socrates' devotion to Phaedrus seems to be similar to the attitude of this follower 
ofZeus92 . Once he recognizes a character in his beloved, for example love of logos, 
he tries to expose it clearly as far as he can. Here, Phaedrus can be understood as 
someone who has not started with philosophy yet. He seems to be preparatory to 
92 However de Vries (1969)6 rightly comments "Nor is there any foundation for the 
belief which establishes erotic links between Phaedrus and Socrates or Plato." In this 
case, Socrates is for a follower of Zeus (a true lover) and Phaedrus for beloved one. 
But we do not need to assume that Socrates really loves Phaedrus. Here, Socrates 
faces Phaedrus as if he were a true lover of Phaedrus, to improve Phaedrus as a 
philosopher (or make him into one). Socrates' way of loving can be said as "Platonic 
Love": loving philosophically, not erotically. 
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philosophy. More exactly, Socrates seems to concentrate on the love of speeches 
(logos) and he attempts to see ifPhaedrus has an inherent potential for philosophy. 
Phaedrus seems to cause the way of speaking which Socrates displays in the 
second part of this dialogue. That is, Socrates tries to persuade Phaedrus in the way 
most suited to his preferences93, so that Phaedrus will be embarking himself in 
philosophy. Is this speech of Socrates an ideal one or not? To answer this question, let 
us focus on the passage (277b5-c6) in which Socrates talks about the way to be an 
excellent orator. It seems to be a summary in the last part of dialogue. 
Until a man knows the truth about each of the things about which he speaks or writes, and becomes 
capable of defining the whole by itself, and having defined it, knows how to cut it up again according 
to its forms until it can no longer be cut; and until he has reached an understanding of the nature of soul 
along the same lines, discovering the form which fits each nature, and so arranges and orders his 
speech. offering a complex soul complex speeches containing all the modes, and simple speeches to a 
simple soul- not before then will he be capable of pursuing the making of speeches as a whole in a 
scientific way, to the degree that its nature allows, whether for the purpose of teaching or persuading, 
as the whole of our previous argument has indicated. 
In the first part of this passage, we can notice that Collection and Division are 
referred to, that is, "defining the whole" as Collection and "cutting it up again 
according to its forms until it can no longer be cut" as Division. Then, in the same 
way, the nature of soul has to be considered. Finally, we have to "arrange and order" 
speeches to match the soul of audience. This passage clearly describes the whole way 
of acquiring the ability to speak scientifically, in other words, dialectical method and 
the care for soul. 
It is noteworthy that the passage about care for soul is repeated for emphasis, that 
is, "offering a complex soul complex speeches containing all the modes, and simple 
speeches to a simple soul". Here, Socrates clarifies the importance of giving speeches 
to suitable souls. And this sentence offers important evidence about the attitude of 
93 Griswold(1980)534 comments "the development of the Phaedrus ... could be 
explained in the light of Socrates' efforts to persuade Phaedrus in various ways" and 
"Socrates' philosophical discourse is formed or stylized in accordance with the soul he 
is addressing." Griswold continues to explain these comments to say "Socrates' two 
speeches are narrated for the sake of (because oD Phaedrus. Since Phaedrus is 
plainly unaffected by Socrates' spectacular myth, Socrates suddenly shifts his style of 
discourse to arguments about the nature of rhetoric. Phaedrus appears to be more 
affected by this style and more interested in this topic." 
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Socrates, so helping to give an answer to the question what whether the speech of 
Socrates is excellent or not. To clarify it, let us look at the comment about 277c2-3 of 
Rowe (1986a) 212-3. 
He comments that the terms of"sirnple" and "complex (variegated)" does not 
mean "simplicity and complexity in 270b ff', but they are equal to the meaning in 230 
a3-6. 
I inquire - as I said just now - not into these but into myself, to see whether I am actually a beast more 
complex and more violent than Typhon, or both a tamer and a simpler creature, sharing some divine 
and un-Typhonic portion by nature. (230a3-6) 
The distinction between a complex soul and a simple soul depends on whether it 
has a divine feature or not, because "every soul is in principle complex" (it consists of 
three parts). Here, let us remember the argument in section 2-5. In this section, the 
state of soul which is truly in love was considered. The kind of soul is ruled rightly by 
the charioteer, namely reason, and has a harmonious state as if it were a divine soul94• 
This is a "simple soul" and the person who has this kind of soul is truly a philosopher. 
Contrary, a "complex" soul means one which is influenced by other parts of soul and 
has no well-organised state. Thus non-philosophical people who cannot reach the 
divine situation (true love) have a "complex" soul. 
If we base ourselves on this consideration, "offering a complex soul complex 
speeches" seems to mean "offering non-philosophical people non-philosophical 
speeches"95• Now, it seems to be possible to judge the attitude of Socrates toward 
Phaedrus. As we have seen so far, Phaedrus' preferences and tendencies seem to show 
fact that he has non-a philosophical (complex) soul. So, Socrates, who identifies him 
correctly, gives Phaedrus complex speeches, which enable him to cope with the non-
94 Rowe (1986a)213 rightly comments "if speeches are to match souls, a 'simple' 
speech for a 'simple' soul will address itself to the ruling rational element alone, 
while a 'variegated' speech, for the variegated soul, will be forced to speak to all the 
elements in it, including the worst". 
95 Rowe (1986a)212 says about the concept of a 'variegated' soul, that this is related to 
"the description of the democratic state and the corresponding type of individual in 
Republic vm: the democratic state is 'like a poikilos garment ... , variegated with all 
types of characters (557c); so too the democratic individual (561e), whose way oflife 
is marked by his giving equal status to all his desires, with no distinction between 
good and bad (588c ff.)." And Griswold (1986)25 comments about this state of 
Phaedrus that he is "a cultivated dabbler in rhetoric, materialistic physics, and 
medicine". 
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rational parts. That is, he tells a story, refers to famous people (to reject their idea), 
uses concrete examples and repeats the same argument. All of them seem to be highly 
suitable for Phaedrus' complexity96• 
As mentioned so far, Socrates gives speeches corresponding to Phaedrus, so that 
he seems to disobey the rule that a speech should employ. Division and Collection 
should include a defmition and a clear structure generally. However, he tries to 
acquire the best result to give speeches in the most efficient and suitable way for 
Phaedrus. What is the result? It ought to make Phaedrus someone who is suitable for 
using dialectical methods and proceeding to truth together with Socrates. This 
prepares the base for Phaedrus to embark on quest for truth. Then it results that 
Phaedrus will become a philosopher in the future97• Therefore Socrates' attempt is 
actually the activity of a true follower of Zeus, a true lover and rhetorician. 
Is this way ideal or not? This judgement seems to be difficult because it lacks one 
ofthe conditions for ideal speeches98, which has been clarified in the previous chapter. 
However, it is convincing that the choice of Socrates is the best for a philosopher 
living in the actual (non ideal) world99• A philosopher living in the world is never in 
96 It seems to result that Socrates' speech is non-philosophical, but it would be too 
hasty to reach the assumption. We have to focus not on the fact that Socrates does 
not give a philosophical way of speech, but the fact that Socrates tries to deal with 
Phaedrus, who has a complex soul, therefore Socrates has to use a non-philosophical 
way of speaking. It is difficult to clarify the meaning of the "non-philosophical way." 
But, here, I think of it as a lack of Division and Collection Gn other words, a lack of 
definition or organic structure.) 
97 By offering a complex soul complex speeches, someone who has a complex soul does 
not seem to directly change into someone who has a simple soul: philosophical soul. 
And, even if someone offers a suitable speech, the listener does not seem to change so 
quickly. However, I think, it has a great possibility to improve the listener in the long 
VIew. 
98 The gap between the picture of ideal speeches and the way which Socrates shows 
seems cause the difficulty of interpretation of this dialogue like "the Gothic art" 
which de Vries (1969)22 cites from Shorey. This serious problem, namely the complex 
structure of this dialogue will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
99 Compared with written works, Socrates maintains that spoken speeches are 
excellent at 27 4B·278B. Socrates explains the superiority as an earnest attitude for 
speeches. (It is very interesting to compare with the concept of"amusement'', which 
is repeated in this dialogue. See the next chapter.) First, Socrates defines ideal 
speeches as "one that is written together with knowledge in the soul of the listener, 
capable of defending itself, and knowing how to speak and keep silent in relation to 
the people it should" (276a5·7). Moreover, he hopes that the man who will give 
speeches should "make use of the science of dialectic, and taking a fitting soul plants 
and sows in it words accompanied by knowledge" (276e5·7). From these statements, 
Socrates wants to put more emphasis on offering suitable speeches to souls, than 
using strictly Division and Collection. Here, Socrates seems to think of flexibility as 
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the situation where everyone around him has a high intellect, frankness to say what 
they think and eagerness for conversation (question and answer style). Actually 
people misunderstand, people lie and people hate. Plato vividly describes the 
philosopher who manages to express what he thinks and improve his listeners in this 
actual world. 
And as we have considered above, we seem to be able to answer the problem (b): 
the influence ofPhaedrus. Coping with Phaedrus' non-philosophical character, 
Socrates has to have a great difficulty, so that his way of speaking looks irregular as 
we have seen. I think that Plato might choose Phaedrus as an interlocutor because of a 
representative of the common (non-philosophical) people living in the world. 
The next question is whether Socrates' struggle can have a good influence on 
Phaedrus or not. In order to answer the question, in the next chapter, let us focus on 
the state of Phaedrus. If the argument which we have considered so far is right, we 
ought to fmd that Phaedrus converts his way of life and wants to be a philosopher like 
Socrates. Does Phaedrus become a philosopher or not? 
more important. (And, in the second part of this dialogue, Division and Collection are 
discussed just once, but there are so many references to inquiry into soul.) 
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5. Problem of the Phaedrus 
In this chapter, we shall take a wider perspective on the dialogue. We have 
considered the arguments of Love and Rhetoric respectively in chapters 2 and 3. Then, 
we proceeded to discuss the attitude of Phaedrus and Socrates, who are the characters 
ofthis dialogue. Finally, as a further stage, let us focus on what the author (Plato) 
intends to express by writing this dialogue. 
To begin, it will be helpful to have a review of the previous chapter. We have seen 
the unique features of Phaedrus, namely his passion for speeches and his reliance on 
authority, and Socrates ' relationship to Phaedrus. More exactly, Phaedrus loves to 
listen to any beautiful speech somewhat blindly (i.e. he does not seem to care about 
the truth) and he is eager to produce more speeches. And, he is inclined to depend on 
what famous people say and to want to know who the speaker is or what the origin of 
a speech is. In response to this attitude, Socrates tries to fmd an adequate way of 
talking to Phaedrus. To suit Phaedrus ' taste, Socrates is willing to tell a story, to offer 
an example and to repeat the same argument in order to make Phaedrus understand 
what he wants to say. As a result, the form of Socrates' speaking is not strictly an 
ideal one, because it has no organic and well-organized structure100. However, 
Socrates ' attempt may be as close to " ideal" as far as he, a philosopher living in the 
actual world, can manage. 
This was what we concluded in the previous chapter, and if it is true, we should be 
able to recognize the influence on Phaedrus. In other words, if Socrates can succeed in 
persuading Phaedrus, and Phaedrus understands properly what Socrates wants to say, 
Phaedrus will need to abandon his special features, love for speeches and authority, 
and to embark on the search for the truth, namely philosophy. Now, let us look at his 
attitude at the end of this dialogue to see the result. 
100 As I pointed out a note in the previous chapter, the lack of organic structure is not 
a proper reason for concluding that Socrates' way of speaking is non-philosophical. 
But now his speech is directed to the one who has non-philosophical soul, so he has to 
choose that way. (If he offers philosophical way to the person who is non· 
philosophical, it also seems to be inappropriate because the person might not be 
persuaded. In this case, it is not an ideal speech either.) 
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As we have seen in chapter 4, Phaedrus does not hesitate to show his 
misunderstanding of Socrates' argument. That is, from 277A toE, we can see the fact 
that Phaedrus has not understood what Socrates has said so far. At that point, Socrates 
has completed his case and asks Phaedrus to inform his friend (Lysias) of it. And 
Phaedrus' reply is the following: 
Phdr: And what of you? What will you do? For we certainly shouldn't pass over your friend, either. 
Soc: Who is that? 
Phdr: The beautifullsocrates. What will you report to him, Socrates? What title shall we give him? 
Soc: !socrates is still young, Phaedrus: ... 
Here, Phaedrus refers to !socrates as a "friend" of Socrates (278e6). How should 
we think ofthis reference to !socrates? What kind of features does !socrates have as a 
friend of Socrates? In order to consider these questions, let us look at briefly 
!socrates' Against the sophists. 
There, first !socrates enumerates the failings of sophists, who insist that they have 
ability to educate young people about oratory. !socrates indicates their "utter disregard 
of the truth" and the fact that they engage in "devoting themselves to disputation", 
and "deceive us with lies" (1). In addition, he points out the fact that they "distrust 
those from whom they are to get this money (just three or four minae )" because they 
doubt whether their pupils will pay their tuition after the lecture (5). !socrates 
comments that this is their most "ridiculous" feature 101 • 
There are some resemblances between Socrates and !socrates. One of the most 
important points is the recommendation that a good rhetorician has to know the most 
effective way to speak. !socrates says "oratory is good only if it has the qualities of 
fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment" in the case of 
discourse (13). What he says seems to be similar to a condition of Socrates' ideal 
101 Norlin (1928)164·5, note.b comments that "Socrates speaks with the same 
sarcasm of a sophist named Even us, who professed to teach all the virtues necessary 
to a good man and a good citizen for five minae". In Apology, Socrates says that he 
had asked Callias about an expert who makes people excel in their proper qualities. 
Then Callias had answered that the man was Even us from Paris and "his fee is five 
minas". Socrates thought ironically that ''Evenus is a happy man, if he really 
possesses this art, and teaches for so moderate a fee" (20B·C). 
Therefore, this rebuke against sophists is common to both Socrates and !socrates. In 
addition to this point, since there are some of the same features shared between 
them, Phaedrus seems easily to misunderstand the thought of Socrates and !socrates. 
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oratory: to give appropriate speeches to individuallisteners102• Again, !socrates 
enumerates three required features for a competent orator: nature, practical experience 
and formal training ( 14 ). They seem reminiscent of three requisites which Socrates 
refers to: nature, knowledge and practice (269D)103 • 
However, it is easy to fmd the main differences between both of them. First, 
!socrates insists that becoming an excellent orator is not difficult. Thus, he says ''to 
obtain a knowledge of the elements out of which we make and compose all discourses 
is not so very difficult if anyone entrusts himself .... to those who have some 
knowledge of these things" (16). By contrast, in Phaedrus, as we have seen in chapter 
3 and 4, even ideal orators who possess two requirements (i.e. abilities to produce 
speeches with an organic structure by Division and Collection, and to offer suitable 
speeches to people in order to persuade efficiently) have great troubles in trying to say 
what they want to say in this actual world. Compared with this view, !socrates seems 
optimistic. 
Next, let us focus on what !socrates thinks about the way to become a good orator. 
He considers that the student of oratory must "learn the different kinds of discourse 
and practice himself in their use" ( 17) 104• They take lectures and imitate the way of 
the teacher, so that they will be able to "show in their speaking a degree of grace and 
charm which is not found in others" ( 18). Here, we can recognize !socrates' view of 
the aim of oratory. What he regards as an excellent feature of oratory seems to be its 
beauty, not its truth. In this point, Phaedrus seems to argue with !socrates. 
102 However, as we shall know later, there is a fundamental difference between them. 
Especially, !socrates never mentions "soul" in the explanation of rhetoric. In 
Phaedrus, rhetoric is regarded as "leading a soul" and those who are eager to become 
able orators have to inquire into soul. And we can see many arguments in Plato's 
dialogues to the effect that soul is so important that we have to take care of soul first 
of all. 
103 It seems likely to be interesting to compare !socrates' "experience" with Socrates' 
"knowledge". Plato criticizes rhetoric as just "experience" in Gorgias, and in this book 
of !socrates, there are some parts where we may notice relationships with some 
phrases of Plato' Gorgias: 519C, 460E and 463A, which Norlin(1928) points out at 
p.l67 and p.174. 
104 The concrete way of becoming competent orators is the following: "to choose from 
these elements those which should be employed for each subject, to join them 
together, to arrange them properly, and also, not to miss what the occasion demands 
but appropriately to adorn the whole speech with striking thoughts and to clothe it in 
flowing and melodious phrase" (16). It is interesting to compare this with the 
requirements for becoming able rhetorician in Phaedrus, as we have seen in chapter 
3. 
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Then !socrates identifies someone who engages in the activities mentioned above 
with ''the devotee of philosophy" ( 18). And he regards himself as one of ''those who 
have pursued philosophy" (14). Namely, !socrates thinks that a rhetorician is a 
philosopher, but by that he means that someone who can compose and display a 
graceful speech is someone who can deal with logos excellently. In this respect, 
Phaedrus seems to believe simply that !socrates is a "philosopher" ( d3). But the 
meaning of "philosopher" which Socrates uses is someone who pursues truth in his 
speech and care for the partner. And a rhetorician who can do that is equal to a 
philosopher. Therefore, Socrates and Phaedrus use the same word "philosophy", but 
in totally and fundamentally different ways105 : the Socratic, and the !socratic. 
As we have seen above, we can understand what Phaedrus accidentally expresses 
when he refers to !socrates: in addition to the misunderstanding of the opinion of 
Socrates, it is evident that he still sticks to the beautiful appearances of speeches and 
the names of famous people. First, he seems still to love the beautiful speeches which 
make him feel comfortable. For the very aim oflsocrates in speeches, which Phaedrus 
approves of, is "grace" and "charm", not ''truth" or "knowledge". Moreover, Phaedrus 
still has the feature of reliance on well-known rhetoricians106• Therefore, we may 
conclude that Phaedrus is still in his original place: passion for beautiful speeches and 
dependence on authority. 
That is, we may conclude that Phaedrus has not changed his attitude or preference 
even by the end of the dialogue. This is illustrated by what Socrates says next to 
Phaedrus. After he (pretends to) eulogize( s) !socrates, he says "so that is the report I 
105 In fact, when Phaedrus refers to !socrates, Socrates seems to express a feeling of 
slight irritation. Then, Socrates describes the future of I socrates as very promising. 
Actually, it seems to be so excessive that we often wonder if this praise is Plato's real 
intention or not. For example, he is "superior to Lysias and his speeches" and has "a 
greater nobility" (279A). I think it is natural to suppose that Socrates (Plato) means 
to use irony to Phaedrus, to use exaggerated expressions and so to compare !socrates 
with Lysias whom Phaedrus admires. Socrates continues saying that "some diviner 
impulse led him to greater things; for there is innately a certain philosophical 
instinct in the man's mind" (279a8-bl). De Vries (1969)264 comments that this praise 
is "a mordant sarcasm" and, about this meaning of"philosophy", he says "Plato 
leaves it to his readers to decide whether .... Philosophia (is) in the Platonic or the 
!socratic sense." Rowe (1986a)215 thinks Plato has implied the presence oflsocrates 
in the beginning of the dialogue. The common feature ofLysias and !socrates is that 
both were "essentially writers of speeches" because !socrates was poor at his delivery. 
Thus, Rowe thinks "what Plato says about !socrates here is ironic". 
106 Rowe (1986a)215 comments that !socrates is "a counterpart ofLysias belonging to 
Plato's own generation". !socrates seems to have been a match for Lysias in respect of 
(written) speeches. 
78 
take from the gods here to !socrates as my beloved, and you take the other to Lysias 
as yours". And Phaedrus answers innocently "I'll do it" (279b2-4)107• There is no 
record of what Phaedrus tells Lysias later, but it is highly possible that Phaedrus will 
not inform Lysias of the reformed rhetorical style which Socrates has argued for 
because he cannot understand it properly. (Instead, I am afraid that Phaedrus will be 
eager to recommend Lysias to make another speech in rivalry with Socrates.) And 
even ifPhaedrus converts to philosophy and encourages Lysias to philosophy, this 
"philosophy" may well be totally different from Socratic philosophy. Phaedrus is still 
Phaedrus108• 
Finally, now, let us turn to the most important question: why does Plato have 
Phaedrus behave like this? In other words, why does Phaedrus not end up with a clear 
change in Phaedrus? This question is deeply related with the idea that the way of 
speaking which Socrates uses towards Phaedrus is excellent. I mean, if the speech 
which Socrates gives is especially effective for Phaedms, it is natural to expect that 
Phaedrus should accept the influence and show some signs of changing. At the least, 
Plato could have described a reformed Phaedrus, someone who intends to start 
vigorously with Socratic philosophy at the end of the dialogue. However, Plato does 
not do so. Why does Plato venture to keep Phaedrus unchanged? What is he trying to 
tell us? 
In order to answer these questions, we shall consider why Plato writes this 
dialogue. That is, we need to take a wider view to examine the dialogue: the author's 
view. In this chapter, in 5-2, let us focus on the criticism of writing activity, and then 
107 Heath(1989b) thinks of this reply as having a positive sense, and assumes that 
Phaedrus abandons ordinary rhetoric which he has been extremely interested in. 
(Similarly, Hackforth (1952)13 also comments "I am inclined to think that Phaedrus 
is converted to philosophy in the end".) Thus, "Phaedrus in the end is attached still to 
Lysias, but not perhaps to rhetoric; for he promises to convey the conclusions of their 
discussion to his beloved·-- conclusions which amount to a condemnation of rhetoric 
as he and Lysias have hitherto conceived it" (pp.190·1). This might be true if 
Phaedrus perfectly understood what Socrates wants to say and what true rhetoric is. 
But, Phaedrus seems to misunderstand. However it is true, as Heath says, that 
Socrates always intends to improve Phaedrus, throughout the dialogue. Heath 
comments "Socrates has the same paedeutic aims in the palinode and in the 
discussion" (p.190) 
lOB It is useful to remember that Phaedrus borrows the phrase from Alcidamas in 
267A, where some commentators are inclined to recognize the positive change of 
Phaedrus. (Phaedrus seems to plagiarize from Alcidamas' work by saying "you mean 
the living and animate speech of the man who knows, of which written speech would 
rightly be called a kind of phantom") This was considered in chapter 4. 
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(5-3) the structure of Phaedrus itself. Finally (5-4), we will face the question which 
this dialogue itself presents to us. 
In this section, we shall concentrate on the critique of writing in this dialogue. 
This seems to cover the written letter, written contents and writers themselves. This is 
very problematic because of the fact that Plato himself writes dialogues. First, let us 
confirm the nature of the criticism of writing exactly. 
This appears at 274B-278B in the dialogue: the last part of the argument about 
Rhetoric. At the beginning, Socrates suddenly makes a proposal, namely ''what we 
have left is the subject of propriety and impropriety in writing" (274b6-7). This 
specification, "writing", is unexpected for us because there has been no clear 
distinction between writing and speaking so far109. But, from here on, Socrates strictly 
divides writing and speaking, and totally criticizes the method of writing. 
The criticism starts as a story of Egyptian gods: Theuth and Thamus. Theuth 
discovered and invented a lot of arts, for example number or calculation. What we 
have to understand is the fact he invented letters as well. Then he went to Thamus, a 
king of all Egypt, and explained the merit and demerit of his inventions. His 
explanation about letters is the following. 
But this study, King Thamus, will make the Egyptians wiser and improve their memory; what I have 
discovered is an elixir of memory and wisdom. (274e4-6) 
But King Thamus rejected the advantage ofletters, as follows. The passage is a bit 
long, but I will cite all of what Thamus says because of its importance. 
Most scientific Theuth, one man has the ability to beget the elements of a science, but it belongs to a 
different person to be able to judge what measure of harm and benefit it contains for those who are 
going to make use of it; so now you, as the father of letters, have been led by your affection for them to 
109 At the beginning of the second part of this dialogue , Phaedrus presents the 
evaluation of speech-writers, especially Lysias at 257C. Then Socrates poses the 
question "in what way we can speak or write a speech fine and in what way not fine?" 
(259E). Thus, as Rowe(1986a)207 rightly points out, "since the 'science of speaking', 
or r hetoric, includes the writing of speeches, there is no real contrast between 
'speaking' and 'writing"'. 
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describe them as having the opposite of their real effect. For your invention will produce forgetfulness 
in the souls of those who have learned it, through lack of practice at using their memory, as through 
reliance on writing they are reminded from outside by alien marks, not from inside, themselves by 
themselves: you have discovered an elixir not of memory but of reminding. To your students you give 
an appearance of wisdom, not the reality of it; having heard much, in the absence of teaching, they will 
appear to know much when for the most part they know nothing, and they will be difficult to get along 
with, because they have acquired the appearance of wisdom instead of wisdom itself. (274e7-275b2) 
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This passage seems to contain every criticism of writing. Here, the criticism is 
characterized as the following two features: that writing prevents people from 
remembering truth within themselves, and makes people wise-seeming men. A deep 
indulgence in written words seems to be a bad influence on readers. 
So, why are written works harmful? Socrates accounts for this by using the 
analogy of a painting. That is, even if a picture looks like alive, it cannot answer our 
questions but "preserves a quite solemn silence" (275d6). In the same way, no written 
words are able to reply to us and "they point to just one thing, the same each time" 
(275d9). The reason, then, is that there seems to be no opportunity of questions and 
answers 
111
• 
How do people become, who are eager to devote themselves just to written works? 
As Thamus clearly said, they try to remember written words. As a result, it gives 
people "the appearance of wisdom". In other words, they spend a lot oftheir time 
reading or listening to written works in order to remember them without questions and 
answers, so that they look intelligent at a glance because of what they have 
memorized. But, if something goes beyond their understanding, they do not seem to 
be able to follow it at all. They seem to be able to deal with the subject with which 
110 And it is noteworthy that Phaedrus replies to this story and expresses his 
surprising feeling with joy: "Socrates, you easily make up stories from Egypt or from 
anywhere else you like"(275b3·4). His love for speeches is still remarkable. And 
because of no questions and answers, it is clear that Phaedrus undoubtedly relies on 
what Socrates and Egyptian kings say. It illustrates his reliance on authority. 
111 Moreover, we can see the other reason: written work has no ability to choose the 
reader (listener). "Every composition is trundled about everywhere in the same way, 
in the presence both of those who know about the subject and of those who have 
nothing at all to do with it, and it does not know how to address those it should 
address and not those it should not." (275e1·5) This demerit is well understood by 
contrast with the Socrates' way of speaking: he manages to fit his speech to his 
listener (Phaedrus). 
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they have already become familiar. This fact is enough to prevent people from 
embarking on a philosophical research. They are getting far from Truth112• 
Is the very man who depends on written works perhaps Phaedrus? As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, he eagerly remembers the speech ofLysias and tries to 
practice what he has memorized on Socrates. He looks intelligent, in fact is intelligent 
to some extent113, but he cannot follow Socrates' argument perfectly. For, it seems to 
be beyond the limit ofhis comprehension. The person who is influenced badly seems 
to be equal to Phaedrus114• To put it another way, this story ofTheuth and Thamus 
also points out the real situation ofPhaedrus, like the story of the cicadas. The 
criticism of writing is directly against Phaedrus, who loves just to accept any speech 
without questions and answers. 
How should we react to this critique as readers of Phaedrus? In this dialogue, as 
Socrates gives his warning about the dangers of deep indulgence in written works, is 
Plato trying to deliver something to us the reader? Simply speaking, does Plato think 
that this dialogue, a written work, will be a bad influence on the reader, like Phaedrus? 
112 Griswold(1980)541 articulates the criticism of written works by saying that "the 
written word lets us persuade ourselves too easily that we are in irrefutable 
possession of the truth, while in fact we are not. It facilitates our tendency to become 
dogmatists or religious zealots rather than philosophers" because of the lack of 
questions and answers. 
113 Hackforth (1952)13 comments that "He (Phaedrus) is plainly an intelligent person, 
alive to the movement of thought in his day; no stranger to Socrates, but clearly not 
of his 'circle"'. Phaedrus may be regarded as a person who is familiar with the 
modern fashion of thought and rhetoric. Heath (1989a) 173 thinks of the reason why 
Plato chooses Phaedrus as a character: "he (Phaedrus) and the pattern of his 
preoccupations were representative in some way of those to whom Plato was 
addressing the dialogue, or had some philosophical relevance to them". 
It seems interesting to cite de Vries'(1969)5 comment on Phaedrus in other dialogues: 
"in the Protagoras (315C) Phaedrus is among the audience of Hippias, the teacher of 
universal science. His interest is wide, but superficial. He is interested in mythology 
(Symp. 178b ff.; Phdr. 229b, 259b), but above all things he is addicted to ''literature" 
and a fervent admirer of Lysias." 
114 Griswold (1986)211 regards the disadvantage of writing as being that "the written 
word will encourage the reduction of philosophy to a merely intellectual business", 
because he thinks of "the language about the growth of the soul and the externality 
of the written word" as something "indicate(s) that Socrates is praising a way of life 
as opposed to a merelyintellectual occupation". (We have to pay attention to the 
word "merely".) This "intellectual occupation (business) seems to mean something 
"devoid of the recollective insight into Truth and so of the madness of eros". And he 
comments that "the written monologue ... possesses the dangerous tendency to drug 
living thought. The Phaedrus is named after a man who perfectly exhibits this 
danger" and "the critique of writing is ... a critique ofPhaedrus as well". (p.213) 
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To answer this question, let us consider Griswold's idea (1981) about Plato's 
dialogues. He thinks every dialogue of Plato's is immune to this criticism of written 
words because ofthe style: dialogue form. In other words, writing something that is 
itself in spoken form not like a composition, but like a conversation. He offers two 
reasons to justify his opinion that "Plato's use of the dialogue form both preserves the 
sense of uncertainly and incompleteness that characterizes Socratic dialogue, and 
neutralizes Socrates' objections to writing"(p.542) 115• 
The first reason is this: Griswold thinks "these texts faithfully mirror Socratic 
dialogue": that is, a dialogue in which the main speaker never presents his own 
opinion: Plato's dialogues are not dogmatic. Thus "Platonic philosophy is precisely 
that it is not a dogma, a system, but a search"(p.543). There is no statement in his 
dialogues for the reader to memorize116• What we the readers engage in seems to be 
taking part in the Socratic dialogue and facing Truth117• 
We may fmd this opinion very attractive. Plato's dialogue is like a preserved food, 
and when we feel hungry for conversation, all we have to do is to open and read the 
dialogue. But is it true? When we read the dialogue, are we supposed to be having a 
real conversation? This seems problematic. We should consider the structure of 
dialogue form itself in the next sectionn8• 
115 And Griswold(1980) thinks Socrates' attempt is to "keep his own views in a state of 
ultimate unclarity, uncertainty, incompleteness" (p.542), because he has to avoid the 
most dangerous situation: "solipsism". Thus, "one must discourse in such a way as to 
arrest the danger, and this consists of questioning others and defending oneself' 
(p.542). In this position, Plato seems write down Socratic dialogue to prevent us from 
"solipsism" (to encourage us to embark on search constantly, namely without being 
satisfied with sticking to one position). 
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"A Platonic dialogue does not present a clear and certain or complete teaching". 
And because of its anonymity, the dialogue can avoid "dogmatism" (Griswold 
(1986)220·1). 
117 The second reason is the following: when Socrates offered his objection to written 
works in the dialogue, "Socrates did not conceive of the dialogue form as Plato 
developed it" (Griswold(1980)543). In other words, if Socrates knew dialogue form as 
a writing style, which Plato seems to invent first, Socrates would not have criticized 
written works, because dialogue form could be immune to the disadvantages of 
written works. Thus, the fact Socrates does not notice this new style, dialogue form, 
causes his criticism. But I think this reason is a bit strange because it seems to 
confuse the historical Socrates (who did not seem to know the style in fact) with the 
Socrates whom Plato describes. 
118 Griswold(1980)546 note15 says "what I have said does not, to be sure, explain why 
Plato decided to write in the first place. I am trying only explain why it is that he 
wrote dialogues" in his article. But I would like to examine "why and how does Plato 
write?" 
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In this section, let us consider the structure of the dialogue. Griswold thinks, as we 
have seen above, that Plato' s dialogues are immune to the critique of written works 
because Plato writes in dialogue form. But here, I would like to focus on the fact that 
Plato writes works, in spite of the fact he points out the harm of written works. 
Now we shall examine the structure of Phaedrus. How does the author, Plato, 
intend to compose this dialogue? Generally speaking, it starts with the scene on the 
bank ofthe Ilissus. In this introduction, Phaedrus bumps into Socrates, and they sit on 
the bank to enjoy Lysias' speeches about love. Then, in the main part, there are two 
arguments: about Love (230E-257B) and about Rhetoric (257B-277A or 278B). The 
first part consists of three (long) speeches about love, and second part is in 
conversation form, between Socrates and Phaedrus. Here, Socrates severely criticizes 
writing. Finally, Socrates gives a message to Lysias and !socrates, prays to the local 
gods and leaves 119. 
Now let us compare the dialogue with an ideal speech. As we have seen in chapter 
3, there are two required conditions for ideal oratory: (1) a speech has to have a well-
organized and self-consistent structure in order to reach the truth efficiently and (2) 
orators have to pay attention to the person to whom their speech is directed, and take 
the result into consideration. First, we shall consider the first condition. 
Can we fmd a well-organized structure in Phaedrus? First of all, we have to ask 
the question: what is the subject? The problem ofthe subject we have considered in 
chapters 2 and 3. Generally, there seems to be two subjects in this dialogue: Love and 
Rhetoric. Then if we try to fmd the defmition of the each subject, as a good starting 
point for proper argument, we fail to find it. (E.g. the argument about Love starts with 
the speech ofLysias, which Socrates severely criticizes. And the first part ofthe 
argument about Rhetoric is the wrong praise ofPhaedrus.) Then, as we concluded at 
the end of chapter 3, what might unite Phaedrus is the concept of good relationship 
with someone (the aspect of Love) to attain truth by people' s having a conversation 
with each other (the aspect of Rhetoric). However the problem still remains. Even if 
we admit that the theme could unite the dialogue, we cannot fmd the well-organized 
structure. It is extremely problematic, because if the author (Plato) obeys the first rule, 
119 See the more detailed outline of Phaedrus which forms the appendix of this 
dissertation. 
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to supply an organic structure for his speech (actually the man who states that is 
himselfl), he must have offered a defmition of the subject (which can be acquired by 
dialectical methods). It is one of the most importruit procedures because we the 
readers can start our search with the characters (and the author), from the defmition. 
But we are given no clue to a defmition in Phaedrus. 
Someone may think that it is natural that there is no defmition and structure 
because this is a dialogue. And, in relation to this point, Griswold seems to think that 
Plato's books have different rules from other written works, so that the critique does 
not apply to Plato's case. But this does not seem to be reasonable because Plato the 
author himself clearly presents the conditions for excellent composed works, and 
Plato himself breaks them. Namely, if the author intends to keep the rules, he can do it 
easily. 
Here, the original question has come back. That is the problem of Socrates' way 
of speaking to Phaedrus, as considered in the previous chapter. Socrates here too 
departs from the ideal form. However, his speech seems to be as good as a 
philosopher in the real world can make it. For Socrates tries to address Phaedrus, 
responding to his preferences and tendencies. Even though his speech has no structure, 
it is full of consideration for the listener. 
Therefore, now let us think of Phaedrus in respect of its influence and outcome: 
condition (2) for ideal oratory. First, we have to identify the people at whom Plato 
intends to aim. In order to consider this question, it may be helpful to refer to 
M.M.McCabe (1982). She thinks that we are "the targets" (p.69). To put it another 
way, the real interlocutor of Socrates in Plato's dialogues is us, namely the readers. 
Thus, we have to ''wary of supposing that every question is closed, every line of 
argument merely an aniseed trail towards the revealed truth of Platonism" (p.69). We 
have to regard every statement in this dialogue which Plato presents as a question 
which is addressed to us. 
However, there is still a problem. How can Plato address us, as Socrates addresses 
Phaedrus? At a glance, it seems to be impossible because written works cannot vary 
according to their readers. But McCabe thinks it is possible. Moreover, she thinks that 
this part of criticism of writing enables the dialogue to do that. Her explanation is the 
following. 
She explains the use of double arguments (dissoi /ogoi) as a matter of"playing 
one argument off against another" (p.68): antilogia. This method is characteristic of 
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Zeno 120, but she regards it as a positive way to "incorporate the views of an unknown 
reader" (p.69)121 • When all opinions are discussed and "each arm ofthe dilemma 
concludes as an antinomy, the reader is suspended between the arms, and forced to 
question the very structure of the argument". Thus, McCabe assumes that ''this 
method of antilogia triggers speculation" (p.69). 
How do we apply this idea to the case of Phaedrus? The antilogia seems to occur 
in the criticism of written works: Plato writes "do not trust written words"122• Faced 
with this problematic position, we wonder what Plato wants to say: whether writing 
itself is good or not? As a result, we have to start on the search by ourselves. McCabe 
proposes that this function which makes people embark on search is the aim of 
Phaedrus123• For ''the Phaedrus proposes that inquiry is stimulated by paradox"124• 
Thanks to its influence on the reader, it may be possible for the dialogue to be 
immune to the general criticism of written words125• It does not force us to remember 
120 
"Zeno makes his hearers see the same thing as both the same and different, one 
and many, moving and at rest ..... This art of antilogia works by conflating and 
confusing same and different". She seems to think that Plato regards Zeno as "a 
knowledgeable practitioner of antilogic". 
121 She thinks "antilogia is neutral; it may be practiced either by an ignorant man, or 
by a knower" (p.68). And it is likely that she thinks that if the man who knows (e.g. 
Zeno or Plato) uses this art, it has useful meaning. 
122 McCabe (1982)65 comments that "it has been recognized that this passage 
(Phaedrus274C·277A, namely the criticism ofwritten words) is odd. Here is Plato, 
writing a book which repudiates the writing of books" and "this is a full-blooded 
antinomy- and consequently hard to shrug off'. "At 277e7 Socrates says 'No logos 
has ever been written, whether in verse or in prose, which is worthy of great 
attention .. .'. 'Socrates' says it; but Plato writes it. If he writes to convince, he writes 
that writing should not convince us; if what he writes does convince us, it convinces 
us that it should not convince us." However, Rowe (1986b)l15 offers some objections 
against this idea. He concludes "there is no antinomy here", because Plato shows that 
writing can convince us, but not teach us. For the details of Rowe' s idea, see the next 
section. 
123 Griswold(1980) seems to agree with McCabe. Thus, as we have seen, "what the 
Platonic dialogues teach about "Platonic philosophy" is precisely that it is not a 
dogma, a system, but rather a search" (p.543). Later (1986) he states more clearly 
that "the dialogues not only encourage the search, and even defend the view that 
philosophy is a search, they also portray this very activity" (p.223). 
124 This idea also may give us a hint of how to avoid the criticism, that written works 
cannot help themselves. I mean the point of this criticism is that written works may 
deceive us. The reason why written works deceive us might be the fact they always 
just show the same words and keep silence (i.e. they cannot help themselves). But 
the function of double arguments can offer not only single opinion, but also several 
views. Thus, it would be able to correspond to many people who have different idea. 
125 Griswold (1986)223 thinks that dialogue has nothing to memorize, and nothing to 
authorize. "Plato's anonymity reflects his pedagogical awareness of the danger his 
authority poses to his student's growth". It seems to be interesting to compare these 
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any idea or phrase, so that it is incapable of making a person even appear "wise". 
Instead, it gives us an opportunity to embark on search for Truth. From this 
perspective, we can regard Plato ' s dialogues as something to improve us. As a result, 
we judge that the Phaedrus is worth considering with serious attention. 
However, is this solution correct?126 For there is a problematic concept which is 
repeated though this dialogue: "amusement". Socrates says that the speeches which he 
offers are just "amusement" at 262C-D (as I will consider in the next section). And 
written works are expressed as "amusement" as well. What does this word mean? 
Does not this "amusement" prevent us from examining written dialogue too closely? 
Anyway, we have to consider this idea to understand rightly what Plato wants to say 
and why Plato chooses to write. 
In this section, let us concentrate on the problematic term "amusement". In order 
to identify what Plato intends to express by using this word, we shall pick up some 
examples in the second part of Phaedrus. First, Socrates uses this word when he refers 
to his two speeches. 
By some chance - so it seems - the two speeches which were given do have in them an example of 
how someone who knows the truth can mislead his audience by making play (prospaizon) in what he 
says (logoi). (262c10-d2) 
And we can find other parts which refer to "amusement". Socrates makes this 
comment on his second speech: "the madness of love we said was best, and by 
expressing the experience of love through some kind of simile, which allowed us 
perhaps to grasp some truth, though maybe also it took us in a wrong direction, and 
mixing together a not wholly implausible speech, we sang a playful hymn in the form 
of a story ... " (265b5-c 1 ). And then, Socrates continues with the following: 
features with the features of Phaedrus: passion for speeches (remembering and 
practising them) and reliance on authority. 
126 Rowe(1986b)114 rejects Thompson's idea: "So long as something is written in 
dialogue form, it is said, it will be immune to Socrates' general case against writing". 
He asks against Thompson, "Why, if Plato means to make an exception for one 
written form, does he make Socrates insist, four times over, that it applies to all 
forms?" 
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To me it seems that the rest really was playfully done (pepaisthai), by way of amusement (paidia); but 
by chance two principles of method of the following sort were expressed, and it would be gratifying if 
one could grasp their significance in a scientific way. (265c8-dl) 
From the passages mentioned above, we see how Socrates regards his previous 
speeches. There are some peculiar features which characterize them: namely they are 
told "playfully" and "by chance", and have the capacity to deceive the audience (in 
other word, to lead people in a false direction). Here, Socrates clearly seems to have 
doubts about what he said before. 
If we focus on the passage in the last part of this dialogue (277A-279C), this 
problem becomes more serious. When Socrates is about to finish the discussion of 
rhetoric, he says "so now we have had due amusement (pepaistho) from the subject of 
speaking" (278b7). Now, we can see that Socrates judges all the discussions which 
have been displayed in this dialogue as "amusement", not just his speeches ofLove. 
What does this mean? If it means that the whole discussion is literally a mere pastime, 
what should we conclude about the dialogue as a whole? 
To answer these questions, now, we need to know the meaning of"amusement". 
What does this "amusement" relate to? It seems to be associated with "writing". 
Namely "his garden of letters, it seems, he will sow and write for amusement (paidia), 
when he does write, laying up a store of reminders both for himself, .... and for 
anyone who is following the same track" (276dl-3). Here, writing is compared with 
speaking, which should be paid serious attention. Again, we should notice the critique 
ofwriting, as de Vries (1969)20 says, "this (writing qualified as apaidia) is certainly 
a depreciation". 
Now, we have to deal with the serious problem: Socrates clearly regards his whole 
arguments as "amusement". As we have considered above, "amusement" is something 
little to be examined seriously. What does Plato intend? Rowe (1986a) focuses on 
Socrates' two speeches in respect of possessing "a large number of central Platonic 
ideas" (p.9). Plato presents these ideas in the dialogue127 (especially in the first 
part128), and he himself looks back on them in it (in the latter part). And, in the latter 
part, we have a number of uses of the term for "amusement" (which refer to the 
127 In this point, Rowe offers an objection to Griswold's idea that the dialogue has no 
doctrine to be memorized. See 5-2 above. 
128 We can find "Idea" and recollection, which are typically regarded as Platonic ideas. 
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arguments which have been presented in the dialogue). Rowe thinks that "Plato will in 
part be using the dialogue in order to comment on the nature and value of his own 
output as a writer" (p.l 0). Plato seems to try to review his ideas in order to be judged 
in respect of their truth. The idea of "amusement" which appears frequently seems to 
make his whole arguments open (suspended)129, even if the idea was written in 
dialogue form or not. 
This "amusement" seems to give a greater impetus on us to try to understand this 
dialogue. For, by regarding the whole discussion as "amusement", Plato tries to show 
that not only writing itself, but also the contents of Phaedrus should be devalued. This 
makes us think that every passage is open to be questioned, or to be doubted. We have 
to ask ourselves "Is Socrates' way of speaking in fact persuasive? Can we admit that 
it is efficient?", or "Are the arguments, for example about ideal Love or dialectical 
method, true or false?". We are supposed to be wondering by ourselves130, because 
the dialogue gives no answers, like a painting. 
In order to answer these questions, we the readers seem to have to engage in 
dialectical method: conversation. Namely, we have to converse with other readers to 
solve the questions: sometimes we have doubt us to a passage of the dialogue, 
sometimes we agree with it. And this attempt seems to be important for the author as 
well. By saying that a writer has to possess something more than what he writes, and 
by implying that his written words are "amusement", Plato has to try to make himself 
more valuable than his works. Rowe rightly (1986a)ll says "Plato himself expects to 
be challenged about what he has written, and to be forced to improve on it". 
Given what we have said about "amusement", we the readers are supposed to be 
forced to embark on research by ourselves. This can avoid making people wise-
seeming men, because in the company of other people it seems to be harder for us to 
keep our subjective and arbitrary impressions than when we just read books. In other 
words, we are encouraged to proceed to lively conversation to improve ourselves. 
129 Rowe (1986b) 116 comments "Socrates' attitude towards his speech will exactly 
parallel Plato's towards his dialogue". As Socrates regards his arguments as 
"amusement", Plato also regards his dialogue as "amusement". It enables Plato to 
criticize his own idea indirectly (Rowe expresses it as "subterfuge"). 
130 McCabe (1982)72 comments that "Were we to consider the book antinomy within 
the dramatic context of the dialogue, ... there would be no paradox, since the 
antinomy is exclusively about the written word. And so the true nature of the 
dialogue- that it is a piece ofliterary composition- is brought home to us just 
because we, the readers, are outraged by the antinomy". 
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"Amusement" enables us to do that because it makes the whole discussion doubtful131 , 
which provokes the readers. 
Now, it is possible for us to understand what Plato intends to say in presenting this 
dialogue. In other words, Phaedrus itself is Plato's attempt to make us think by 
ourselves and converse with others. And this attempt seems to be intended directly to 
make us all do philosophy. As Griswold (1986)222 says, "Plato's dialogues seem 
designed to function as mirrors of a peculiar sort, for they allow the reader who is 
unsuited to philosophy to see himself in the text, and the reader who is suited to 
philosophy to glimpse something that he has not yet achieved and that he desires." 
Finally, we can now answer the question about the change in Phaedrus, which we 
raised in 5-l. We cannot admit that Phaedrus has changed, by accepting Socrates' 
speeches. Why does Plato not describe Phaedrus as someone who decides to turn to 
philosophy, if Socrates' way of speaking is excellent? The same problem seems to 
apply to us the readers: whether we have changed after reading this dialogue, if Plato 
writes excellently? The absence of significant change in Phaedrus shows that our 
situation is still open to be decided. In other words, Plato tries to make us focus on 
ourselves and locate in the same situation of Phaedrus. As Socrates hopes that 
Phaedrus will become someone who has something more valuable inside than written 
works, Plato wishes that the readers become this kind of people. Certainly, Plato 
seems to expect us to converse with other readers, questioning and answering, namely 
converting to philosophy. I think Plato might wait for us to change spontaneously, by 
leaving his dialogues for coming ages 132• 
131 Griswold (1986)218·9 offers an interesting idea on the structures of Phaedrus. 
"The Phaedrus offers us a palinode recanting the first two speeches of the Phaedrus; 
then a recantation Gn the form of a discussion of the techne of words) of his palinode; 
then a recantation (introduced by the Theuthfl'hamus story) of this recantation; 
followed by Plato's recantation (visible in his deed of writing) of the critique of 
writing expressed by the personae in his text. But a self-qualification of Plato's irony 
will also appear, for the deed of writing can be seen to acknowledge its inferiority to 
living dialogue between philosophers. This fifth palinode of the Phaedrus returns us 
to something like Socratic dialegesthai as the proper medium for philosophizing. For 
Plato, too, dialogue is the living self-motion of thought." 
132 Griswold (1986)224 points out two advantages of Plato's dialogue as written works: 
namely, that when compared with spoken words, they have "permanence" and 
"repeatability". They enable these dialogues to acquire "a far wider audience". 
Thanks to Plato's dialogues, we moderns can start philosophy properly. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have considered the whole argument of Phaedrus according to the approach 
which I suggested in the Introduction. I have dealt with three problems unique to this 
dialogue: (a) the subject of Phaedrus , (b) the influence ofPhaedrus as the interlocutor 
and (c) the critique of written works. To solve these problems, we have divided the 
whole dialogue into four stages and examined each stage. In this final chapter, basing 
ourselves on the discussions, let us answer the first question '"what unites Phaedrus?" 
But before that, in this section, it is better to look the main chapters again in order 
to draw our conclusions properly. As I said, there are four stages and they correspond 
to each chapter. I list the four stages again. 
(1) In the earlier part of this dialogue, what is argued? 
(2) In the latter part of this dialogue, what is argued? 
(3) How do the characters converse on those topics? 
(4) What does the author, Plato, intend to express by writing this dialogue? 
And each stage was corresponding to each chapter: (1) was chapter 2, (2) was 
chapter 3, (3) was chapter 4 and (4) was chapter 5. Stage (1) and (2) dealt with the 
arguments on love and rhetoric respectively. But in stage (3), we focused on the 
characters who made the arguments. Then, in stage (4), concentrating on "writing", 
we considered the view ofPlato as the author. Thus this way of interpreting the 
dialogue enabled us to acquire more comprehensive and more transcendental view. 
As stage ( 1 ), we considered the first part of the dialogue, the discussions of love. 
There, I examined the three speeches on love in turn to identify the exact meaning of 
sophrosyne and mania. In Socrates ' second speech, love is defmed as a kind of 
madness, --- a divine kind. But, love can be still more worthy because it enables a 
lover to lead a well-organized life: a philosopher' s life. The ideal status can be 
described as one under the control of reason. This will come true, not by one' s 
searching alone, but by the lover and the beloved cooperating with each other. This 
91 
ideal companionship seems to be similar to becoming like gods, something extremely 
hard for human beings. 
As stage (2), the second part of this dialogue was examined. The arguments are 
concerned with rhetoric. In chapter 3, I discussed ideal rhetoric by comparing it with 
ordinary rhetoric, whose representatives are Lysias, Pericles and other trivial 
rhetoricians (whom Phaedrus admires). The worthless rhetoricians have two failures: 
lack of knowledge and lack of care for their audience. By contrast, Socrates seems to 
think of ideal oratory as one enabling a person to proceed to truth by using dialectical 
method, and paying attention to the listener to whom his speech is directed. This is the 
most efficient and certain way to make the speaker reach truth with the listener. Thus 
this rhetorician can be called as a philosopher properly. 
This concept of the philosopher connects two subjects, love and rhetoric. As we 
have considered, the discussion of love presented a picture of ideal companionship 
involving the development of each other's intellectual ability. And then, the 
discussion of rhetoric seems to reinforce the actual aspects of the ideal philosophical 
companionship. Thus, if we answer problem (a), the subject of Phaedrus, it is 
cooperation to develop one's philosophical capacity by engaging in dialectical method. 
This relates with the view both of love and of rhetoric. 
Then what of the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus? This, we 
considered in chapter 4 (stage (3)). And this connects with problem (b): the influence 
ofPhaedrus as the interlocutor. First, we recognized the nature ofPhaedrus; love for 
speeches and reliance on authority. Moreover, it is clear that Phaedrus fails to follow 
Socrates' arguments. Therefore, Socrates has to be flexible with Phaedrus, so that his 
speech is forced to be distorted, for example by telling a story to have Phaedrus 
understand easily, repeating the same statement for emphasis and using many 
concrete examples to acquire Phaedrus' conviction. The reason is that Socrates is 
trying to convert Phaedrus to philosophy and embark on the search with him. Thus 
Socrates manages to correspond with Phaedrus. Here, we can recognize the true 
picture of a philosopher living in the world. 
Finally, as stage (4), Plato's critique of writing has been discussed in chapter 5. 
And this is problem (c). First, we examined the change or lack of change in Phaedrus, 
because it seems to be deeply related with understanding the meaning of the critique. 
In spite of Socrates' eagerness, Phaedrus does not seem to decide to convert to 
philosophy. Rather, Phaedrus fails to understand what Socrates wants to say and 
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confuses it with !socrates' idea of rhetoric. What does this poor situation of Phaedrus 
mean? Perhaps, we are forced to ask ourselves, "Is Socrates ' way actually effective or 
not?" or "are the arguments of this dialogue appropriate or not?" Here, we can 
recognize what the critique means. It recommends us not to trust written works but to 
search by ourselves, by using logos. In this case, this dialogue as a written work never 
helps us because ''they [it] point[s] to just one thing, the same each time" (275d9). 
Thus, we have to start with the inquiry and the conversation by ourselves or with 
other readers, leaving the dialogue as just a reminder. 
As we have seen above, this interpretation leads us to a comprehensive reading of 
the whole dialogue. As the argument proceeds, the picture of a philosopher gets more 
actual and accurate. Finally, the argument forces us to become involved in the inquiry 
which is presented in Phaedrus and makes us philosophers. In the next section, basing 
ourselves on the all considerations above, I will clarify the unity of Phaedrus. 
[~:i ·xif; illiilltlltt~!!iiiiS 
In the previous section, we have looked back on the whole argument of the 
dialogue. Now, in this section, let us consider an idea which enables us to unite the 
Phaedrus as a whole. In the Introduction, especially 1-2, and in chapters 2 and 3, we 
have examined the subject of Phaedrus. There, the main subject seems to be double: a 
best kind of companionship (the aspect of love) to inquire into truth by engaging in 
logos (the aspect of rhetoric). 
Is this the true purpose for which Plato writes the Phaedrus? Does Plato intend to 
say that this kind of companionship is best and admirable for everyone? I think that 
the answer is yes, and also in a way no. Let me explain. Certainly, Plato might hope 
that we recognize this kind of friendship is best, but he might be satisfied with not just 
recognizing, but practising. 
This seems to be clarified by the considerations in chapters 4 and 5. There, we 
considered the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, and the critique of written 
works ofPlato. The latter seems, at a glance, to involve Plato in a contradiction. 
However, it could be special device of Plato's: to make us embark on inquiry, not 
sticking to the book. And Plato shows the word and deed of Socrates, as a very 
realistic model of conversation in the living world, searching for truth. 
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Thus, the Phaedrus seems to have two functions. One is to show the picture of a 
philosopher Plato regards as true. A philosopher can be in cooperation with others to 
proceed to truth, by exchanging opinions with each other. And the other function is to 
attempt to provoke us the reader in order to encourage us to practise this activity like 
Socrates. We are not only supposed to read and recognize how Plato confronts the 
problems on love and rhetoric and manages to solve them, but fmally to inquire by 
ourselves, regarding the solution written by Plato as just tentative. 
Thus, the critique of writing seems to show the deep coincidence between the 
thought and the practice of Plato. The Phaedrus seems to give us the true picture of 
philosopher which we have to become, and the material which enables us to start with 
discussion (as a base), and a realistic model (as a reminder) of the way to argue using 
dialectical method. Plato intends to write down his ideas, because he might think that 
it is great help for us. But he never forgets the harm of writing, which has possibility 
of preventing any progress. Thus, Plato criticizes written works themselves, urging us 
not to rely on them deeply. Thus, when we finish reading this dialogue, we are 
supposed to get started with a search to try to solve the puzzle. For, the Phaedrus 
itself faces us as a big question. 
In this section, I will consider whether this consideration of Phaedrus can be 
applied to Plato' s other dialogues. Detailed discussion of the dialogue' s relationship 
with other works lies outsides the scope of this dissertation. Thus, here I will merely 
offer a starting-point for such a discussion. 
Symposium may be picked out as a most suitable text to contrast with Phaedrus. 
The reason is that Symposium also deals with love, and is supposed to be composed in 
the "middle period of Plato ' s writing, along with e.g. the Phaedo, the Republic and 
the Phaedrus"(Rowe (1998)11). Thus, comparing these two dialogues with each other, 
we will be able to clarify the similarities and differences between them and acquire a 
proper interpretation of Symposium. 
First, let us look at the outline of Symposium. The scene is Agathon ' s, a tragic 
poet's, house. He holds a drinking-party to celebrate his prize. Then, people who are 
invited decide to give a speech on love in tum as entertainment, instead of listening to 
the flute or drinking too much. The first speaker is Phaedrus, who fust proposes love 
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as the theme. Then, the participants each give an encomium oflove. Finally, Socrates 
offers his speech on love (but first, he begins to offer questions to Agathon in short 
conversation form, in his familiar way). Now, let us think of his speech, especially 
what Diotima, a woman of Mantinea, says to Socrates. In fact, Socrates confesses that 
"she is the very person who taught me too about erotics"(201d5). 
Diotima' s speech seems to consist of two parts: the preliminary passage (204d 1-
209e4) and the main passage (209e5-212a7) which includes the famous "ascent" 
description. Here, we shall focus on the passage where the "ascent" of love is treated 
as an initiation. There, Diotima highly recommends turning to a single body, all 
beautiful bodies, and beauty in souls and so on. At a glance, it seems to be that this 
process oflove is personal activity, which can be engaged in alone. For, one 
individual may just look at various kind of beauty and proceed to more complete and 
spiritual beauty. 
However, we have to examine the passage more closely. Diotima explains the first 
stage: "If the one leading him leads him correctly, he must fall in love with a single 
body and there procreate beautiful words, and then realise for himself that the beauty 
that there is in any body ..... " (210A). Moreover, there is another clear example: 
The next stage is that he must consider beauty in souls more valuable than beauty in the body, so that if 
someone who is decent in his soul has even a slight physical bloom, even then it's enough for him, and 
he loves and cares for the other person, and give birth to the sorts of words - and seeks to them - that 
will make young men into better men .... (210C) 
Here, I admit it is too simple a comparison, but we seem to certainly fmd the 
common features133 oflove in Phaedrus: care for others and giving a speech. And the 
process from beauty of body to beauty of soul can remind us of love defmed as 
sophrosyne: not indulging in physical pleasure, but engaging in mental development. 
As we have seen above, there seem to be two interesting points which Symposium 
and Phaedrus have in common. The first is the picture of Phaedrus. In Symposium too, 
133 de Vries (1969) 108 comments "at first sight a striking disagreement with what is 
said in the Symp.; there it is explicitly stated that Eros is not a god (202bc), nor a 
child of Aphrodite, but ofPenia (202 d ff.). "And he cites the idea ofHackforth by 
saying that "Hack£. 55 rightly explains the apparent "retraction" as a result of the 
different aims and points of view of the two dialogues: in Symp. the soul's effort is 
stressed, in the Phaedrus the "possession", the divine madness which presupposes a 
deity as its source." 
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it is clear that Phaedrus loves speeches and is eager to produce speeches, as 
Eryximachus, who proposes to give a speech on love in turn, rightly points out134• 
The second point relates to the concept of love. There are some differences, for 
example a lot of definitions or the lack of reference to mania in Symposium, but it is 
possible for both dialogues to have a deep relation with each in respect of love135• 
Thus, can the logos in the process of love in Symposium be examined by comparing it 
with logos of Phaedrus136? 
What I have said above will be our next problems. As our interpretation of 
Phaedrus widens and extends, we shall have to consider what Plato wants to say, 
from one dialogue to other dialogues, and to the dialogues as a whole. Thus, first, I 
will start with application of this consideration of Phaedrus to Symposium as a next 
task137• It seems not easy, but there is no doubt that the result will be excellent if we 
succeed. 
134 Rowe (1998) 135 suggests an interesting comment: "it looks as if the 'favour' 
Eryximachus is doing Phaedrus includes setting things up so that he can give a 
speech he has prepared (the beginning of the Phaedrus, too, has Phaedrus anxious to 
show off his rhetorical skills)". 
135 Lysis is also an important dialogue, which deals with the subject of love. About 
this dialogue, Cooper (1997)687 comments briefly in Plato, Complete Works that 
Socrates in Lysis recommends to Hippothales that "the right way is by engaging 
them (beloved boys, Lysis) in philosophical discussion. If they are worth attention at 
all, it is by turning them toward the improvement of their souls, that is, their minds, 
that you will attract their sober interest and grateful affection." Here, Cooper points 
out the relationship between Lysis, and Phaedrus and Symposium. 
136 Concerning logos, it would also be interesting to compare Phaedrus and Gorgias, 
whose subject is rhetoric. In the case of Gorgias, ordinary rhetoric is regarded as just 
experience by Socrates. Just like the rhetoric Phaedrus admits, rhetoric in Gorgias 
seems to have no connection with truth. 
137 This consideration is beyond the limits of this dissertation. I show the next step of 
this research. 
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The outline of Phaedrus 
(based on the outline of Hackforth and Rowe) 
The scene on the bank of the llissus 227 A-230E 
First part about "Love" 230E-257B 
Lysias' speech 230E-234C 
Criticism ofLysias' speech and Transition to Socrates' first speech 234C-237B 
Socrates' first speech 237B-241D 
A definition of love 23m-238C 
Conclusion 238C-241D 
Socrates' recantation of his speech and Transition to Socrates' second speech 241D-
243E 
Socrates' second speech 243E-257B 
Socrates' second speech begins Three types of divine madness 243C-245C 
"Experiences and actions" of divine and human souls The procession of souls 
and its fall and incarnation 245C-249D 
The blessings ofthe madness of love The soul's recollection of ideal beauty 
Love as the regrowing ofthe soul's wing 249D-257A 
The speech concluded A prayer to Love 257 A-B 
Second part about "Rhetoric" 257B-277 A 
Transition to a discussion about speaking and writing 25m-259D 
Preliminary consideration of speech writing 257B-259D 
Interlude- the myth ofthe cicadas 258E-259D 
Rhetoric as it should be, and as it is 259E-274B 
Rhetoric and knowledge 259E-261A 
Knowledge of resemblances and differences 261A-264E 
Dialectic method as exhibited in preceding speeches 264E-266B 
The technique of existing rhetoric 266C-269C 
The true method of rhetoric 269C-274B 
How useful is writing as a medium of communication and teaching? 274B-278B 
Messages to Lysias and !socrates A final prayer 278B-279C 
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